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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO  
A CUMULATIVE DISSERTATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transparency is one of the three core principles embedded into to the General 
Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR) of the European Union, requiring the use 
of any personal data to be carried out in a transparent manner in relation to the 
individual whose data is concerned. The transparency of, and the informed 
consent to, personal data processing and the purposes thereof have been regarded 
to be in the centre of the struggle to solve the conflict between individual privacy 
on the one hand, and commercial freedom on the other.2 However, the need for 
transparency in regard to personal data processing and the scope of the principle 
of transparency are not limited to commercial uses of personal data. The 
requirement of transparency in relation to the individual (i.e. the data subject) 
applies whenever data processing activities fall under the scope of the GDPR. 
In addition to data processing for commercial purposes, transparency 
regarding personal data usage is as crucial when it comes to the context of 
research as transparency is a vital component in ensuring public trust in, and 
thus support for, research.3 Transparency becomes particularly relevant when it 
comes to the research use of personal data regarded as distinctly sensitive and 
inherently identifying as genetic data.4 
                                                                                                 
1  Art. 5(1)(a), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation). OJ L119/1. 
2  J. Dickie (1999), p 55. 
3  T.P. van Staa et al. Big Health Data: The need to earn public trust. BMJ 2016; 354 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i3636 (Published 14 July 2016). 
4  Evidenced amongst many other sources in, e.g., the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data. UNESCO 2003. The declaration recognizes, “that human genetic data have a 
special status on account of their sensitive nature since they can be predictive of genetic pre-
dispositions concerning individuals and that the power of predictability can be stronger than 
assessed at the time of deriving the data; they may have a significant impact on the family, 
including offspring, extending over generations, and in some instances on the whole group; 
they may contain information the significance of which is not necessarily known at the time 
of the collection of biological samples; and they may have cultural significance for persons or 
groups”. 
The inherently identifying nature of genetic data has been recognized, inter alia, by the 
European Court of Human Rights, and can be argued based on the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union concerning fingerprints. See S. and Marper v. The United 
Kingdom, ECtHR [2008], Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008: 
1204JUD003056204; and Judgement of 17 October 2013, Schwarz v. Bochum, C‐291/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:670. See also K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads 
of human and data research. Bioethics, 33(3) (2019), 347–356,  
https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12475, 349. 
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1.1. The research problem 
Transparency in relation to the individual participating in research has histori-
cally been facilitated via the notion of informed consent, i.e. via the process of 
providing information to potential research subjects before obtaining their con-
sent to participation in a given research project. The requirement of informed 
consent for human subject research became a widely recognized part of research 
ethics with the adoption of the Nuremberg Code5 in 1947.6 Although informed 
consent is generally mainly seen as a vessel for enabling the exercise of autonomy-
related rights, its key component is the provision of information prior to 
obtaining consent. The information provided to the individual should make all 
relevant nuances of the research project transparent to the potential participant 
(i.e. most notably, what is the aim of the project, what is required of the parti-
cipant, and what are the potential risks and benefits involved).7 Transparency in 
regard to the intentions of the researcher is what enables the (potential) parti-
cipant to exercise autonomous decisions concerning participation in the research 
(e.g. whether to give, withhold, or withdraw consent).8  
The basic principles of prior informed consent in research have largely re-
mained the same as established in the Nuremberg Code, whilst transcending 
from ethics to the legal realm as well.9 A potential participant of research must 
be informed of the nature, risks and purposes of the research to be undertaken, 
and participation is conditional on voluntary consent.10 However, the historic 
understanding of informed consent in human subject research, and the nature of 
the information to be provided to a potential participant, is generally focused on 
the planned physical or psychological intervention to be carried out on the 
                                                                                                 
5  Full text available at https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf  
[Accessed 8 March 2018]. 
6  The Nuremberg Code “is generally seen as the first authoritative statement of consent 
requirements in biomedical ethics”. N.C. Manson, O. O’neill (2007), p 2. 
7  The role of informed consent in facilitating transparency has also been regarded from a 
broader perspective than transparency in relation to the research participant. For example, it 
has been suggested that in addition to informing participants, informed consents should be 
part of the documentation submitted to publicly available registries concerning clinical trials 
so that any interested parties, including the public, could review the original and any 
amendments thereafter. See Y. Yazici and H. Yazici. Informed consent: time for more trans-
parency. Arthritis Research & Therapy 12(3) (2010), 121.  
8  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, p 5, para 4. Available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=622227 [Accessed 3 May 
2019]. 
9  E.g. the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (‘Oviedo convention’). Oviedo, 4.IV.1997, ETS No. 164. 
10  Ibid., Art. 16 Oviedo convention. 
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research subject.11 Meanwhile, biomedical research has undergone a paradigm 
shift as “translational bioinformatics […] has become a key component of bio-
medical research in the era of precision medicine.”12 This, in turn, has created a 
reliance in research on the secondary use of biosamples and genetic data due to 
the high volumes of data needed.13 This paradigm shift can be described as one 
from human subject research to human data research; effectively eliminating the 
need for the direct involvement of individuals. 
In this shift from human subject research to human data research, transparency 
is challenged by increasing data processing and analysis capabilities as data can 
be easily replicated, transferred and used concurrently and repeatedly in multiple 
varying research projects anywhere in the world. In addition to general shifts in 
research stemming from developments in data analysis and transfer capabilities, 
the nature of genetic data in particular adds another level of complexity to the 
challenges regarding transparency in relation to individuals in the research 
context. 
With the myriad of possibilities in regard to future and secondary research 
uses of genetic data, the question of transparency in relation to the individual 
essentially becomes one regarding the informedness of the individual – i.e. 
whether the individual can be informed to the extent that the possible future and 
secondary research uses of their genetic data are genuinely transparent to the 
individual. As G. Laurie has put it, “how can meaningful informed consent be 
obtained to future, yet-to-be-determined research?”14 In addressing this dilemma, 
some have suggested anonymisation of data as an alternative to consent.15 This 
‛binary approach’ of consent or anonymise has been criticised16 – particularly in 
regard to genomic data as it “serves as a marker unique to the individual” and 
“cannot, therefore, be completely anonymised”17. Furthermore, anonymity is 
context specific18 and changes over time, depending on the availability of other 
data relating to the individual, but also depending on developments in techno-
logy and availability of such technology (i.e. the decrease in cost). If anonymity 
could be guaranteed, the data would be effectively detached from the individual 
                                                                                                 
11  This is evident from, e.g., the comments on Arts. 5 and 16 in the Explanatory Report to 
the Oviedo convention. Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medi-
cine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Oviedo, 4.IV.1997, ETS No. 164.  
12  J.D. Tenenbaum. Translational Bioinformatics: Past, Present, and Future. Genomics 
Proteomics Bioinformatics 14(1) (2016), pp 31–41. 
13  Ibid. 
14  G. Laurie (2002), p 292. 
15  I. Ellis, G. Mannion. Humanity versus Utility in the Ethics of Research on: ‘Human Ge-
netic Material’. Genetics Law 1(5) (2001), p 2. 
16  E.g. E.S. Dove, G. Laurie. Anonymising and sharing individual patient data. British 
Medical Journal 350:h1139 (2015).  
17  E.g. G. Laurie (2002), p 294. 
18  M. Taylor (2012), p 132. 
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and the question of transparency in relation to the individual would become 
obsolete. However, since anonymity cannot be guaranteed and, arguably, the 
concept of anonymous genetic data is an oxymoron, anonymity of genetic data 
cannot therefore be used as an argument for setting aside individual rights and 
interests, and the respective need for transparency in order to facilitate the 
exercise of such rights and interests. 
Whilst the notion of prior informed consent still remains relevant today in 
conventional research scenarios in which physical or psychological interven-
tions are carried out on human subjects, it does not play an equally significant 
role when it comes to human data research and the secondary uses of biosamples 
and genetic data retrieved therefrom. In cases where the requirement of informed 
consent does not apply in genetic research, the question of transparency becomes 
one of if and how transparency is facilitated in relation to data subjects if 
information is not provided as part of consent procedures. 
Based on the above, this dissertation aims to address three research problems 
regarding transparency in relation to data subjects in genetic research. The first 
research problem pertains to the question of the applicability of consent require-
ments in genetic research and the resulting impact on the potential of informed 
consent for facilitating transparency. Namely, the issue to be first addressed is 
“The lack of clarity regarding when researchers need, and do not need, to obtain 
consent to use genetic data for research purposes”.19 This is a matter that could 
have been addressed during the reform of the personal data protection frame-
work in the EU. However, the regulatory picture regarding the use of genetic 
data for research purposes remains fragmented and calls for clarification, par-
ticularly in regard to the requirement of consent and the legal possibilities of 
using genetic data in research without the consent of individuals. This research 
problem will be addressed from the perspective and on the example of Estonia. 
The second research problem to be addressed – in scenarios where consent 
requirements still apply – is how effective can informed consent be as a vessel 
for facilitating transparency in relation to data subjects. On the one hand, the 
potential of informed consent for facilitating transparency faces the above 
addressed problem of uncertainty regarding the potential future research uses of 
genetic data. On the other hand, as there are legal alternatives to informed con-
sent for using genetic data in research, the question is how such alternatives for 
data usage without consent impact the role of informed consent in facilitating 
transparency. 
The third research problem relates to existing alternatives to informed con-
sent in facilitating transparency in relation to data subjects. If informed consent 
of the individual is not required for the use of genetic data in research, the ques-
tion is whether any and which legal modalities apply to facilitate transparency 
in relation to the individual and how effective they are as currently designed. 
 
                                                                                                 
19  M. Taylor (2012), p 217. 
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1.2. Research objectives and questions 
The aim of this dissertation is to critically analyse transparency in relation to the 
data subject in the context of genetic research in the post-GDPR era on the 
example of Estonia. As such, the first objective of the dissertation is to analyse 
and outline the current regulatory framework to determine the role of (informed) 
consent in research making use of genetic data. The exploration of applicable 
consent requirements will be accompanied by an analysis of the possible legal 
bases for the use of biosamples and genetic data in research without consent. This 
will enable to draw conclusions on how transparency in relation to the individual 
is affected by the interaction between consent as a legal basis for using genetic 
data in research on the one hand, and alternative legal bases on the other. Since 
the research use of both biosamples and genetic data derived therefrom is a matter 
not comprehensively addressed in international or EU law, Estonian law will be 
used as an example to outline the contradictions of the current regulatory system 
in regard to the requirements of consent, alternative legal bases for using 
genetic data in research, and their combined impact on transparency in relation 
to the individual. Whilst some have expressed concern that the GDPR might 
constitute an impediment to research and the re-use of data,20 this dissertation 
will exemplify the opposite on the example of Estonia. 
However, the problems regarding transparency in genetic research are not 
solved by and go beyond the notion of informed consent. Transparency becomes 
a challenge regardless of whether the use of genetic data in research is based on 
consent, or legal bases arising from national or other EU law. Thus the second 
objective of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the current normative frame-
work as a whole in terms of transparency in relation to the individual by exploring 
alternative legal modalities for facilitating transparency in genetic research.  
The described objectives of this dissertation are limited to the fundamental 
problems relating to transparency in relation to the individual in the context of 
genetic research. Although many of the issues raised and addressed in this disser-
tation can be applied mutatis mutandis to the research use of other types of 
personal data, the key differences are the inherently identifying nature of genetic 
data, and its vast informative and research potential.  
This dissertation will not address the exercise of autonomy and other indi-
vidual rights. In this dissertation, transparency is understood to be an essential 
prerequisite for the exercise of individual rights. There is little meaning to 
addressing individual rights in a regulatory context where the lack of trans-
parency and informedness might effectively strip the individual of the basic 
knowledge in regard to the use of their biosamples and genetic data in the first 
place. Without knowledge on the part of the individual regarding the use of 
their biosamples and data, the invocation of individual rights becomes a mere 
                                                                                                 
20  J. Krutzinna and L. Floridi (2019). Ethical Medical Data Donation: A Pressing Issue. In 
J. Krutzinna and L. Floridi (Eds.). The Ethics of Medical Data Donation (pp. 1–6). Springer 
Open, p 2. 
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theoretical exercise. Thus it is not the objective of this dissertation to address 
individual rights in research, but to focus on transparency as a fundamental re-
quirement, which serves as an essential prerequisite for any potential exercise of 
such rights. 
The scope of analysis and discussion in this dissertation in regard to trans-
parency in relation to the individual will be limited to the individual, i.e. issues 
related to genetic data being ‘data in common’21 shared in part by blood relatives 
will not be discussed. 
To achieve the research objectives laid out above, the main research questions 
to be addressed will be: 
1. What are the legal modalities under the GDPR for facilitating transparency 
in relation to data subjects that apply in the research context? 
2. How effective is informed consent in facilitating transparency in relation to 
the data subject in genetic research and what are its limits as a modality for 
transparency? 
3. How does the correlation between informed consent and alternative legal 
bases for the use of genetic data in research impact transparency in relation 
to the data subject? 
4. To what extent is the general obligation to inform applied in the research 
context and how does it impact transparency in relation to data subjects in 
genetic research? 
5. What, if any, normative changes are necessary to effectively facilitate trans-
parency in relation to the data subject in the context of genetic research? 
 
 
1.3. Current status of research in the area 
Regulatory approaches to genetic data, both in the general and in the research 
context, have been the subject of academic discourse for decades, with consent 
to biomedical research being one of the focal points of discussion.22 The most 
extensive works in terms of genetic data and genetic privacy specifically 
include G. Laurie (2002)23 and M. Taylor (2012)24.  
Laurie’s work entails a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the 
concept of privacy in the health care setting25, encompassing both informational 
and spatial privacy26, with particular reference to genetic information. Laurie 
                                                                                                 
21  M. Taylor (2012), pp 103 ff. 
22  E.g., N.C. Manson, O. O’neill. Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. Cambridge 
University Press 2007; T. Murphy (ed.). New Technologies and Human Rights. Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2009; J. Candlish. Genetics, Molecular Biology and the Law. Wildy, Simmonds 
& Hill Publishing 2010; D. Price. Human Biosamples in Transplantation and Research. 
Cambridge University Press 2010. 
23  G. Laurie (2002). 
24  M. Taylor (2012). 
25  G. Laurie (2002), p 11. 
26  Ibid., p 64. 
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criticises consent as a means of protecting privacy and ensuring autonomy. One 
of the criticisms towards consent that Laurie puts forth is the fact that “there is 
no residual power once consent has been given unless further consent is required 
at some future point.”27 As such, according to Laurie, the power afforded by 
consent is somewhat illusory, as “the individual retains no continued relation-
ship with the sample in either a factual or legal sense once consent has been 
obtained and the sample surrendered.”28 Laurie proposes to approach the issue 
of control regarding the use of genetic material through a ‛property paradigm’,29 
not as an alternative, but rather a supplement to the consent and other privacy 
models.30 At the same time, Laurie admits that this approach is more difficult 
when it comes to the data derived from the samples.31 Essentially, Laurie’s 
proposal aims to provide individuals with bargaining power in regard to the use 
of their biospecimen through property rights. It does not entail (future) access to 
and (secondary) use of the data derived from the biosamples per se. 
This dissertation addresses particularly the transparency of the use of genetic 
data in the research context through the lens of data protection. The arguments 
put forth by Laurie challenging the practical feasibility of prior informed consent 
in terms of failing to preserve a connection between the individual and their 
biosample can be mutatis mutandis applied here in terms of genetic data. Whereas 
regarding biosamples, transparency concerning the research use of genetic data 
through the data protection framework would concurrently affect biospecimen as 
well to the relevant extent, since although the physical sample itself is not data, 
it can be argued that from the moment that genetic data is retrieved from the 
sample, data protection rules come into play.32 As such, the propositions made 
in this dissertation complement, and by no means challenge or substitute the 
property rights approach proposed by Laurie in regard to biosamples. 
In his work, Laurie recognises an opt-out scheme in regard to research with 
genetic data as an “ethically justifiable public good” 33 , and notes that the 
possibility to opt out ensures respect for individual autonomy34. Although this 
                                                                                                 
27  Ibid., p 312. 
28  Ibid., p 312. 
29  Ibid., p 315 ff. 
30  Ibid., p 328. 
31  Ibid., p 326. 
32  Although it can also be argued that data protection rules apply to the biosamples as they 
contain DNA. D. Hallinan and P. De Hert argue that stating otherwise would be equal to 
suggesting “that handling a USB stick containing personal data was not subject to data pro-
tection law.” See D. Hallinan and P. De Hert. Many Have It Wrong – Samples Do Contain 
Personal Data: The Data Protection Regulation as a Superior Framework to Protect Donor 
Interests in Biobanking and Genomic Research. In B. D. Mittelstadt and L. Floridi (Eds.). 
The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (pp 119–138). Springer International Publishing Switzer-
land 2016. 
33  G. Laurie (2002), p 291. 
34  Ibid., p 288. 
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dissertation does not address autonomy rights in the context of genetic research, 
Laurie’s work supports the underlying argument of this dissertation that providing 
individuals with the necessary knowledge regarding the use of their genetic data 
in research could mitigate the shortcomings of the current framework in which 
consent is either illusory (as noted by Laurie) when it is required, or has been 
forsaken entirely. Thus a common feature between the current work and the 
contribution of Laurie is that both are concerned with mechanisms to offer indi-
viduals whose biosamples or genetic data are being used in research a con-
tinuing connection with the samples or data derived from them. 
M. Taylor (2012) has published a more recent comprehensive work on genetic 
privacy. Taylor analyses privacy protections specifically in the context of genetic 
research. He emphasises the need for clarity in regard to the application of 
consent requirements in terms of using genetic data in research, and, further-
more, has stressed the importance of this being co-ordinated consistently in 
Europe.35 Taylor also points out the need to recognise biological samples in 
certain circumstances as personal data, thus suggesting a more logical and har-
monised approach to genetic data and the biosamples carrying the said data.36 In 
this regard, the approach in the hereby dissertation relies on the argument that 
the recognition of biospecimen as data is not necessary if genetic data in the 
meaning of DNA sequencing data is recognized as personal data regardless of 
additional identifiers or information, in which case the retrieval of genetic data 
from biosamples would trigger the application of the personal data protection 
framework – thereby alleviating the need to recognise biospecimen as data.  
Though Taylor calls for a shift in the regulatory environment regarding the 
use of genetic data and biosamples in the research context, his work predates 
the GDPR, whereas this dissertation will analyse and lay out applicable consent 
requirements in genetic research in the current post-GDPR regulatory context 
on the Estonian example as a reference to relevant national rules. Whilst Taylor 
also calls for improvements in research infrastructure that could benefit both 
data subjects and researchers, his work does not entail specific suggestions in 
this regard.37 Taylor does, however, underline a critique in regard to information 
disclosure to data subjects, which is central to this dissertation as well. Namely, 
Taylor points out in regard to Directive 95/46/EC38 that, “the responsibility to 
provide information to a data subject on the purposes of processing, at least as 
required by the Directive, is not expressly an ongoing responsibility.”39 The same 
argument will be tested in this dissertation in terms of the GDPR and trans-
parency in research in relation to data subjects. Another important remark made 
                                                                                                 
35  M. Taylor (2012), p 217. 
36  Ibid., p 218–19. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data. 23.11.1995 OJ L281. 
39  M. Taylor (2012), p 207. 
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by Taylor in regard to the notification of data subjects is the omission of the 
process of anonymisation of data from the concept of processing. Taylor deems 
this omission unjustifiable, and argues that this undermines the expectations of 
individuals in regard to the future uses of their data; especially in light of 
Taylor’s argumentation regarding identifiability being context specific.40 This 
dissertation will suggest the recognition of human DNA sequencing data as 
personal data regardless of additional identifiers or information, thus nullifying 
the anonymisation argument. 
Concerning transparency in human data research, and the ongoing disclosure 
of information to data subjects, an earlier work of M. Taylor (2011)41 is of par-
ticular relevance to this dissertation. In his article of 2011, Taylor specifically 
addresses the use of health data without consent, arguing that in the absence of 
consent an ongoing obligation to inform individuals of the research uses of their 
data would be needed to facilitate transparency on at least the minimal level. 
Taylor puts forth the same arguments in terms of ongoing informedness and 
anonymisation (as ‘processing’ within the meaning of the data protection frame-
work) as referred to above. Taylor argues that, minimally, transparency “requires 
that people know when their expectations vis-a-vis their data are not met.” As 
such, the core argument of this dissertation in regard to transparency of genetic 
data processing in the research context aligns with that made by Taylor in 2011. 
However, Taylor tackles the described issues from the UK perspective, taking 
into account Directive 95/46/EC, and in terms of health data of the National 
Health Service specifically. 
In his doctoral thesis of 2018, D. Hallinan addresses the role of the GDPR in 
protecting genetic privacy in the context of biobanking.42 In doing so, Hallinan 
also touches upon issues related to transparency, analysing whether the provisions 
of the GDPR are “technically unsuited for the broad analytical potential of 
genomic data”, and “for the future uncertain analytical potential of genomic 
data”, whereas arguing that the GDPR’s “self-determination provisions rely on 
the effective function of transparency provisions”.43 The latter point regarding 
the relationship between transparency and individual rights under the GDPR 
forms an underlying argument put forth in this dissertation in regard to the 
essential importance of transparency. Namely, as Hallinan puts it, “[transparency] 
is a prerequisite for the effective function of other aspects of protection – for 
example self-determination provisions such as consent.” 44  Like M. Taylor, 
Hallinan as well points out that the provision of information to data subjects 
                                                                                                 
40  Ibid., pp 213–216. 
41  M. Taylor. Health research, data protection, and the public interest in notification. Medical 
Law Review 19(2) (2011), pp 267–303. 
42  D. Hallinan. “Feeding Biobanks With Genetic Data: What role can the General Data 
Protection Regulation play in the protection of genetic privacy in research biobanking in the 
European Union?” (doctoral thesis) Vrije Unversiteit Brussel 2018. 
43  Ibid., pp 376–380 and 426–431. 
44  D. Hallinan (2018), p 427. 
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under the transparency clauses in the GDPR is a one-off communication.45 
However, unlike Hallinan’s work, which analyses the impact of the GDPR on 
biobanks in general, this dissertation aims to address specifically transparency 
in relation to the data subject, and to do so based on the Estonian example as a 
reference to national law to offer a comprehensive analysis on the matter. 
Although Hallinan briefly refers to Estonian law as an example as well, he does 
so only in a context in which a biosample is obtained directly from an 
individual, and in regard to specifically the Estonian Biobank46.47 
In earlier works, D. Hallinan et al. (2013)48 have discussed the regulation of 
genetic data under the then draft version of the GDPR more generally (i.e. not 
limited to particularly research, although including certain aspects of it), but 
their work precedes the final version of the GDPR, which makes a significant 
difference when it comes to the use of genetic data in research specifically (i.e. 
their earlier work contains references to clauses in the draft, which were omitted 
from the final version; e.g. reference to Articles 81 and 83, which, in the draft 
version, specifically concerned research regulations of health and other 
sensitive data) 49. Furthermore, the referred work presents a broader approach of 
genetic data under the GDPR in general without specific focus on research (e.g. 
the issue of multiple data subject, anonymity, etc.).  
A number of scholars have addressed the implications of the GDPR on 
scientific research in general.50 For example, M. Shabani and P. Borry (2018)51 
                                                                                                 
45  Ibid., p 376. 
46  The Estonian Biobank is a population-based biobank, currently operating as part of the 
Estonian Genome Center at the University of Tartu, containing samples and genetic data of 
more than a hundred fifty thousand Estonians. See the official website of the Estonian Bio-
bank, available at https://www.geenivaramu.ee/en/about-us [Accessed 12 April 2019]. 
47  Hallinan refers to certain paragraphs in the Estonian Penal Code arguing that there is a 
“general prohibition on scientific research without research subject consent.” However, the 
relevant paragraphs in the Penal Code concern human subject research and obtaining bio-
samples from the individual directly. They do not concern secondary research uses of bio-
samples or human data research in which there are no human subjects. See D. Hallinan 
(2018), p 193. 
48  D. Hallinan et al. Genetic Data and the Data Protection Regulation: Anonymity, multiple 
subjects, sensitivity and a prohibitionary logic regarding genetic data? Computer Law & 
Security Review 29 (2013), pp 317–320. 
49  Ibid., p 325. 
50  E.g., G. Chassang. The impact of the EU general data protection regulation on scientific 
resesarch. Ecancermedicalscience 11:709 (2017); or J.M.M. Rumbold, B. Pierscionek. The 
effect of the General Data Protection Regulation on Medical Research. Journal of Medical 
Internet Research 19(2):e47 (2017); also N. Bertels. Scientific research under the GDPR: what 
will change? KU Leuven Centre for IT & IP Law 01.06.2016; available at  
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/scientific-research-under-gdpr-what-will-change/ 
[Accessed 12 March 2018]. 
51  M. Shabani, P. Borry. Rules for processing genetic data for research purposes in view of 
the new EU General Data Protection Regulation. European Journal of Human Genetics 26 
(2018), pp 149–156. 
 18 
have analysed the rules for using genetic data under the GDPR, however, their 
work is more focused on issues of pseudonymisation, and the consent or 
anonymise approach. Furthermore, the author’s analysis of genetic research 
under the GDPR52 predates the relevant work of Shabani and Borry. More 
importantly, this dissertation aims to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
research use of genetic data in the post-GDPR era, taking into account other 
applicable law as well (e.g. national law, other applicable EU law, and the legal 
rules applicable to biospecimen). 
The particular challenges of health data research in a research environment 
increasingly reliant on big data analytics have more recently been addressed by 
E. Vayena and A. Blasimme (2018)53. In their article, Vayena and Blasimme 
propose “the implementation of a systemic oversight approach tailored to the 
features of the health data ecosystem.” Though they support “more granual con-
sent models” (i.e. essentially more specific), they recognize that general tenden-
cies are leaning to the contrary (i.e. broad consent), and they further argue that it 
is not consent models that can bring along a more detailed oversight, but rather 
changes in the systematic approach to data oversight. In this regard, the under-
lying approach of this dissertation aligns with the arguments put forth by 
Vayena and Blasimme in terms of the limits of the concept of prior informed 
consent in regard to safeguarding the interests of individuals in terms of the use 
of their health (incl. genetic) data in research. This dissertation will address the 
same underlying concerns in regard to the possible implications of the short-
comings of the current system as laid out by Vayena and Blasimme: 
“The combination of weakened consent and insufficient research oversight is 
potentially detrimental to health research in an evolving health data ecosystem. 
This state of affairs can result in direct harms to individuals and groups, and 
also risks damaging public trust in scientific research.”54  
The research undertaken for this dissertation serves the purpose of compli-
menting the existing literature in regard to regulations concerning the research 
use of genetic data. 
 
 
1.4. Methods and resources 
The objectives of this dissertation have been pursued through a qualitative 
systematic analysis of the relevant laws and associated documentation such as 
prior drafts, explanatory reports, etc. The principal research methods employed 
were analytical and teleological methods. 
                                                                                                 
52  K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? 
International Data Privacy Law 7(2) (2017), pp 137–146. 
53  E. Vayena and A. Blassime. Health Research with Big Data: Time for Systemic Over-
sight. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 46(1) (2018), pp 119–129. 
54  Ibid., p 123. 
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A systematic analysis of relevant legal acts was conducted in order to outline 
a possible supranational legal framework (or the lack thereof) for the use of 
genetic data in research in the European legal sphere55. The following legal 
instruments were determined to be of main importance to this dissertation: 
Directive 95/46/EC (until 25 May 2018); the GDPR (as of 25 May 2018); 
Regulation 536/2014 on clinical trials56 (presumably as of 2020)57; the Oviedo 
convention 58 ; and respective national laws implementing the discretionary 
clauses of the GDPR (of which Estonian law is referred to in this dissertation).  
Though matters concerning health and health-related data, including cellular 
samples and DNA, are also covered by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)59 (most notably, by Art. 8 ECHR concerning the right to private 
life)60, the ECHR does not contain any specific rules regarding research and there 
is currently no relevant case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Furthermore, presumably the ECHR would apply a case-by-case 
approach rather than determine the existence of any specific and uniformly 
applicable rules under Article 8 ECHR in regard to the research use of genetic 
                                                                                                 
55  The European legal sphere within the meaning of this dissertation is to be understood as 
encompassing both the EU and the members of the Council of Europe. 
56  Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 
2001/20/EC. OJ L158/1. 
57  The entry into application of Regulation 536/2014 depends on the development of the 
EU portal and EU database for clinical trials (See Art. 80–82 and 99 of Regulation 536/2014). 
According to the European Commission, Regulation 536/2014 is currently estimated to 
come into application in 2020 (instead of 2018, as initially estimated). See the official 
website of the European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/clinical-
trials/regulation_en [Accessed 22 April 2019]. 
58  Supra n 9. The Oviedo convention has been ratified by the following countries: Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey. For the chart of 
signatures and ratifications see official website of the Council of Europe at  
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164/signatures 
[Accessed 14 March 2018].  
Although it is important to emphasize that the ECtHR has referred to the Oviedo convention 
even in the absence of signature or ratification. See, e.g., Glass v. The United Kingdom, 
ECtHR [2004], Application no. 61827/00, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:0309JUD006182700. 
59  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Rome, 
4.XI.1950. ETS No. 005. 
60  For an overview regarding the case law of the ECtHR in matters regarding bioethics, See 
Research Report: Bioethics and the case-law of the Court. Council of Europe/European 
Court of Human Rights, 2016. Available at  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_bioethics_ENG.pdf [Accessed 2 May 
2018]. 
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data.61 In addition, the ECtHR has given substance to Article 8 of the ECHR via 
reference to the Oviedo convention independent of whether the state party to the 
dispute has signed or ratified the Oviedo convention. For example, in Glass v. 
the United Kingdom62 , in assessing the UK’s compliance with Article 8(2) 
ECHR, the ECtHR noted that it considered the UK’s system consistent with the 
Oviedo convention. As F. Seatzu (2015) has put it, the Oviedo convention is a 
sort of tool used in the interpretation of the ECHR, and “the Oviedo Convention 
might be used interpretatively to specify and expand the scope of the provisions 
of ECHR, consistently with the unwritten rule that reference should be made to 
the source that provides the higher standards of protection of human health.”63 
In this light, analysis concerning the ECHR is only briefly included in this 
dissertation due to the lack of specific rules regulating research or relevant case 
law, and due to the references to and reliance on the Oviedo convention in the 
case law of the ECtHR regardless of signature or ratification by the state party 
to the dispute. 
For the purposes of establishing a systematic overview of supranational 
consent requirements (or lack thereof) in the context of genetic research, and 
taking into account that the latter might entail procurement of biosamples, but 
might also rely on already available biospecimen and genetic data, a systematic 
analysis of the GDPR, Regulation 536/2014 and the Oviedo convention was 
undertaken. 
In regard to national law, in one prior publication reference was made to 
German data protection law as an example instead of Estonian law.64 This is due 
to the fact that the new Estonian Personal Data Protection Act was not adopted 
until December 2018, and only came into force 15 January 2019.65 Hence, the 
German Act to Adapt Data Protection Law 66  was referred to in order to 
illustrate possible approaches under national law (the German law was adopted 
already in June 2017, whereas the first draft version of the respective Estonian 
                                                                                                 
61  See M. Taylor (2012), p 73. 
62  Supra n 58. 
63  F. Seatzu. The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Utrecht Journal of International and Euro-
pean Law 31(810 (2015), pp 5–16. 
64  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Bioethics, 33(3) (2019), 347–356, https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12475. 
65  Estonian Personal Data Protection Act, RT I, 04.01.2019, 11. Available in English at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523012019001/consolide [Accessed 12 April 2019]. 
66  German Act to Adapt Data Protection Law to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and to Imple-
ment Directive (EU) 2016/680 (DSAnpUG-EU) of 30 June 2017. Available at  
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/gesetztestexte/datenschutzanpassungs
umsetzungsgesetz.html;jsessionid=309B1C7C94FA075EDF5837DFA525EAAE.1_cid295 
[Accessed 14 March 2018]. 
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law was not published until November 201767). The analytical compendium will 
use the Estonian Data Protection Act of 2019 to provide an example of how the 
interaction between the GDPR and national data protection law – most import-
antly the dynamics between the research use of genetic data based on consent 
on the one hand, and without consent on the other – impact transparency in rela-
tion to the data subject.  
The above-referred analysis in regard to applicable consent requirements in 
genetic research and the use of genetic data in research without consent is de-
veloped in five prior publications of the author: 
Article I ‛Informed consent to sensitive personal data processing for the 
performance of digital consumer contracts on the example of “23andMe”’ 68 
examines the processing of genetic data in the context of contractual relation-
ships and analyses the intersection of data protection and contract law in this 
context. In terms of the use of genetic data in research, Article I opens up a 
specific dimension of genetic research left largely unnoticed by current regulatory 
frameworks. Namely, the fact that commercial genetic testing entities are 
accumulating vast collections of genetic data, and that genetic research is no 
longer in the exclusive realm of traditional research facilities. The fact that, 
once obtained (even if for commercial purposes), further research use of genetic 
data (by commercial entities) might not require additional consent, further 
emphasizes the need for transparency in relation to data subjects. 
Article II ‛The GDPR and Big Data: Leading the Way for Big Genetic 
Data?’69 discusses the processing of genetic data under the GDPR from the 
perspective of big data, i.e. the fact that for purposes of research, genetic data is 
generally processed in high volumes, involving the data of a large number of 
data subjects. Article II analyses how this fact impacts rights and obligations 
under the GDPR. Most importantly, Article II contains an analysis of Article 
14(5)(b) GDPR (which creates exceptions to the obligation to inform in regard 
to processing for, inter alia, research purposes) and discusses the impact of 
Article 11 GDPR in the context of genetic research. The interplay between 
Articles 14(5)(b) and 11 GDPR, and their combined impact on transparency in 
relation to data subjects, will be further elaborated upon in the analytical 
compendium. 
                                                                                                 
67  The draft law of the new Estonian Personal Data Protection Act was published on 6 
November 2017. Available only in Estonian at 
http://www.aki.ee/sites/www.aki.ee/files/elfinder/article_files/iks_en_9.11.17.pdf [Accessed 
14 March 2018]. 
68  K. Pormeister. Informed consent to sensitive personal data processing for the per-
formance of digital consumer contracts on the example of “23andMe”. Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law 6(1) (2017), pp 17–23. 
69  K. Pormeister. The GDPR and Big Data: Leading the Way for Big Genetic Data? In 
E. Schweighofer et al. (Eds.) Privacy Technologies and Policy. Springer 2017 (Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science), pp 3–18. 
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Article III ‛Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too 
far?’70 establishes part of the core analysis regarding the research use of genetic 
data under the GDPR by outlining how genetic research is (and is not) regulated 
by the GDPR, and to which extent the matter is left to be regulated by Member 
State or other EU law. This publication will be relied upon in the analytical 
compendium in the analysis concerning applicable consent frameworks. 
Article IV ‛Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and 
data research’71 presents an analysis of consent requirements in terms of genetic 
research, taking into consideration the fact that genetic research might, and might 
not, entail procurement of biosamples, and how this might influence applicable 
consent requirements. Furthermore, Article IV outlines the parallel rules applying 
to biospecimen on the one hand, and genetic data derived therefrom on the other. 
The analytical compendium will refer to and elaborate upon these findings. 
Article V ‛Regulatory environment for biobanking in Estonia’72 addresses 
both the specific national law concerning the Estonian Biobank, and general regu-
latory frameworks concerning the use of biospecimen and data derived there-
from in research (stemming in most part from data protection law). Most 
importantly, Article VI contains a comprehensive analysis of the rules for using 
personal (incl. genetic) data in research without consent under the 2019 Estonian 
Personal Data Protection Act. The analysis provided in Article V concerning 
Estonian data protection law will be relied upon in the analytical compendium. 
The analysis regarding the impact of applicable consent frameworks on 
transparency in relation to data subjects, and the discussion concerning alternative 
modalities for facilitating transparency (and their efficacy in doing so), will be 
developed in this analytical compendium. 
The choice to utilize Estonian law as an example is based first on the prac-
ticality of the author’s familiarity and in-depth knowledge of this particular 
jurisdiction. The second reason for this choice is the fact that the health informa-
tion of the whole population is available in electronic state databases, and can 
be accessed fur purposes of research. Furthermore, part of the strategical vision 
of the Estonian e-Health system is to eventually include genetic data into 
electronic health records.73 Thus Estonia provides for a unique setting in which 
                                                                                                 
70  K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? 
Supra n 52. 
71  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64. 
72  K. Pormeister. Regulatory environment for biobanking in Estonia. In: Slokenberga, S. et 
al. (Eds.). Individual rights, public interest and biobank research. Article 89 GDPR and 
European legal responses. Springer 2019/2020 (to be published). 
73  E-Health vision 2025. E-Health strategic development plan 2020. (E-tervise visioon 
2025. E-tervise strateegiline arengukava 2020). Estonian Health Strategy 2020. Government 
Office, 29–31. Available in Estonian. https://www.sm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/ 
eesmargid_ja_tegevused/Eesti_e_tervise_strateegia/e-tervise_strateegia_2020.pdf. Accessed 
28 March 2018. 
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the regulatory framework must be approached and understood from the per-
spective that potentially the health and genetic data of the whole population will 
be readily available for secondary use in research. 
The methods of using the Estonian example are two-fold. In the first part of 
the analytical compendium, Estonian national law will be used as an example to 
comprehensively outline the main aspects of consent requirements applicable to 
genetic research, and how this impacts transparency. In the second part of the 
compendium, the Estonian e-Health system will be used as a practical example 
of demonstrating shortcomings regarding, and potential for, transparency in 
relation to data subjects within the current system. 
 
 
1.5. Definitions 
Before the commencement of the substantive discussion of the analytical com-
pendium, some key definitions must be addressed first in order to clarify the 
meanings attached to them in this dissertation. 
Genetic data. For the purposes of this dissertation, the term ‛genetic data’ is 
to be understood as human DNA sequencing data (incl., but not limited to, whole-
genome sequencing data). This is due to two reasons. First, DNA sequencing 
data cannot be fully anonymised, as it is unique to the individual and constant, 
thus carrying particular privacy implications.74 As the ECtHR has observed, 
“[DNA] profiles contain substantial amounts of unique personal data.”75 The 
ECtHR’s conclusions on the privacy implications associated with the retention 
of genetic data are “not affected by the fact that, since the information is in 
coded form, it is intelligible only with the use of computer technology and 
capable of being interpreted only by a limited number of persons.”76 
Second, it is the essentially boundless informational potential77 that sets this 
particular type of sensitive data apart from possible broader interpretations of 
the term ‘genetic data’, and from other types of sensitive data (e.g. other 
categories of health-related data). Thus resulting in equally boundless potential 
for its various uses in (future) research. 
                                                                                                 
74  G. Laurie (2002), pp 109, 115. 
75  S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR [2008], Applications nos. 30562/04 and 
30566/04, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:1204JUD003056204, § 75. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Or interpretive potential as Taylor puts it, to indicate that it is possible to recognise future 
potential to interpret certain data before such interpretation is even possible. See M. Taylor 
(2012), p 41. In the context of genetic data, it refers to the fact that the data itself that is 
available today (e.g. one’s DNA sequence, or a biosamples from which the DNA sequence 
can be derived) can yield information, the quality and quantity of which is relative to 
technological and scientific advancements. In other words, the ability to interpret genetic 
data, and thus the meaning of the data can (and, in fact, will) change over time. 
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Some of the arguments made in this dissertation can mutatis mutandis be 
applied to the research use of other (special) categories of personal data as well, 
however, due to the heightened potential privacy implications of particularly 
human DNA sequencing data, this dissertation focuses specifically on genetic 
data. 
Genetic research. In accordance with the definition assigned to ‘genetic data’, 
‘genetic research’ within the meaning of this dissertation shall be understood as 
research making use of human DNA sequencing data. Generally, genetic research 
could be defined much more broadly, e.g. including research making use of 
family medical history in order to determine inheritable patterns.78 However, the 
focal interest of this dissertation lies on human DNA sequencing data because 
of the ongoing possibility of re-identification, and due to the privacy implica-
tions associated particularly with the informative potential of this type of data. 
Furthermore, as noted, human DNA sequencing data provides for essentially 
boundless research possibilities in the search for “correlations within extensive 
multi-parametric datasets”. 79  In order to find possible correlations between 
DNA and other factors, this type of research will in most cases require additional 
personal data to be processed (most importantly health and medical data, but also 
other types of personal data). This is not to assert that some arguments made in 
this dissertation could not be applied vis-à-vis other types of research as well. 
As defined in this dissertation ‘genetic research’ might – but need not – 
entail the procurement of biospecimen and genetic data. It shall cover both 
scenarios in which individuals are directly involved in order to procure bio-
samples, and those in which the biosamples and/or genetic data derived there-
from have already been obtained and stored. The necessary biospecimen and 
data might already be available from previous research projects. They might 
also have been accumulated into clinical or health databases, or commercial 
databases, which have obtained the data for respectively purposes of clinical 
care, or provision of commercial services (e.g. direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing). 
The notion of ‘scientific research’ in general, as emphasized in Recital 159 
GDPR, should be interpreted in a broad manner, and not defined through an 
institutional prism. Research within the meaning of this dissertation should be 
understood as it is under the GDPR, i.e. as not being confined to traditional 
research settings or institutions, but defined through the activity itself as being 
“a research project set up in accordance with relevant sector-related methodo-
                                                                                                 
78  Regarding the importance of family history in genetics, see, e.g., Understanding 
Genetics: A New York, Mid-Atlantic Guide for Patients and Health Professionals. Genetic 
Alliance; The New York-Mid-Atlantic Consortium for Genetic and Newborn Screening 
Services 2009. Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK115563/ [Accessed 2 
May 2018]. 
79  E. Vayena and A. Blassime. Health Research with Big Data: Time for Systemic Over-
sight. Supra n 53, p 121. 
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logical and ethical standards, in conformity with good practice.”80 This may also 
include privately funded research and research carried out by private companies 
with commercial interests. 
Secondary use of genetic data. ‛Secondary use’ is understood as referring to 
the use of biosamples or genetic data for purposes other than which they were 
initially collected for.81 In a research context this might, on the one hand, refer 
to the use of biosamples and/or data that was initially collected for a different 
research purpose. On the other hand, the term ‛secondary use’ might also refer 
to a scenario in which the biosample and/or data was originally collected in an 
entirely different context and for a purpose other than research, i.e. for purposes 
of clinical care or commercial genetic testing services. 
Data controller and third party controller. In terms of transparency and 
the data controller’s obligation to provide information, it is important to clarify 
the concepts of ‘data controller’ and ‘third party (data) controller’. The GDPR 
defines ‘data controller’ in Article 4(7) as the party that “determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data”. Whereas according to Article 
4(8) GDPR ‘processor’ refers to the party that “processes personal data on behalf 
of the controller”. 
The GDPR defines ‘third party’ in Article 4(10) as “a natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or body other than the data subject, controller, processor 
and persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or processor, are 
authorised to process personal data”. However, this is not to be confused with 
‘third party (data) controller’. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
(WP29) have, in their guidelines regarding transparency under the GDPR, 
referred to ‘third party data controllers’ in a scenario where data is obtained not 
from the data subjects directly, but from another data controller (who might 
have obtained said data from the data subject, but also, in turn, from another 
data controller).82 ‘Third party controller’ could vice versa be used to refer not 
to the controller from whom the data was obtained, but to the controller who 
obtains the data for further processing (i.e. rendering the receiving party a new 
controller, rather than just a ‘recipient’ within the meaning of Art. 4(9) GDPR). 
To exemplify the above, when a researcher acquires health data from research 
participants directly, the researcher is the data controller as he determines the 
                                                                                                 
80  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679. Adopted 
on 28 November 2017. As last revised and adopted on 10 April 2018. Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, 17/EN WP 259 rev.01, p 28. Available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=623051  
[Accessed 3 May 2019]. 
81  See, e.g., International Review of Secondary Use of Personal Health Information. Health 
Information and Quality Authority (Ireland), January 2012. Available at  
https://www.hiqa.ie/system/files/Review-Secondary-Use-Health-Info.pdf  
[Accessed 19 March 2018]. 
82  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 15, para 26. 
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purpose and means of processing. If the researcher then shares the data with 
another researcher, the latter could become a data controller in terms of the 
same (duplicated) data depending on the terms on which the data is transferred 
to him (i.e. whether the receiving researcher can conduct further research with 
the data on his own terms). If the second researcher is free to use this data in his 
research at his own discretion, i.e. to determine the (research) purposes and means 
of processing, then the second researcher could be referred to as a third party 
controller. 
In this dissertation, the phrase ‘third party controller’ will be used in this 
simplistic manner as referring to the exchange of personal data between two 
parties who both can be deemed data controllers within the meaning of the 
GDPR, with the receiving party becoming the third party controller. 
 
 
1.6. Structure of the analytical compendium 
The analytical compendium is structured into three substantive chapters. 
Chapter II will analyse the meaning and role of research transparency under the 
personal data protection framework, and analyse existing legal modalities under 
the GDPR for facilitating transparency in relation to data subjects. These legal 
modalities will then be subject to in-depth analysis in Chapters III and IV. 
Chapter III will explore the role of informed consent and its impact on trans-
parency in genetic research, using Estonia as a reference to national law. 
Chapter IV will analyse the general obligation to inform under the GDPR as a 
modality of transparency in genetic research. Chapter V will follow with con-
clusions and normative propositions. 
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II. TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE PERSONAL  
DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
Under the GDPR, transparency in relation to data subjects is one of the three 
core principles of data protection alongside lawfulness and fairness.83 Trans-
parency has been regarded as a new obligation arising from the GPDR,84 given 
that, unlike the GDPR, Directive 95/46/EC did not include transparency as a core 
principle of processing, and only indicated to it in a single recital.85 Trans-
parency within the meaning of the GDPR is seen by the WP29 as an over-
arching obligation concerning three central areas: provision of information to 
data subjects; how data controllers communicate with individuals regarding their 
rights under the GDPR; how controllers facilitate the exercise of the referred 
rights.86 This dissertation is concerned with the first of the three areas of trans-
parency distinguished by the WP29 – provision of information to data subjects – 
as it serves as a prerequisite for the latter two dimensions of transparency under 
the GDPR. 
This chapter will first explore the meaning and role of transparency in 
research from the perspective of the personal data protection framework (2.1.). 
This will be followed by a compendious analysis of the existing legal modalities 
for facilitating transparency under the GDPR (2.2.). 
 
 
2.1. Transparency as a procedural prerequisite  
for substantive values 
In data protection law, the principle of transparency is established in relation to 
the data subject87 and is thus approached from the perspective of individuals 
whose personal data is being processed.88  The WP29 have referred to trans-
parency within the meaning of the GDPR as being “user-centric rather than 
legalistic”.89 
Transparency in research, however, has historically carried a different 
meaning – one focused on the internal workings of the research community, rather 
                                                                                                 
83  Art. 5(1)(a) GDPR, supra n 1. 
84  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 4, para 1. 
85  Art. 6(1)(a) and Recital 38 of Directive 95/46/EC, supra n 38. 
86  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 4, para 1. 
87  An identified or identifiable natural person as defined in Art. 4(1) GDPR, supra n 1. 
88  Art. 5(1)(a) GDPR, supra n 1. 
89  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 5, para 4. 
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than being geared towards research participants.90 Transparency in the research 
context is often addressed from the perspective of the research community as a 
means of ultimately ensuring the validity of research.91 Given that data protection 
law applies to personal data processing in research,92 the principle of transparency 
in the research context must therefore be seen as twofold. On the one hand, 
research transparency can indicate to ethical or legal standards that are aimed 
towards transparency within the research community. On the other hand, research 
transparency from the perspective of data protection law and within the meaning 
of the GDPR must be understood as being directed at individuals (participating in 
and/or having their personal data used in research). This dissertation is concerned 
with the latter aspect of transparency in genetic research, i.e. transparency within 
the meaning of the personal data protection framework. 
As noted, in the personal data protection framework transparency is one of the 
three core principles alongside lawfulness and fairness. Recital 39 GDPR elab-
orates on the importance and meaning of transparency by stating that the prin-
ciple of transparency “concerns, in particular, information to the data subjects 
on the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing […]”. 
According to the referred recital, this information relayed to the data subject 
must be “easily accessible and easy to understand”. Recital 58 GDPR reiterates 
the same notions in regard to the principle of transparency. Essentially, as 
explained in Recital 60 GDPR, “The principles of fair and transparent pro-
cessing require that the data subject be informed of the existence of the pro-
cessing operation and its purposes.” Hence, the principle of transparency in data 
protection requires, at the very least, for the individual to be informed about the 
fact and the purposes of the processing of their personal data, and the identity of 
the data controller in charge of such processing. 
The WP29 have described transparency as being “about engendering trust in 
the processes which affect the citizen by enabling them to understand, and if 
necessary, challenge those processes.”93 Referring to an Opinion of Advocate 
General Cruz Villalon94, the WP29 note that, 
                                                                                                 
90  See, e.g., The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (Revised edition). 
ALLEA – All European Academies 2017. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/research/ 
participants/ data/ref/h2020/other/hi/h2020-ethics_code-of-conduct_en.pdf [Accessed 2 May 
2019].  
91  See, e.g., A. Moravcsik. Transparency: The Revolution in Qualitative Research. Sym-
posium, American Political Science Association (2014). Available at  
https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/transparency.pdf [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 
92  Recital 159 GDPR: “Where personal data are processed for scientific research purposes, 
this Regulation should also apply to that processing.” Supra n 1. 
93  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 4, para 2.  
94  Case C-201/14 Smaranda Bara and Others v Președintele Casei Naționale de Asigurări 
de Sănătate, Casa Naţională de Asigurări de Sănătate, Agenţia Naţională de Administrare 
Fiscală (ANAF) [2015] Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalon (9 July 2015), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:461. 
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“Transparency, when adhered to by data controllers, empowers data 
subjects to hold data controllers and processors accountable and to exercise 
control over their personal data by, for example, providing or with-
drawing informed consent and actioning their data subject rights.”95 
Thus, the core importance of transparency in the data protection framework can 
be most simply expressed by the following: an essential precondition for the 
exercise of any rights is transparency within the context in which these rights 
are to be exercised. In other words, without knowledge regarding the use of 
their data, an individual cannot exercise any rights in terms of the data and the 
specific use.96 Hence, the lack of transparency in relation to individuals would 
essentially render all rights afforded to them under the GDPR practically 
meaningless.  
However, the crucial role of transparency in the data protection framework 
should not be seen as being limited to protecting solely the private interests of 
data subjects. To the contrary, transparency serves as an essential cornerstone in 
safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders in research. On the one hand, 
transparency is necessary to enable the effective exercise of autonomy and 
privacy97 related individual rights. On the other hand, transparency is equally 
important in protecting public interests98 and those of the research community. 
A lack of transparency can endanger trust in the research being in the public 
interest, which can have a debilitating effect on the willingness to participate in 
and the acceptance of research activities; which, in turn, can ultimately hamper 
research. As M. Taylor (2011) has put it in regard to the use of health data in 
research, “The maintenance of trust in the decision-making system requires 
transparency, accountability, and proportionality.”99 
Thus transparency is not just a prerequisite for safeguarding individual private 
interests related to autonomy and privacy, but it is also crucial in protecting the 
interests of the public and the research community, thereby serving as a pro-
cedural foundation for safeguarding substantive values at stake in research. 
Schematically, the role of transparency in relation to the individual in the 
research context can be expressed as follows: 
                                                                                                 
95  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 5, para 4.  
96  K. Pormeister. The GDPR and Big Data: Leading the Way for Big Genetic Data? Supra 
n 69, p 18. 
97  This dissertation does not aim to add to the already extensive discourse and literature on 
the definitions of and relationship between autonomy and privacy in (genetic) research, as 
both are recognized substantive values in data protection and research, and data protection in 
the research context. See, e.g., G. Laurie (2002), pp 182 ff; M. Taylor (2012), pp 14 ff. 
98  The understanding of ‘public interest’ within this dissertation follows M. Taylor’s (2011) 
approach of using a ‘thin’ concept of public interest, “founded upon the every-day obser-
vation that there are common (individual) interests within any community.” M. Taylor. Health 
research, data protection, and the public interest in notification. Supra n 41, p 272. 
99  Ibid., p 301. 
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The importance of transparency in building trust in research, and getting the 
public invested, has been demonstrated, for example, by a 2007 study of the UK 
Medical Research Council on the use of personal health information in medical 
research.100 Focusing specifically on the secondary use of health information, 
the study showed that, 
“If the public feels in control of their information and its potential uses, 
then they are likely to be more inclined to allow their personal health 
information to be used for medical research purposes.”101 
Furthermore, the findings of the referred study indicate that though few people 
are aware of the very notion of the secondary use of personal health information 
in research, “if the public is informed about what medical research entails, they 
are generally positive towards it.”102 The main findings of the study include the 
conclusion that, 
“The key factor that might make people more inclined to allow their 
personal health information to be used for medical research is informa-
tion. If the public had more information specifically about the purposes of 
medical research, they would be more inclined to allow their personal 
health information to be used for that purpose.”103 
Similar findings were established in regard to the Estonian Biobank104. A survey 
with 917 participants found that an overwhelming majority (95%) considered 
“it most important to be informed about what kind of research will be done 
                                                                                                 
100  Medical Research Council. The Use of Personal Health Information in Medical Research: 
General Public Consultation. Final Report. June 2007. Available at  
https://www.mrc.ac.uk/documents/pdf/the-use-of-personal-health-information-in-medical-
research-june-2007/ [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
101  Ibid., p 7. 
102  Ibid., p 8. 
103  Ibid., p 9. 
104  Supra n 46. 
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using their gene data.”105 A notable 81% were in favour of renewed consent being 
sought before conducting new research on existing samples.106 
The importance of keeping individuals informed about the use of their genetic 
data has been recognized on an international level as well. The importance of 
transparency in regard to genetic data specifically has been underlined, for 
example, in UNESCO’s International Declaration on Human Genetic Data107, 
which, in Article 6(a), stresses the importance of transparency in regard to the 
collection, processing, use and storage of genetic data. As another example, in 
their 1997 recommendation regarding the protection of medical data (incl. 
genetic data),108  the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe109  put 
forward in Principle 5.2. that, “when medical data are not collected from the 
data subject, the latter should be notified of the collection as soon as 
possible […], unless this is clearly unreasonable or impracticable, or unless the 
data subject has already received the information.” The recommendation adds in 
Principle 5.3. that information should be given to each data subject individually. 
The explanatory memorandum 110  to the recommendation states that each 
member state should determine the ways and means to supply the information. 
Based on the above, the author asserts that transparency of personal data 
processing in research is an important precondition not just for the exercise of 
the rights of the data subject, but a tool for engaging the public in discourse 
regarding research and enhancing public trust in research. By enhancing public 
trust in research, transparency in relation to individuals concurrently serves the 
interests of the public and the research community. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
105  K. Korts. Estonia. In M. Häyry et al. (Eds.). “The Ethics and Governance of Human Ge-
netic Databases: European Perspectives.” Cambridge University Press (2007), pp 47–52, 51. 
106  Ibid. 
107  International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. UNESCO, 2004. Available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001361/136112e.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2018]. 
108  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97) 5 on the 
Protection of Medical Data (Feb. 13, 1997). Accessible at https://rm.coe.int/16804f0ed0 
[Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
109  The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe’s statutory decision-making body, 
which is made up of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member States. See official website 
of the CoE at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/home [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
110  Explanatory Memorandum of Recommendation No.R (97) 5 of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on the protection of medical data (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 13 February 1997 at the 584th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). Available at  
https://rm.coe.int/16806846cb [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
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2.2. Modalities of transparency under the GDPR 
As defined above, the core of the principle of transparency under the GDPR is 
the provision of information to data subjects concerning the fact of processing 
of their data, the purposes of the processing, and the identity of the controller. 
This core is complemented with further layers of transparency such as certain 
additional information to be communicated, and the precision and clarity of the 
information to be provided (as required under Article 12 GDPR); thus concerning 
more than the mere fact of communication, but the quality of it. As noted in the 
introductory part of this chapter, the WP29 have as well considered the facilita-
tion of the exercise of data subjects’ rights as part of the “overarching obligation 
of transparency under the GDPR”.111 
Though the manner in which information is provided to data subjects, and 
the facilitation of the exercise of individual rights and communication relevant 
thereto, can as well be regarded to form integral parts of the principle of trans-
parency in data protection, on the very primary level, it is the provision of 
elementary information like the fact and purposes of processing that is a 
prerequisite for any more precise communication or activity to follow, or for the 
quality and clarity of the information provided to even become relevant. This 
dissertation focuses on the fundamental aspect of transparency as the provision 
of information to data subjects regarding (at least) the fact and purposes of the 
processing of their data, and the identity of the data controller. In the author’s 
opinion, the described fundamental aspect of providing basic information to 
individuals must be regarded as the primary means of facilitating transparency 
in relation to data subjects, upon which further layers of transparency can then 
be built. 
The general obligation to provide information to data subjects is stipulated in 
Articles 13 and 14 GDPR. Whereas Article 13 GDPR concerns scenarios in 
which data has been obtained directly from the individual, Article 14 GDPR 
concerns scenarios where data has been obtained from other sources. The obli-
gation to inform established under the referred articles is independent of the 
legal basis used for processing the data (i.e. whether processing is based on 
informed consent of the individual, or alternative legal grounds). 
Particularly in the research context, the provision of information to the 
individual might be part of consent procedures. If the use of personal data in 
research is based on consent as a legal basis for processing, the provision of 
information to the individual is part of the process of obtaining consent, as con-
sent to data processing needs to be informed (Art. 4(11) GDPR). As explained 
in Recital 42 GDPR, “For consent to be informed, the data subject should be 
aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing 
for which the personal data are intended.” Thus the provision of information 
prior to obtaining consent can be seen as a modality of transparency as its 
                                                                                                 
111  Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 17/EN WP260 rev.01, supra n 8, p 4, para 1. 
 33 
purpose aligns with the requirements stemming from the principle of trans-
parency in data protection: for the individual to be informed about at least the 
fact of the processing of their data, the identity of the controller, and the pur-
poses for which the data is processed. 
In addition to the provision of information to data subjects, the ‘purpose 
limitation’, embedded in Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, can be regarded as a modality 
of transparency. The purpose limitation establishes a general rule that personal 
data may only be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes” – 
thus making the purposes of processing transparent to the extent of excluding 
processing for purposes other than for which the data was collected. As such, 
the purpose limitation has been seen as serving primarily the principle of trans-
parency, providing predictability, and thus strengthening the data subjects’ 
autonomy, “as they can be confident that their data are processed only for 
purposes for which they were collected.”112 
However, there is an explicit exception to the purpose limitation in Article 
5(1)(b) GDPR when it comes to further processing for archiving purposes in the 
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes. 
This means that personal data can be further processed for research purposes 
regardless of the initial purposes for which the data was collected, as long as 
this is done in accordance with Article 89(1) GDPR. The latter, however, merely 
refers to vague ‘appropriate safeguards’ that should be adopted.113 It is important 
to emphasize that such further research use of personal data would still require 
an appropriate legal basis for the processing of the data. The exception from the 
purpose limitation allows for available personal data to be further used in 
research if an appropriate legal basis for such use of the data can be invoked. If 
this legal basis were informed consent, the data subject would be informed of 
the new processing purposes during consent procedures. If such further 
processing for research purposes would be based on alternative legal grounds 
(i.e. based on law), the question is whether the new purposes would be commu-
nicated to the data subject. 
Thus, from the three primary modalities of transparency under the GDPR 
outlined above, two remain applicable in the research context: the provision of 
information to data subjects prior to obtaining consent, and the general obli-
gation to inform (regardless of the legal basis for processing). The efficacy of 
these modalities in providing transparency in relation to the data subject in 
genetic research shall be analyzed in the following chapters.  
                                                                                                 
112  The Data Protection Commissioner of Hessen as Chair of the Conference of the Data 
Protection Commissioners of the Federation and of the States. The General Data Protection 
Regulation requires substantial improvement in crucial points! 26 August 2015, p 2. Avail-
able at https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-
08-26_Press_Release_DSK.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2019]. 
113  For criticism regarding Art. 89(1) GDPR, See, e.g., K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the 
research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? Supra n 52, p 140. 
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III. INFORMED CONSENT AS A MODALITY  
OF TRANSPARENCY IN GENETIC RESEARCH 
In the previous chapter, the provision of information prior to obtaining consent 
for personal data processing was identified as one of the modalities of trans-
parency under the GDPR. The aim of this chapter is to analyse applicable consent 
requirements in genetic research in order to determine the role and impact of 
informed consent in regard to transparency in relation to the data subject in the 
context of genetic research. 
The need to regulate the research use of genetic data consistently across the 
EU has been called for by scholars114, however the relevant regulatory picture 
remains fragmented.115 Although the GDPR was meant to harmonize personal 
data protection rules across the EU, and in terms of its scope, the GDPR clearly 
governs the use of genetic data in research, relevant substantive rules within the 
GDPR are scarce, and major aspects – such as conditions for processing data 
without consent for research purposes, and most of the derogations from the 
rights of data subjects116 – have been left to be regulated in national or other EU 
law.117 Furthermore, in terms of genetic research, the GDPR is concerned with 
data but not with the physical biosamples from which the data is derived. To 
formulate a comprehensive understanding of applicable consent requirements in 
genetic research, however, relevant rules in regard to biosamples must be taken 
into account as well. 
Considering the aim of this chapter, and the fragmented nature of consent 
frameworks in genetic research, this chapter will, first, address genetic research 
scenarios in which biosamples are procured from individuals (3.1.). This will be 
followed by a respective analysis regarding research making use of already avail-
able biosamples or genetic data (3.2.). A separate analysis will follow regarding 
genetic data and research in the context of clinical trials as these are subject to 
                                                                                                 
114  Taylor’s (2012) suggestions in this regard predate the GDPR. Taylor proposes that the 
questions regarding consent in genetic research could be best addressed “through reform of 
the Directive.” He adds that the question of how to interpret the relationship between 
consent and the research use of genetic data in terms of the Directive “would ideally be co-
ordinated so as to be consistent across Europe.” See M. Taylor (2012), p 217. 
115  What is more, within this fragmented legal framework, the matter of intra-EU applicable 
law in the research context has been overlooked entirely. See K. Pormeister. Genetic research 
and applicable law: the intra-EU conflict of laws as a regulatory challenge to cross-border 
genetic research. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 5(3), 706–723. 
116  Some derogations are embedded into the GDPR in regard to personal data processing for 
research purposes. For example, Art. 17(3)(d) creates an exception from the right to be 
forgotten when it comes to researches uses of personal data, provided that the invocation of 
this right “is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives 
of that processing”. For an analysis concerning derogations from data subjects’ rights in the 
GDPR in regard to personal data processing for research purposes, See K. Pormeister. 
Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? Supra n 52. 
117  Ibid. 
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specialized EU law (3.3.). Thereafter, the previously made conclusions will be 
put into context on the example of Estonia in order to offer a comprehensive 
analysis on consent requirements (or lack thereof) in genetic research based on 
the example of one Member State (3.4.). Finally, the chapter will close with 
conclusive remarks on informed consent as a modality of transparency in genetic 
research (3.5.). 
 
 
3.1. Consent in genetic research entailing  
procurement of biosamples 
3.1.1. Consent to participation in human subject research 
Following World War II, the concept of free and informed consent became “a 
cardinal principle governing scientific research with human subjects.” 118  It 
reflects the basic rule that one has “the right to protect one’s bodily integrity 
from unauthorized intrusions”119; i.e. no one can be forced to participate in 
research against their will nor can biosamples be retrieved from an individual 
for research purposes without their consent. 
In addition to being an ethical principle, the notion of informed consent in 
medicine and research is also embedded in international law. The general 
principle of informed consent in medicine and biology is as well reflected in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,120 however, EU law does not regulate 
human subject research as such, other than in the case of clinical trials,121 which 
shall be addressed separately. 
Research that entails a physical intervention for procuring biosamples from 
an individual falls under the definition of biomedical research within the 
                                                                                                 
118  G. Mazur (2011), p vii. 
119  R.R. Faden and T.L. Beauchamp (1986), p 121. 
120  Art. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although the 
Charter applies to institutions and bodies of the EU, it only applies to Member States when 
they are implementing EU law. Since human subject research as such is not regulated by EU 
law (other than clinical trials), it remains debatable whether the Charter could be referenced 
as establishing a general rule of informed consent in the context of human subject research 
in general (when this is not regulated by EU law). See Art. 51, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), 18.12.2000. OJ C364/1. 
121  Although there is EU law concerning the quality and safety for the procurement of 
human biosamples, this is limited to biosamples intended for human application, i.e. not 
research – unless the human application of the biosamples is part of research, i.e. in vivo 
research on humans. In terms of in vivo research on humans, the referred directive does not 
regulate research as such, but the safety of the procedures associated with the retrieval, 
storage and distribution of human biosamples. See Recital 11 and Arts. 1 and 2(1), Directive 
2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on setting 
standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, 
storage and distribution of human biosampless and cells. OJ L102/48. 
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meaning of, and is thus governed by, the Oviedo convention of the Council of 
Europe.122 The latter establishes a general requirement of prior informed consent 
in human subject research under Articles 16(v) and 5. This consent concerns 
primarily the physical or psychological intervention that the participant is to be 
subject to; i.e. in the case of genetic research the procurement process of the 
necessary biosamples (e.g. blood withdrawal or the obtaining of a saliva or 
other tissue sample). The information to be provided prior to obtaining consent 
concerns “the purpose, nature and consequences of the intervention and the 
risks involved.”123  In other words, this type of consent is not the same as 
informed consent within the meaning of the GDPR – consent to human subject 
research is primarily concerned with the physical or psychological dimensions 
of participating in a given research project, whereas consent to data processing 
within the meaning of the GDPR124 concerns the use of personal data obtained 
from participants during the research. Consent to data processing shall be 
addressed in the following section. 
In terms of consent to participation in human subject research, even in regard 
to countries in the European legal sphere that have not ratified the Oviedo con-
vention, the same basic principle of informed consent in human subject research 
would arise from the right to respect for private lifer under Article 8125, and in 
more extreme cases even from the prohibition of torture under Article 3126 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)127. Furthermore, as explained in 
Section 1.4. of this analytical compendium, the ECtHR has referenced the 
                                                                                                 
122  Estonia ratified the Oviedo convention in 2002. For full list of signatures and ratifications 
See the official website of the Council of Europe  
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164/signatures 
[Accessed 18 April 2019]. 
123  Explanatory Report to the Oviedo convention, supra n 11, p 7, para 35. 
124  The GDPR defines the concept of ‘informed consent’ through the lens of data protection 
by limiting it to an individual’s agreement for their personal data to be processed. See Art. 
4(11) GDPR, supra n 1. 
125  The scope of Art. 8 ECHR covers the right to physical, moral and psychological integrity. 
See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights. Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. 
Updated on 31 December 2018. Council of Europe. Available at  
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [Accessed 25 April 2019]. 
126  Regarding human subject research and the prohibiton of torture under Art. 3 ECHR, the 
ECtHR has deemed it unacceptable “that a program of scientific research with new drugs be 
implemented without the consent of the subject submitted to the experimentation. Accordingly, 
the Court considers that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected against his will 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Con-
vention”. See §§ 88–91, Case of Bataliny v. Russia, EctHR [2015], Application no. 10060/07, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0723JUD001006007. 
127  Supra n 59. 
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Oviedo convention and used it to give substance to Article 8 ECHR even in 
cases where the state party had not been a party to the Oviedo convention.128 
Hence, when it comes to obtaining biosamples necessary for genetic research 
from individuals directly for research purposes, this constitutes ‘human (subject) 
research’ within the meaning of the Oviedo convention, 129  and thus prior 
informed consent is clearly required by the convention. If, however, the bio-
samples have been obtained for purposes independent of research, this general 
requirement of consent to research within the meaning of the Oviedo conven-
tion no longer applies.130 It follows that whilst the procurement of biosamples 
from individuals for research purposes requires informed consent of the indi-
vidual under the Oviedo convention, the research rules of the Oviedo conven-
tion do not apply where biosamples have been obtained independent of research 
(e.g. in the course of clinical care) and might later be used in research. 
Although the Oviedo convention establishes quite clear rules on informed 
consent for participation in human subject research, as an instrument of inter-
national law it does presume in Article 1 the adoption of relevant national laws 
by the state parties in order to give effect to the rules established under the con-
vention. Hence informed consent in regard to participation in genetic research 
in the form of human subject research, i.e. as in including the collection of bio-
samples from individuals, shall be revisited in Section 3.4. of this chapter on the 
example of Estonia. 
 
 
3.1.2. Consent to data processing in genetic research 
Genetic research entailing the procurement of biosamples directly from indi-
viduals would, of course, at the same time entail the processing of genetic data. 
The very purpose of obtaining biosamples for research purposes is, in most 
                                                                                                 
128  See supra n 58 and n 63. 
129  The act of obtaining biosamples for research purposes constitutes a physical intervention 
within the meaning of Art. 5 of the Oviedo convetion, and thus triggers the consent require-
ment in research as stipulated in Art. 16(v) of the convention, which refers back to consent 
rules under Art. 5. 
130  This is evidenced in the explanatory report to the additional protocol of the Oviedo con-
vention regarding biomedical research. The explanatory report to the additional protocol on 
biomedical research emphasizes that the definition and scope of ‘biomedical research’ does 
not encompass scenarios in which biosamples or personal data are obtained in the course of 
medical interventions independent of a research project, even when they might be later used 
in biomedical research. See Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research. Strasbourg, 25.I.2005. 
CETS No. 195, p 4, para 17. 
See also K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, p 350. 
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cases, the data they can provide.131 This means that the personal data protection 
framework becomes applicable parallel to the rules regarding participation in 
human subject research. 
In terms of genetic data, the GDPR sets out general rules in terms of pro-
cessing special categories of personal data. The only specific reference in the 
GDPR to genetic data remains that in Article 9(4), which affords additional dis-
cretion to Member Sates for adopting “further conditions, including limitations,” 
when it comes to genetic, health or biometric data. Thus, discrepancies between 
national laws in terms of rules concerning any processing of genetic data (incl. 
for research purposes) might arise from Article 9(4) GDPR. In the research 
context specifically, discrepancies are likely to arise since Article 9(2)(j) GDPR 
leaves the research use of special categories of personal data to be regulated in 
other EU law or Member State law. Aside from a few clauses in the GDPR con-
cerning research specifically (e.g. Art. 14(5)(b), Art. 17(3)(d) and Art. 89), the 
research use of genetic data will be subject to national or other EU law. 
In terms of genetic data and the rules stemming directly from the GDPR, the 
general prohibition of processing in Article 9(1) GDPR applies. This means that 
one of the exceptions permitting processing, listed in Article 9(2) GDPR, has to 
be applied in order for any processing of genetic data to be in compliance with 
the GDPR. One of these exceptions is the explicit and informed consent of the 
individual for specific data processing purposes. It is important to emphasize 
that the GDPR does not explicitly establish a requirement of consent when it 
comes to the research use of any of the special categories of personal data, 
including genetic data.132  
The general legal basis for processing genetic data based on consent is estab-
lished in Article 9(2)(a) GDPR. The latter requires for the consent to set out the 
specific purpose(s) for which the data will be processed. In the context of 
research, this should be understood as setting out specific research projects in 
which the data will be used.133 In this regard, Recital 33 GDPR recognizes the 
need for more lax consent requirements in the research context by setting out 
that “data subjects should be allowed to give their consent to certain areas of 
scientific research when in keeping with recognised ethical standards for 
scientific research” (as opposed to “for one or more specified purposes” as 
stipulated in Art. 9(2)(a) GDPR). The answer to the question of how specific 
the processing purposes must be within the consent will impact how efficiently 
consent can provide for transparency in relation to the data subject, i.e. whether 
                                                                                                 
131  In certain cases, e.g. in vivo research on humans involving transplantion of tissue, cells 
or organs, the physical biosamples might be of interest rather than the data contained within 
them (e.g. research involving stem cell transplants).  
132  See K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? 
Supra n 52, pp 138–140; and K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads 
of human and data research. Supra n 64, p 353. 
133  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data re-
search. Supra n 64, p 353. 
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the information provided to the data subject prior to obtaining consent will 
make it transparent to the data subject what purposes the data will be processed 
for.   
Presumably, a recital cannot alter a rule in the regulation itself. Recitals have 
been seen as interpretive tools, sometimes performing “a supplementary norm-
ative role”.134 Recitals, however, do not have an autonomous legal effect.135 As 
made clear by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), “[…] the preamble to a 
Community act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground 
for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question.”136 
Based on this role attributed to recitals in EU law by the CJEU, a possible 
broader consent notion for research purposes, as described in Recital 33 GDPR, 
is something that could be addressed in national or other EU law, as indicated in 
Article 9(2)(j) GDPR. The latter enables Member States and the EU to establish 
legal grounds for the processing of special categories of data for research 
purposes, with these legal grounds being independent of the strict requirements 
regarding consent under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR.137 Hence, Recital 33 GDPR can 
be seen as setting limits to the discretion provided under Article 9(2)(j) GDPR 
in terms of regulating consent in research. However, the WP29 seem to have 
taken the opposite approach towards Recital 33 GDPR. 
In an opinion of 2017 regarding consent under the GDPR (in November 
2017, the opinion was adopted, but still to be finalized)138, the WP29 main-
tained that, 
“First, it should be noted that Recital 33 does not disapply the obligations 
with regard to the requirement of specific consent. This means that, in 
principle, scientific research projects can only include personal data on 
the basis of consent if they have a well-described purpose. Where pur-
poses are unclear at the start of a scientific research programme, cont-
rollers will have difficulty to pursue the programme in compliance with 
the GDPR.”139 
                                                                                                 
134  R. Baratta. Complexity of EU law in the domestic implementing process. 19th Quality of 
Legislation Seminar ‘EU Legislative Drafting: Views from those applying EU law in the 
Member States’. 3 July 2014. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/seminars/ 
20140703_baratta_speech.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2019]. 
135  Ibid.  
136  Judgement of 19 November 1998, Nilsson and Others, C-162/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:554, 
paragraph 54. 
137  See K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? 
Supra n 52, pp 138–140. 
138  Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (as of 24 January 2018). Adopted on 
28 November 2017. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 17/EN WP259. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=615239 [Accessed 19 March 
2018]. 
139  Ibid., p 27. 
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These guidelines were revised in 2018, and in the revised version the WP29 had 
somewhat modified its stance on Recital 33, by altering the last sentence in the 
quotation above to the following, 
“For the cases where purposes for data processing within a scientific 
research project cannot be specified at the outset, Recital 33 allows as an 
exception that the purpose may be described at a more general level.”140 
(emphasis added by the author) 
From this last reference it appears that the WP29 see Recital 33 GDPR as 
creating an exception to the general rules of specificity of consent. In the author’s 
opinion, this approach is in conflict with the case law of the CJEU concerning 
the legal status of recitals referred to above. Although recitals can be used to 
interpret legal clauses, they cannot create outright exceptions to rules established 
in the substantive clauses themselves. 
In the 2017 version of the guidelines, the WP29 then goes on to explain that 
Recital 33 GDPR will allow describing the research purpose on “a more general 
level”, but should be interpreted more strictly when it comes to special categories 
of personal data.141 They further add that if the purposes of the research cannot 
be “fully specified”, the controller can ask for consent for a purpose in “more 
general terms”.142 In the 2018 version of the guidelines, the WP29 refers to the 
fact that Article 9 GDPR sets strict conditions for the processing of special 
categories of data, and so “applying the flexible approach of Recital 33 will be 
subject to a stricter interpretation and requires a high degree of scrutiny.”143 
Essentially, according to the WP29 it seems that in terms of special categories 
of data such as genetic data, the specificity requirement of consent is to be seen 
as laying somewhere in-between the strict rules established in Article 9(2)(a) 
GDPR and the more lax principles expressed in Recital 33 GDPR. From this it 
follows that, on the one hand, the WP29 are trying to maintain a strict approach 
to consent to (sensitive) data processing in research. On the other hand, the WP29 
seem to indicate that the approach to research consent reflected in Recital 33 
GDPR is directly applicable, i.e. it need not be regulated under Member State or 
other EU law (unlike previously presumed by the author). Although the WP29 
maintain that “Recital 33 does not disapply the obligations with regard to the 
requirement of specific consent”, at the same time they assert that the purpose 
of processing “may be described at a more general level”. In other words, 
according to the WP29 the level of specification of purposes within the consent 
                                                                                                 
140  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80, 
p 28. 
141  Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (as of 24 January 2018), supra n 138, 
p 28. 
142  Ibid. 
143  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80, 
p 28. 
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is different in research due to Recital 33 GDPR, compared to other scenarios of 
processing based on consent and the general rule under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR. 
With this, essentially the WP29 are stating that at Recital 33 does alter the spe-
cificity requirements regarding consent when it comes to consent to data pro-
cessing in the research context. This makes their opinion somewhat contradictory.  
What is more, the WP29 do not touch upon the question of how broadly 
“certain areas of scientific research” within the meaning of Recital 33 GDPR 
should be interpreted in practice. They emphasize that “future research” as a 
purpose is not specific enough.144  However, they do not bring any explicit 
examples as to which level of specification would be appropriate in a research 
context, other than referring to “more general terms” or “more general level” in 
regard to the applicability of the principles expressed in Recital 33 GDPR, as 
referenced above. 
Even if one were to agree with the WP29 in terms of the direct applicability 
of the principles in Recital 33 GDPR, it remains arguable how liberally one 
should interpret the concept of “certain areas of scientific research”. In other 
words, it is unclear how broad the consent to use special categories of personal 
data in research could be – whether applied directly or established in national or 
other EU law. In this regard, two comparators can be used. First, in the 2013 
amendment proposals to the draft version of the GDPR, Amendment 191 set out 
to establish in Article 81(1b) that “for the processing of medical data [incl. 
genetic data] exclusively for public health purposes of scientific research, the 
consent may be given for one or more specific and similar researches.”145 The 
specific rules for the use of health data (incl. genetic data) in research did not 
make it into the final draft of the GDPR assumedly because of opposition from 
the medical and research sector.146 However, the wording used in the proposed 
Article 81(1b) (“one or more specific and similar researches”) would have been 
more restrictive compared to the phrase used in Recital 33 of the final version 
                                                                                                 
144  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation. 
Adopted on 2 April 2013. 00569/13/EN WP 203, p 16. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf 
[Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
145  Amendment  191, Proposal for a regulation, Article 81. Report on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)). 
22 November 2013, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-
0402+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN# [Accessed 19 March 2018]. 
146  See, e.g., P.G. Casali on behalf of the European Society for Medical Oncology (ESMO) 
Switzerland. Risks of the new EU Data protection regulation: an ESMO position paper 
endorsed by the European oncology community. Annals of Oncology 25(8) (2014), pp 1458–
1461. 
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(“certain areas of scientific research”).147 The former indicates to ‛researches’ as 
in (one or multiple) research projects, whereas the latter concerns whole areas 
of research.148 
In terms of genetic research this leaves the question whether ‘genetic research’ 
as such could be considered a “certain scientific area of research” within the 
meaning of Recital 33 GDPR? Or would ‘genetic research’ be too vague and 
general? Considering that genetic research could theoretically constitute an 
inquiry into the association between DNA and essentially anything and every-
thing, and put in the light of the strict interpretation called for by the WP29 in 
regard to special categories of personal data, the raised questions should be 
answered in the negative. 
To conclude, in the opinion of the author, and based on relevant case law of 
the CJEU, Recital 33 GDPR cannot create an exception to the requirement in 
Article 9(2)(a) GDPR of setting out specific purpose(s) in the consent. As 
established in Article 9(2)(j) GDPR, the research use of special categories of 
data is to be regulated in national or other EU law – including rules on consent 
to data processing for research purposes (within the limits indicated in Recital 
33 GDPR). 
 
 
3.1.3. Conclusions on consent in genetic research  
entailing the procurement of biosamples 
To sum up the matter of consent in genetic research entailing the procurement 
of biosamples, two things can be concluded. First, from a legal theoretical 
perspective such research entails parallel procedures in regard to consent – in 
practical terms this should not be understood as inherently separate processes 
resulting in two consent forms149, but to be taken as entailing two types of 
consent with different focuses and applicable rules. One for participation in the 
research project, and the other for the processing of the personal data obtained 
during the research project. 
The procedure for the procurement of the biosamples as a physical inter-
vention on the human body is subject to consent requirements stemming from 
rules regarding human subject research, like those in Articles 16(v) and 5 of the 
Oviedo convention, unless respective (more specific) rules are embedded in 
                                                                                                 
147  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, p 353. 
148  Ibid. 
149  In practical terms, Art. 7(2) GDPR provides the relevant rules for incorporating informed 
consent to data processing into documentation concerning other matters as well. Consent to 
participation in human subject research (i.e. the physical or psychological intervention) might 
constitute such ‘other matters’. Thus, if consent to data processing is incorporated into one 
consent form with the participation consent, under Art. 7(2) GDPR the consent to data 
processing must “be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other 
matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.” 
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national law (in which case national law should be referred to). This consent 
primarily focuses on the risks associated with the intervention on the human 
subject, such as the risks of infection or bruising related to taking blood samples. 
This type of informed consent is not focused on or concerned with the possible 
(future) uses of the data obtained from the biosample. 
In terms of the use of the genetic data derived from such samples, general 
consent requirements for special categories of personal data under the GDPR 
apply. Based on the consent guidelines of the WP29, one might conclude that 
Recital 33 GDPR creates a directly applicable exception for research when it 
comes to the question of how specific the purposes of processing need to be in the 
informed consent – i.e. whether consent needs to be limited to certain research 
projects, as it would be under the general rule in Article 9(2)(a), or whether 
consent can be obtained for the use of the data in ‘certain areas of scientific 
research’. In the opinion of the author, this is something to be addressed in 
national or other EU law, as Article 9(2)(j) GDPR clearly leaves the research use 
of special categories of personal data to be regulated in either Member State or 
other EU law. 
Furthermore, the author deems the guidelines on consent of the WP29 some-
what contradictory and problematic in terms of the breadth of research consent 
and the practical meaning of Recital 33 GDPR. Whilst the WP29 assert that 
Recital 33 does not disapply the specificity requirement of consent, at the same 
time they state that Recital 33 GDPR (directly, i.e. without national or other EU 
law implementing such principles) enables for processing purposes to be 
described on a more general level when it comes to research. Thus, essentially 
the WP29 are saying that Recital 33 GDPR at the very least alters or modifies 
(even if it does not entirely disapply) the rules of specificity of consent under 
the GDPR. In fact, the WP29 even refer to Recital 33 GDPR as creating an 
exception, which a recital – according to CJEU case law – cannot do. The author 
concludes that instead of creating a directly applicable exception to the specificity 
requirement of consent in research, Recital 33 GDPR should be seen as limiting 
the discretion provided in Article 9(2)(j) GDPR to EU and national lawmakers 
in regulating the research use of special categories of personal data. 
 
 
3.2. Genetic research entailing secondary use  
of biosamples and data 
As established in the introductory chapter of the analytical compendium, the 
phrase ‛secondary use’ is understood as referring to the use of biosamples or data 
for purposes other than which they were initially collected for.150 As opposed to 
the above analysed research scenario, in which biosamples are obtained from 
                                                                                                 
150  See, e.g., International Review of Secondary Use of Personal Health Information. Health 
Information and Quality Authority (Ireland), January 2012. Available at https://www.hiqa.ie/ 
system/files/Review-Secondary-Use-Health-Info.pdf [Accessed 19 March 2018]. 
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research participants directly, research based on secondary use entails the 
utilization of already available biosamples and/or genetic data derived there-
from, and does therefor not directly involve the individuals whose samples and/ 
or genetic data are concerned.  
This might, on the one hand, refer to the use of biosamples or data that was 
initially collected for a different research purpose. On the other hand, the term 
‛secondary use’ might also refer to a scenario, in which the biosamples or data 
were originally collected for an entirely different purpose than research, i.e. 
clinical care or commercial genetic testing services.  
In the ‘secondary use’ scenario, necessary DNA sequencing data might 
already be available for research, and thus further analysis of biosamples might 
not be necessary. However, biosamples might still be involved if the available 
data is not sufficient or if DNA has not yet been sequenced from the samples. 
Because genetic research might rely on the secondary use of both biosamples 
and genetic data, and these are subject to different sets of rules, they will be 
subject to separate analysis.  
 
 
3.2.1. Secondary use of biosamples in research 
In the European legal sphere, the only supranational legal rule governing the 
further use of human biosamples in research stems from Article 22 of the Oviedo 
convention.151 The latter establishes that, 
“When in the course of an intervention any part of a human body is 
removed, it may be stored and used for a purpose other than that for 
which it was removed, only if this is done in conformity with appropriate 
information and consent procedures.” 
Article 22 does not in and of itself establish any such procedures. The referred 
‘appropriate information and consent procedures’ are a matter of national law 
(Art. 1 Oviedo convention).152 The threshold set in Article 22 does not require 
prior informed consent, nor does it necessarily require consent at all.153 As laid 
out in the explanatory report to the Oviedo convention,  
                                                                                                 
151  Although, in the EU, there is Directive 2004/23/EC and directives of the Commission 
implementing the former, these govern human cells and biosamples only in regard to their 
use for human application, but not research, other than their application in the context of in 
vivo human research. See supra n 121. 
See also K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, p 354. 
152  See also Section 3.1.1. of this chapter. 
153  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, p 354. 
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“The information and consent arrangements may vary according to the 
circumstances, thus allowing for flexibility since the express consent of 
an individual to the use of parts of his body is not systematically needed. 
Thus, sometimes, it will not be possible, or very difficult, to find the 
persons concerned again in order to ask for their consent. In some cases, 
it will be sufficient for a patient or his or her representative, who have 
been duly informed (for instance, by means of leaflets handed to the 
persons concerned at the hospital), not to express their opposition. In 
other cases, depending on the nature of the use to which the removed parts 
are to be put, express and specific consent will be necessary, in particular 
where sensitive information is collected about identifiable individuals.”154 
What is clear from the above is that the minimum threshold established by 
Article 22 of the Oviedo convention is due notification that would enable the 
expression of opposition. The latter essentially constitutes a pre-emptive opt-out 
approach to the secondary use of biosamples. As noted, the specific requirements 
are subject to national law, with the minimum requirements being expressed in 
Article 22 of the Oviedo convention. For this reason, the secondary use of bio-
samples for research will be further elaborated upon in Section 3.4. of this 
chapter on the Estonian example. 
To conclude, on a supranational level in the European legal sphere, Article 22 
of the Oviedo convention seems to be the only rule to govern the secondary use 
of biosamples in research. This rule establishes a minimum threshold of due 
notification of the individuals from whom the samples were taken (or their 
representatives) to enable the expression of opposition. More stringent require-
ments – like that of prior (informed) consent – may arise from national laws. 
 
 
3.2.2. Secondary use of genetic data in research 
As previously noted, the secondary use of genetic data in research might occur 
when the data was initially obtained and used in a research context based on the 
consent of the individual, but with the research purposes being limited in the 
consent. The research purposes in this initial consent might either be limited to 
specific projects, or possibly to a “certain area of scientific research” as set out 
by Recital 33 GDPR (if one were to accept the stance of the WP29 regarding 
the direct applicability of Recital 33 GDPR). The purposes of processing laid 
out in the initial consent would then refer to the primary use of the data, and 
possible future research purposes falling outside of the scope of the initial 
consent would thereby constitute secondary use. However, like in the case of 
the biosamples, secondary use of genetic data in research might also occur if the 
                                                                                                 
154  Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. Supra n 11, p 21, para 137. 
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genetic data was initially obtained for and used in an entirely different context, 
e.g. for purposes of clinical care or commercial genetic testing services. 
As to the health care sector, the transition to electronic health records has 
made extensive research based on health record databases a practicable reality. 
Although the GDPR does not explicitly refer to the secondary use of data, it 
does in Recital 157 address research based on data retrieved from registries, i.e. 
existing databases. However, Recital 157 GDPR merely points out that such 
research should be “subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards set out in 
Union or Member State law.” That is as far as the GDPR goes in regard to 
differentiating between research scenarios.155  
There is no question that secondary use of genetic data could be based on new 
consent obtained from the data subject. This would mean that researchers would 
have to reach out to and obtain new consent from all individuals whose data is 
already available and of interest to the researchers. However, and particularly in 
genetic research, this is more often than not considered impracticable, dispro-
portionally cumbersome, or even impossible, as genetic research might require 
the use of data from thousands or even tens of thousands of people.156 
Under Articles 5(1)(b) and (e) GDPR, the purpose and storage limitations do 
not apply when it comes to the storage and further use of data for, inter alia, 
scientific research purposes. This means that regardless of in what context and 
for what purposes genetic data was initially obtained, it can be put to further use 
in research regardless of possible limitations in the initial consent or context 
(i.e. data might also be initially obtained not based on consent, but based on 
law, e.g., in the health care sector, but specifically for the provision of health care 
services). There might be discrepancies in this regard across the EU if a Member 
State has opted to maintain or introduce further conditions, including limita-
tions, in regard to genetic, health or biometric data, as allowed by Article 9(4) 
GDPR for specifically these three categories of data. 
Such further processing of already obtained data for research purposes 
would still require a legal basis. However, obtaining (new) consent is not the 
only alternative for a legal basis for the secondary use of data in research, as the 
GDPR does not explicitly require consent for the processing of special cate-
gories of personal data for research purposes.157 Though Article 9(2)(a) GDPR 
establishes consent as one possible legal basis for such use, alternative legal 
bases might arise from national or other EU law, as Article 9(2)(j) GDPR 
provides for legal grounds for processing to be established in Member State or 
other EU law – legal grounds, that are independent of the consent requirement 
                                                                                                 
155  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, p 348. 
156  See, e.g., E.P. Hong, J.W. Park. Sample Size and Statistical Power Calculation in Genetic 
Association Studies. Genomics & Informatics 10(2) (2012), p 117–122. Available at 
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in Article 9(2)(a) GDPR.158 Thus, reference must be made to national laws to 
further analyse the scenario of secondary use of genetic data in research. This 
will be done in Section 3.4. of this chapter on the example of Estonia. 
To conclude, though secondary processing of genetic data can be undertaken 
by obtaining new consent from data subjects, secondary processing is also 
possible without consent if Member State or EU law provide for grounds for 
data processing without consent for research purposes.159  
 
 
3.3. Genetic research in the context of clinical trials 
One scenario regarding genetic research that needs to be addressed separately is 
that of genetic research entailing the secondary use of genetic data obtained 
during clinical trials. This is due to the fact that unlike other types of human 
subject research, clinical trials are regulated by EU law – namely, by the 
upcoming Regulation 536/2014 (estimated to come into application in 2020160). 
 
 
3.3.1. Primary research use of genetic data in clinical trials 
In regard to clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, according to 
Recital 161 GDPR, Regulation 536/2014 will regulate consent procedures 
regarding participation in such trials. In terms of the referred consent procedures 
under Regulation 536/2014, the WP29 have noted, “In the context of data 
protection law, the latter form of consent could be considered as an additional 
safeguard.”161 Informed consent to participation in a clinical trial is not to be 
confused with informed consent to data processing within the meaning of the 
GDPR.162 Much like in the case of the general requirements for informed consent 
in human subject research previously analysed in this chapter, the consent for 
participation in clinical trials is not concerned with data protection, but responds 
                                                                                                 
158  K. Pormeister. Genetic data and the research exemption: is the GDPR going too far? 
Supra n 52, p 139. 
159  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80, 
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“[…] primarily to core ethical requirements of research projects involving 
humans deriving from the Helsinki Declaration. The obligation to obtain 
the informed consent of participants in a clinical trial is primarily a 
measure to ensure the protection of the right to human dignity and the right 
to integrity of individuals under Article 1 and 3 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU; it is not conceived as an instrument for data pro-
tection compliance.”163 
However, in terms of the legal basis for the primary research use of personal 
data in clinical trials, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) is of the 
opinion that in most cases informed consent within the meaning of the GDPR 
would not be the appropriate legal basis.164 The EDPB argues this based on the 
“clear situation of imbalance of powers between the participant and the sponsor/ 
investigator”, which “will imply that the consent is not ‘freely given’ in the 
meaning of the GDPR.” This imbalance, they claim, might be due to the health 
condition of the potential participant, socio-economic status or “any situation of 
hierarchical dependency”.165 According to the EDPB, informed consent within 
the meaning of the GDPR might be the legal basis for the primary use of personal 
data in clinical trials, however only in cases in which the sponsor can show 
compliance with all the conditions set for informed consent under the GDPR.166 
According to the EDPB, as far as special categories of personal data are con-
cerned, the legal basis for the primary use of such data in research could be either 
Article 6(1)(e) or (f) GDPR (i.e. respectively public interest or legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller), however only where a specific derogation under 
Article 9(2) GDPR can be relied upon. The EDPB suggests both Articles 9(2)(i) 
and (j) as possible appropriate derogations.167  
Thus, the EDPB concludes that the primary research use of special cate-
gories of personal data in clinical trials could be based on three alternative legal 
grounds: (1) informed consent within the meaning of Articles 6(1)(a) and 
9(2)(a) GDPR (only in limited cases); (2) relying on the public interest clause in 
Article 6(1)(e) along with Article 9(2)(i) or (j) GDPR; or (3) based on Article 
6(1)(f) and the legitimate interests of the controller along with Article 9(2)(j) 
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two different phases of clinical trials in regard to determining possible legal bases for the 
processing of personal data. One phase concerns “Processing operations related purely to 
research activities”. The other concerns “Processing operations related to reliability and safety 
purposes”. In the latter case, concerning special categories of personal data, the adequate 
legal basis for processing in the opinion of the EDPB is Art. 9(2)(i) GDPR, and for other types 
of personal data it is Art. 6(1)(c). Ibid. 
165  EDPB Opinion 3/2019 concerning the Questions and Answers on the interplay between 
the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General Data Protection regulation (GDPR) 
(art. 70.1.b)), supra n 162, para 20. 
166  Ibid., para 17. 
167  Ibid., paras 25 and 28. 
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GDPR.168 The same conclusions are recognized by the Directorate-General for 
Health and Food Safety of the European Commission.169 
The author is in disagreement with the position taken by the EDPB and the 
Commission in regard to the claim that in most cases informed consent would 
not be the appropriate legal basis for personal data processing in clinical trials 
in the research phase due to the voluntariness requirement of consent.170 The 
arguments of the EDPB rely heavily on a presumed “imbalance of powers” bet-
ween the potential trial participant and the sponsor of the trial. The core problem 
with this line of argumentation is that the same rationale would then have to be 
mutatis mutandis applied to the consent for participation in the clinical trial, as 
Regulation 536/2014 defines ‘informed consent’ as a “free and voluntary 
expression” (Art. 2(2)(21) Regulation 536/2014) – as does the GDPR, which 
requires consent to be freely given (Art. 4(11) GDPR). In other words, if the 
supposed imbalance of powers between a potential participant and the sponsor 
of a clinical trial negates the possibility of consent within the meaning of the 
GDPR to be freely given, it would then also have to have the same impact on 
the voluntariness of the consent to participation in the trial within the meaning 
of Regulation 536/2014. 
In turn, based on the logic relied upon by the EDPB, it would follow that 
participation in clinical trials in most cases could not be based on informed 
consent since consent could not be considered ‘freely given’ due to the presumed 
imbalance of powers – which would be a ludicrous conclusion, as the exact 
opposite principle applies. As a general rule, participation in clinical trials is 
subject to informed consent.171 Regarding consent to participation in a clinical 
trial, the possibility of the imbalance of powers and its impact on the volun-
tariness of consent is addressed in Regulation 536/2014, which sets out in Recital 
31 that, 
“In order to certify that informed consent is given freely, the investigator 
should take into account all relevant circumstances which might influence 
the decision of a potential subject to participate in a clinical trial, in particu-
lar whether the potential subject belongs to an economically or socially 
disadvantaged group or is in a situation of institutional or hierarchical 
                                                                                                 
168  Ibid., para 34. 
169  European Commission. Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety. Health Systems 
and Products. Medical products – quality, safety and innovation. Question and Answers on 
the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation and the General Data Protection 
Regulation. Updated 10 April 2019. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/ 
files/files/documents/qa_clinicaltrials_gdpr_en.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2019]. 
170  The author does not dispute the positions of the EDPB in regard to the legal bases for 
data processing in clinical trials related to reliability and safety (as opposed to processing 
related to research activities). See also supra n 164. 
171  Arts. 1 and 3, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, supra n 120; Recital 27 of 
Regulation 536/2014, supra n 56. 
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dependency that could inappropriately influence her or his decision to 
participate.”  
This means that an imbalance of powers excluding the voluntariness of consent 
would rule out participation in the trial. Vice versa, if consent to participation in 
the trial can be deemed freely given, the same conclusion must be made in 
terms of the consent to data processing, since the latter is obtained in the context 
of the same relationship (i.e. between the potential participant and the sponsor). 
Exceptions do apply to the general requirement of consent to participation in 
a clinical trial, and certain circumstances can justify incorporating individuals 
into clinical trials without or prior to obtaining consent.172 In the opinion of the 
author, it is specifically these cases in which trial participation is based on legal 
grounds other than consent in which data processing needs to rely on alternative 
bases as well. 
What is more, in stating that consent would not be the appropriate legal basis 
for data processing for the primary research purposes in clinical trials, both the 
EDPB and the Commission refer to the opinion of the WP29 regarding consent 
under the GDPR in a misleading manner.173 The EDPB and the Commission 
make a general reference to the opinion of the WP29 in stating that, “as explained 
in the Guidelines on consent of the Working Party 29, consent will not be the 
appropriate legal basis in most cases, and other legal bases than consent must be 
relied upon”.174 However, the WP29 do not make this statement in regard to the 
research context specifically. In fact, in their guidelines on consent, in regard to 
research the WP29 make no reference to any alternative suitable legal bases for 
data processing for research purposes.175 In these guidelines the WP29 address 
the imbalance of powers and the resulting difficulties of using consent as a legal 
basis for data processing in the context of processing by public authorities and 
in employment.176 In terms of the appropriateness of consent as a legal basis for 
data processing the WP29 note that consent is an appropriate option “if a data 
subject is offered control and is offered a genuine choice with regard to accepting 
                                                                                                 
172  See Art. 35 and Recital 36 of Regulation 536/2014, which refer to emergency situations 
like a patient having “suffered a sudden life-threatening medical condition due to multiple 
traumas, strokes or heart attacks, necessitating immediate medical intervention. For such 
cases, intervention within an ongoing clinical trial, which has already been approved, may 
be pertinent. However, in certain emergency situations, it is not possible to obtain informed 
consent prior to the intervention.” Supra n 56. 
173  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80. 
174  European Data Protection Board (EDPB). Opinion 3/2019 concerning the Questions and 
Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General Data 
Protection regulation (GDPR) (art. 70.1.b)), supra n 162, para 20; European Commission. 
Question and Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation and the 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra n 169, p 6. 
175  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80, 
pp 27–30. 
176  Ibid., pp 6–7. 
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or declining the terms offered or declining them without detriment.” 177  As 
emphasized above, the very same rationale applies to consent in regard to par-
ticipation in clinical trials (or any human subject research for that matter). 
To conclude, unlike the EDPB and the Commission, the author is of the 
opinion that the primary research use of personal (incl. genetic) data in clinical 
trials can and should, in most cases, be based on informed consent within the 
meaning of the GDPR. The counterarguments to this position used by the 
EDPB and the Commission are illogical given that consent to participation in 
the trial needs to be freely given as well – and if consent to participation in the 
trial can be freely given by the potential participant, the voluntariness of the 
consent for data processing within that same relationship between the partici-
pant and trial sponsor cannot be negated. 
 
  
3.3.2. Secondary use of genetic data obtained during clinical trials 
Regulation 536/2014 contains a specific clause regarding the secondary use of 
the personal data obtained during clinical trials. Article 28(2) of Regulation 
536/2014 sets out that, 
“Without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC, the sponsor may ask the subject 
or, where the subject is not able to give informed consent, his or her 
legally designated representative at the time when the subject or the 
legally designated representative gives his or her informed consent to 
participate in the clinical trial to consent to the use of his or her data out-
side the protocol of the clinical trial exclusively for scientific purposes. 
That consent may be withdrawn at any time by the subject or his or her 
legally designated representative. 
The scientific research making use of the data outside the protocol of 
the clinical trial shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable law 
on data protection.” 
The EDPB and the Commission have dismissed the consent referred to in 
Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 as a possible legal basis for data processing. 
Both argue that in order to utilize the possibility referred to in Article 28(2) of 
Regulation 536/2014, the sponsor of the clinical trial would need a specific 
legal basis for data processing – whereas the Commission refers to Article 6 
GDPR in stating so.178 The EDPB emphasizes that consent within the meaning 
of Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 “is not the same consent referred to in 
                                                                                                 
177  Ibid., p 3. 
178  European Data Protection Board (EDPB). Opinion 3/2019 concerning the Questions and 
Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General Data 
Protection regulation (GDPR) (art. 70.1.b)), supra n 162, para 30; European Commission. 
Question and Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation and the 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra n 169, pp 7–8. 
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the GDPR as one of the legal basis for the processing of personal data”.179 Both 
the EDPB and the Commission are of the opinion that the concept of ‘informed 
consent’ in its entirety within the meaning of Regulation 536/2014 and its 
Chapter V is to be distinguished from the consent for data processing within the 
meaning of the GDPR. 180  The Commission explains that informed consent 
within the meaning of Regulation 536/2014 “serves as an ethical standard and 
procedural obligation”, and “is the fundamental condition under which a person 
can be included into a clinical trial. It is not conceived as an instrument for data 
processing compliance.”181 
The author concurs with the general notion that the consent to participation 
in clinical trials within the meaning of Regulation 536/2014 (and human subject 
research as such) is to be distinguished from consent to data processing within 
the meaning of the GDPR. However, in the author’s opinion the one exception 
to this general approach in regard to consent under Regulation 536/2014 is 
precisely that embedded into Article 28(2). There are three arguments to support 
this dissenting position of the author. 
First, from the text and wording of Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 it is 
apparent that the consent established in the referred clause is not concerned with 
participation in the trial as it refers solely to the future use of data. Consent 
under Article 28(2) concerns the secondary use of the data obtained during the 
trial outside of the trial (i.e. for different research purposes). It thus constitutes a 
parallel procedure to obtaining participation consent and does not impact 
participation in trial. This means that the overarching approach to the meaning 
of ‘informed consent’ under Regulation 536/2014 as being focused solely on 
participation in clinical trials (and not data processing) is not applicable to the 
consent referred to in Article 28(2). 
Second, and closely connected to the previous point, the argument that the 
consent referred to in Article 28(2) is one designed as a legal basis for data 
processing, is further indicated in Recital 29 of Regulation 536/2014. The latter 
explains that the aim of this consent is to enable researchers to use the data 
collected during trials “for future scientific research, for example for medical, 
natural or social sciences research purposes.” Thus the aim of the consent 
referred to in Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 is precisely to enable data 
processing for future projects, provided that this is done “exclusively for 
scientific purposes”. 
Third, the assertion that Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 does not 
establish a separate notion of consent for future processing of the data obtained 
during clinical trials begs the question of why this clause exists in Regulation 
                                                                                                 
179  European Data Protection Board (EDPB). Opinion 3/2019 concerning the Questions and 
Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General 
Data Protection regulation (GDPR) (art. 70.1.b)), supra n 162, para 29. 
180  Ibid.; European Commission. Question and Answers on the interplay between the 
Clinical Trials Regulation and the General Data Protection Regulation, supra n 169, p 6. 
181  Ibid. 
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536/2014 in the first place. The GDPR does not exclude the possibility for other 
EU law to regulate the research use of personal data. To the contrary, concerning 
the research use of special categories of data, Article 9(2)(j) GDPR refers to this 
as being a matter to be regulated in Member State or other EU law. Following 
the rationale of the EDPB and the Commission, however, Article 28(2) of 
Regulation 536/2014 would serve no actual purpose. The trial sponsor could 
always obtain consent in accordance with the GDPR in order to use the data 
outside of the clinical trial, but would then also be limited by the condition of 
having to set out specific purposes in the consent as required by Article 9(2)(a) 
GDPR (though according to the WP29 this is modified to a less strict standard 
by Recital 33 GDPR). This is, in fact, exactly what the Commission argues as 
they refer to Recital 33 GDPR.182 
Since the author disagrees with the Commission and the EDPB in regard to 
the meaning of Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 and the nature of the 
consent referred to therein, it also brings about a disagreement in regard to the 
specificity and acceptable breadth of consent in this context. Unlike Article 
9(2)(a) and Recital 33 GDPR, Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 sets no 
apparent limits to the breadth of this type of consent other than the use of the data 
“exclusively for scientific purposes”. As noted above, Recital 29 of Regulation 
536/2014 further explains that this type of consent will enable “data from clinical 
trials to be used for future scientific research, for example for medical, natural 
or social sciences research purposes” (i.e. essentially any future research pur-
poses). Because the EDPB and the Commission are of the opinion that Article 
28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 does not establish a broader type of consent for 
data processing, and solely refer to the GDPR in terms of consent and its 
requirements, they also conclude that the limits set in Recital 33 GDPR still 
apply (though in the author’s opinion it would then have to be the limits set by 
Art. 9(2)(a) GDPR, unless national or other EU law provides for a broader 
research consent). However, if one were to accept the author’s arguments in 
regard to the independent nature of the consent in Article 28(2) of Regulation 
536/2014 as a legal basis for data processing, one could negate the applicability 
of the limits in the GDPR in regard to the breadth of consent, and conclude that 
Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 allows for a type of open research consent 
for the future use of the data obtained during trials.183 
Other aspects of the collection, storage and further use of the data obtained 
during clinical trials are still subject to the GDPR, as is evidenced by the last 
sentence of Article 28(2) Regulation 536/2014. 
 
To conclude, the author is of the opinion that the primary use of genetic data in 
clinical trials (i.e. genetic research as part of clinical trials) should, in most cases, 
be based on informed consent as a legal basis for the processing. This is in 
                                                                                                 
182  Ibid., pp 8–9. 
183  See K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of human and data 
research. Supra n 64, pp 354–355. 
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contrast to the positions expressed by the EDPB and Commission. However, 
their reasoning against consent as a primary legal basis for data processing for 
research purposes in clinical trials collides with simple logic: if voluntariness of 
the consent to data processing is under question due to the presumed imbalance 
of powers between the potential participant and the sponsor of the trial, this same 
imbalance would exclude the voluntariness of the consent to participation in the 
trial, which, in turn, would exclude participation from the trial in the first place 
(hence nullifying any dilemma regarding the voluntariness of the consent to 
data processing). 
Furthermore, the author also disagrees with the EDPB and the Commission 
regarding the secondary use of genetic data obtained during clinical trials. 
Consent under Article 28(2) of Regulation 536/2014 does not concern or in any 
way affect participation in the trial. Its sole aim is to enable the future research 
use of the data obtained during a clinical trial, i.e. it is designed as a form of 
consent for data processing. 
 
 
3.4. Consent frameworks put into context on  
the Estonian example 
The aim of this Section is to put all the above into context on the example of 
one national legal system with the purpose of establishing a comprehensive 
analysis and overview of applicable consent requirements (or lack thereof) in 
genetic research. This will be done on the example of Estonia. 
 
 
3.4.1. Consent to genetic research entailing procurement of 
biosamples 
Estonian national legal acts do not entail an explicit general rule of consent 
when it comes to participation in human subject research. Of course, this general 
principle can be derived from fundamental rights protected by the Constitution 
of Estonia, like the right to liberty and security of person184 and the right to the 
inviolability of private and family life.185 However, due to the lack of respective 
specific legal clauses in Estonian national law, and based on relevant Supreme 
Court case law, the author is of the opinion that the rules in the Oviedo 
                                                                                                 
184  “Security of person” is a direct translation and should be understood as integrity of person, 
which in health care and research is reflected in the notion of free and informed consent. See 
commentary to § 20, Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (2017). 
185  § 20 and § 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, RT 1992, 26, 349. Available 
in English at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide [Accessed 18 April 
2019]. 
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convention concerning consent to participation in human subject research can 
be directly applied in Estonia.186 
Thus, generally, informed consent is required for participation in human 
research,187 and the physical intervention of obtaining biosamples from indi-
viduals cannot be performed without prior consent. This is also clearly evidenced 
in Estonian penal law, as the latter criminalizes conducting human research on 
individuals who have not provided consent pursuant to law or have not been 
informed of significant risks associated with the research.188 Estonian penal law 
also criminalizes forcing or inducing someone to donate biosamples, organs or 
cells,189 and obtaining organs or biosamples for transplantation purposes if the 
individual was not informed of associated significant risks, or if the person 
removing the organ or biosamples knew that the donor is to receive payment for 
the organ or biosamples190. 
In regard to the primary research use of the genetic data derived from the 
biosamples, in addition to the GDPR, the national data protection law applies. 
On 15 January 2019, the new Estonian Personal Data Protection Act191 (DP Act) 
came into force, elaborating upon and supplementing the GDPR, and imple-
menting the directive on data processing in law enforcement192. However the 
Estonian DP Act does not regulate consent to data processing in the research 
                                                                                                 
186  § 123(2) of the Estonian Constituion establishes that “When laws or other legislation of 
Estonia are in conflict with an international treaty ratified by the Riigikogu, provisions of the 
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3-3-1-58-02 of 20 December 2002 of the Estonian Supreme Court. 
187  There are exceptions, as enshrined in, e.g., Article 17 of the Oviedo convention that 
addresses research on individuals not able to consent. In rare cases and under certain circum-
stances, research without consent on individuals not able to give consent can be justified. 
See also Recital 36 and Art. 35 of Regulation 536/2014 on clinical trials, supra n 56. 
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189  ‘Forcing’ is to be understood as removing organs, biosamples or cells if such removal is 
“performed through deprivation of liberty, violence, deceit, threatening to cause damage, by 
taking advantage of dependence on another person, helpless situation or vulnerable situation 
of the person”. See § 1381 and § 140 of the Estonian Penal Code, ibid. 
190  Note that this only applies if the organ or biosamples are meant for transplantation pur-
poses, i.e. not research. § 139 of the Estonian Penal Code, ibid. 
191  Supra n 65. 
192  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. OJ L119/89. 
 56 
context. This means that in regard to informed consent for genetic data processing 
for research purposes, the GDPR must be referred to. Consent to data processing 
in research under the GDPR was addressed in Section 3.1.2. of this chapter. It 
was concluded that whilst informed consent is an appropriate legal basis for the 
primary research use of genetic data, it remains arguable how broad this consent 
can be, i.e. how specific the purposes listed within the consent have to be. This 
is a notably crucial practical question in genetic research due to the vast research 
potential of genetic data. It is clear that the breadth of research consent – at least 
as far as special categories of data within the meaning of Article 9 GDPR are 
concerned – cannot go beyond Recital 33 GDPR (“certain areas of scientific 
research”). 
One instance in which Estonian law does regulate consent to the research use 
of genetic data is the specific case of the Estonian Biobank. Consent to partici-
pation in the Estonian Biobank project is established under the Human Genes 
Research Act 193  (HGRA). Under § 12(1) HGRA consent is given for the 
purposes of “genetic research, assessment of personal health risks and prevention 
of diseases, public health research and statistical purposes.” This consent con-
cerns the use of the tissue, the genetic data derived therefrom, and all health 
data stored in state databases.  
The issue of the practical application of Recital 33 GDPR in Estonia remains 
unclear in two aspects. First, there is the question of how to determine how 
broadly “certain areas of scientific research” should be interpreted in practice. For 
example, one could question whether the above-referred consent to participation 
in the Estonian Biobank is specific enough (i.e. can ‘genetic research’ as such 
be considered ‘a certain area of research’?). Second, unlike the WP29, the author 
is not convinced that Recital 33 GDPR can be directly applied without respective 
national laws implementing this type of broader research consent. As argued in 
Section 3.1.2. of this chapter, although in EU law recitals might have inter-
pretive value, the rules on consent regarding the processing of special categories 
of data (incl. genetic data) are very clear under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR: consent 
can be given for “one or more specified purposes”. For example, in Estonian 
law, § 12(1) HGRA could be regarded as an exercise of the discretion granted 
to Member States under Article 9(2)(j) GDPR for regulating the research use of 
special categories of personal data – though, as noted, it remains arguable 
whether the breadth of consent under the HGRA exceeds the limits set in 
Recital 33 GDPR. 
Based on the above, and in light of the fact that the Estonian DP Act does not 
address consent for data processing for research purposes, the author concludes 
that informed consent in research for the use of genetic data should adhere to 
the specificity requirements under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR (with the exception of 
the consent of the Estonian Biobank established under § 12(1) HGRA). The 
author does not argue this to be necessarily the best suited approach from the 
                                                                                                 
193  Estonian Human Genes Research Act, RT I 2000, 104, 685. Available in English at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/508042019001/consolide [Accessed 2 August 2019]. 
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perspective of data subjects, however, it is how the law currently stands in the 
opinion of the author. 
Thus, in terms of genetic research entailing the procurement of biosamples 
in order to use the genetic data derived from the samples for research purposes, 
two types of consent requirements apply. First those concerning the physical act 
of the procurement of the biosamples, and, second, those regarding consent to 
data processing under the GDPR. As prescribed in Article 9(2)(a) GDPR, the 
latter consent can be obtained for specific research purposes. 
 
 
3.4.2. Research entailing secondary use of biosamples  
and/or genetic data derived therefrom 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the concept of human subject research within 
the meaning of the Oviedo convention would not cover a scenario in which bio-
samples have been obtained for purposes outside of a research project. For 
example, if blood of a patient was withdrawn in the course of their clinical care, 
and this blood would later be used in research, this would not constitute human 
subject research.194 However, the Oviedo convention does contain in Article 22 
a rule regarding the reuse of a removed part of the human body. The referred 
article establishes a minimum threshold of due notification to enable objection, 
with possible further conditions – such as a requirement of (informed) consent – 
to be established in national laws.195 
Under Estonian law, there is no general rule of consent regarding the secondary 
research use of already obtained biosamples. There is a respective legal rule for 
the secondary use of blood withdrawn from patients in the course of clinical care 
and from blood donors. The Estonian Blood Act196 sets out in § 10(1) that 
secondary use of donors’ blood and blood components in research requires written 
consent. Whereas under § 10(2) of the Blood Act, patients’ blood and blood 
components that were obtained for the purposes of clinical care may be used for 
commercial or research purposes subject to written consent. In either case, there 
is no requirement for the consent to be ‘informed’, but simply in writing.197 
However, the Blood Act would not apply to other types of tissue, e.g., saliva 
or other samples that can as well be used in order to sequence DNA.198 The only 
                                                                                                 
194  See supra n 130. See also K. Pormeister. Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads 
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196  Estonian Blood Act, RT I 2005, 13, 63. Available in English at  
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198  See, e.g., U.G. Poehls et al. Saliva samples as a source of DNA for high throughput geno-
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general national law governing the procurement, handling and transplantation of 
cells, tissues and organs does not govern their use for research purposes,199 as the 
law implements Directive 2004/23/EC, which only concerns human application, 
but not the research use of cells, biosamples and organs.200 Hence the only 
governing rule in terms of the secondary use of biosamples in research in the 
Estonian context remains Article 22 of the Oviedo convention. 
Thus, where Estonian law does not require consent for the further use of 
biosamples – such as is the case with blood in particular – the minimum thre-
shold of due notification established under Article 22 of the Oviedo convention 
applies. This means that in terms of genetic research, biosamples other than 
blood, e.g. saliva samples obtained by direct-to-consumer genetic testing com-
panies, could be further used for research purposes without the need to obtain 
consent from the individual. Article 22 of the Oviedo convention would mini-
mally require due notification in order to enable objections. 
Of course, in regard to either scenario – whether (informed) consent is required 
or not for the secondary use of any type of biosample – in the context of genetic 
research it would not be the physical tissue that is of core interest, but the genetic 
data contained therein. In terms of the use of genetic data in research, informed 
consent could be used as a legal basis for data processing. However, the Estonian 
DP Act201 offers an alternative for the use of the data in research without the 
need to obtain consent. 
 
 
3.4.3. Research use of genetic data without consent of the data subject 
The Estonian DP Act does not distinguish between different types of data in 
terms of the substantive requirements for the use of personal data in research 
without consent. It does distinguish between two scenarios: one where pseud-
onymised data is used, and another where personal data is processed in research 
with direct identifiers.202 
As to the first scenario, § 6(1) of the DP Act allows for personal data to be 
used in research without consent in pseudonymised form or in a form, which 
provides an equivalent level of protection. The DP Acts establishes no sub-
stantive requirements or applicable safeguards other than pseudonymisation. In 
regard to safeguards required under Article 89(1) GDPR, the latter mentions 
pseudonymisation as an example of possible safeguarding measures in the context 
of research. However, under § 6(2) of the DP Act, de-pseudonymisation is per-
mitted for additional research use of the data. What this means in practice, will 
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depend on the exact research scenario. For example, whether a researcher receives 
the data already in pseudonymised form from another controller who holds the 
key-code for de-pseudonymisation, or whether it is the researcher who 
pseudonymises the data and holds the key-code himself. 
In regard to the second scenario referred to above, § 6(3) of the DP Act also 
allows for personal data to be used in research without consent and with direct 
identifiers, i.e. in a form, which enables direct identification of the data subject. 
In this case, three substantive requirements apply: (1) the purposes of processing 
cannot be achieved after removal of the data enabling identification or it would 
be unreasonably difficult to achieve these purposes; (2) there is an “overriding 
public interest” in the given research project in the opinion of the researcher; 
(3) no obligations will be put on data subjects nor will their rights be 
“excessively damaged in any other manner”. 
The first requirement of the three is unambiguous – there needs to be good 
reason for access to and use of data with direct identifiers in research. In 
practice, particularly in the Estonian context, a common argument would be the 
need to accumulate data on the same individual from different (state) databases. 
In order to do this, names and/or personal identification codes would be needed. 
However, the other two conditions are more ambiguous. The “overriding public 
interest” requirement is, first, to be determined by the researchers themselves. 
Second, scientific research is not a linear journey, thus – and specifically in the 
case of genetic and health-related research – it would be extremely difficult to 
draw a line between ‘public interest’ and ‘overriding public interest’. Regrettably, 
the explanatory note to the DP Act does not comment on or elaborate upon the 
requirement of “overriding public interest” in the context of research.203 As to 
the third condition regarding the non-impact on the obligations and rights of data 
subjects, it would be difficult if not impossible to prove a negative. Hence the 
latter condition would have to be deemed as met by way of confirmation on 
behalf of the researcher. 
Generally, as emphasized in the explanatory note to the DP Act, the system 
of the research use of personal data without consent of data subjects in Estonia 
relies on self-monitoring by researchers.204 Only where research is based on 
special categories of data (e.g. genetic data) does § 6(4) of the DP Act require an 
ethics review (alternatively, a review by the Data Protection Inspectorate, where 
there is no ethics committee in a respective area of research). The text of the law 
clearly triggers the review requirement whenever research is based on special 
categories of data. Whereas the explanatory note aims to significantly limit the 
review requirement.205 According to the explanatory note, the ethics review is 
required only where special categories of data are to be processed with direct 
                                                                                                 
203  Seletuskiri isikuandmete kaitse seaduse eelnõu juurde (Explanatory note to the DP Act). 
Available only in Estonian at https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/5c9f8086-
b465-4067-841e-41e7df3b95af [Accessed 27 April 2019]. 
204  § 6 of the explanatory note to the DP Act, ibid. 
205  K. Pormeister. Regulatory environment for biobanking in Estonia. Supra n 72. 
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identifiers (the above-referred scenario under § 6(3) of the DP Act). The 
explanatory note goes even further in stating that a review is only required if 
special categories of data are to be used in research with direct identifiers 
continuously throughout the analysis of the data. The latter statement is dubious 
at best. First, the statement is clearly at odds with the law itself. Second, in 
practical terms, generally data analysis in research does not require the processing 
of direct identifiers such as names or identity codes; making the referred 
statement in the explanatory note highly questionable.206 
It is important to understand that – and this is clearly stated in the explanatory 
note to the DP Act – under the described Estonian approach, i.e. in this system 
reliant on self-compliance of researchers, if the researcher demonstrates com-
pliance with the requirements under § 6 of the DP Act, the researcher must be 
provided access to the requested personal data (available in, e.g., state data-
bases). 
 
Thus the Estonian example demonstrates that informed consent might not neces-
sarily be a legal requirement for the use of genetic data in research (even where 
direct identifiers are attached). Though the physical procurement of biosamples 
is clearly subject to informed consent, the later secondary use of the biosamples 
might not be (e.g. further use of patient or donor blood is subject to written 
consent, whereas further use of saliva samples is subject to a requirement of due 
notification). When it comes to genetic data, though use of the data in research 
might rely on informed consent as a legal basis, the consent can only be for 
limited purposes – according to the WP29 consent could be given on a more 
general level as described in Recital 33 GDPR regardless of national law, though 
in their opinion this exception should still be interpreted strictly; thus leaving it 
entirely unclear, what it means in practice. However, under Estonian law, genetic 
data can as well be used in research without consent based on § 6 of the Estonian 
DP Act. Processing genetic data for research purposes without consent might be 
conditional on an ethics review (or, alternatively, a review by the Data Protection 
Inspectorate), however the substantive requirements to do so would not be 
difficult to meet. In fact, there is at least one case in the practice of the Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu in which the committee approved of 
DNA being sequenced from biosamples obtained for research where the informed 
consent of participants did not explicitly mention the sequencing of DNA from 
the samples or the use of particularly genetic data. Due to the confidentiality of 
the ethics review proceedings and decisions, the author is not able to cite the 
decision.207 
 
 
                                                                                                 
206  Ibid. 
207  The author was a member of the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tartu 
in 2016–2019. 
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3.5. Conclusive remarks on the role of informed consent  
as a modality of and its impact on transparency  
Whilst consent and the required provision of information to individuals is still 
an integral part of genetic research that entails procurement of biosamples from 
individuals directly, it seems to have lost its prominence in the transition of 
research towards reliance on secondary uses of both biosamples and the genetic 
data derived therefrom.  
The research use of biosamples and genetic data is subject to different sets of 
rules. Whereas the use of the genetic data is subject to the GDPR, the use of the 
biosamples depends in most part on national law. The Estonian example illus-
trates how this might create issues with transparency in relation to individuals. 
Whilst Estonian law would require written consent for the secondary research 
use of patient and donor blood, it does not require this consent to be informed. 
This consent would thus not have to specify whether DNA might later be 
sequenced from the blood for research purposes. Furthermore, for other types of 
biosamples like saliva, due notification would suffice. Of course, in regard to 
the genetic data, data protection law would apply. As evidenced by the Estonian 
example, however, national data protection law might allow for genetic data to 
be used in research without consent (even with direct identifiers, though then 
subject to review requirements). Thus, in sum, by giving consent for (or not 
objecting to) biosamples to be used in research the individual might ultimately 
and effectively allow their genetic data to be used in research without being 
aware of doing so. 
However, even where genetic data are obtained for and used in research on 
the basis of informed consent, two problems in regard to transparency in 
relation to the data subject arise. First, it remains unclear how broadly the pur-
poses of processing in a research context may be communicated to individuals 
prior to obtaining consent. The author argues that the strict rules under Article 
9(2)(a) GDPR in terms of the specificity of consent should apply in genetic 
research, unless national or other EU law allows for broader research consent; 
whereas the WP29 have seen Recital 33 GDPR as creating a direct exception to 
the strictness of the referred clause. Regrettably, it remains unclear what the 
position of the WP29 means in practice in the context of genetic research. The 
general rule under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR would require specificity on the level 
of research projects to be communicated to the individual. If national or other 
EU law were to facilitate broader research consent, as set out in Recital 33 
GDPR, then guidelines to the practical application of this type of broader consent 
in research should accompany such provisions. However, if the principles in 
Recital 33 GDPR are directly applicable, as argued by the WP29, such guidelines 
in regard to the practical application of the principles expressed in Recital 33 
GDPR should be issued by the EDPB. 
Second, whether informed consent to data processing in research is limited 
to specific research projects or more broadly defined areas of research, the data 
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could still be later used in different research without the consent of the indi-
vidual. Since the storage and purpose limitations do not apply as far as the 
research use of data is concerned, the limits of the initial consent would not rule 
out the later use of the same data on alternative legal grounds, such as those 
established in national law and embedded in § 6 of the Estonian DP Act. 
In sum, even in cases where requirements of informed consent (and the 
respective prior provision of information) apply in genetic research, these do 
not limit the further research use of the genetic data. Hence, informed consent 
to data processing cannot be seen as an effective modality of transparency for 
two reasons. First, defining specific processing purposes prior to obtaining 
consent would be difficult in genetic research, whereas defining the purposes 
more broadly would render future processing of the data non-transparent to the 
data subject. Second, the processing purposes listed in the consent and the 
provision of information prior to obtaining consent do not limit the use of the 
data for future research purposes that were not communicated to the data 
subject prior to obtaining consent. Thus, in the context of genetic research, 
informed consent cannot adequately facilitate transparency in relation to the 
data subject within the meaning of the GDPR. 
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IV. THE GENERAL OBLIGATION TO INFORM AS MODALITY  
OF TRANSPARENCY IN GENETIC RESEARCH 
Regardless of the legal basis for data processing – whether it is informed 
consent of the individual or an alternative legal ground – the GDPR obliges data 
controllers to provide information to data subjects concerning the processing of 
their data. Thus, where information is not provided to the individual as part of 
consent procedures, the general obligation to provide information to the data 
subject regarding the processing of their data applies. 
The general obligation to inform is not novel in the data protection frame-
work as it was already part of the obligations put on data controllers under 
Directive 95/46/EC.208 Although unlike its predecessor, the GDPR is directly 
applicable and lays out this obligation more extensively and in more detail, it 
remains problematic in terms of effectively facilitating transparency, at least as 
far as the research context is concerned.  
The author concluded in the previous chapter that the provision of informa-
tion in the context of consent procedures does not adequately facilitate trans-
parency in relation to the data subject in genetic research. The aim of this chapter 
is to analyse the general obligation to inform as a modality of transparency in 
order to determine whether transparency in genetic research in relation to indi-
viduals can be effectively facilitated via this obligation of data controllers. In 
this chapter, arguments will be presented to demonstrate that the design of the 
general obligation to inform is flawed as far as the research use of personal data 
is concerned; rendering it ineffective for purposes of facilitating transparency in 
relation to the data subject in genetic research. 
This chapter will first present an analysis on the general obligation to inform 
under the GDPR (4.1.) and, in particular, the exceptions applicable to this obli-
gation when personal data is being processed for research purposes (4.2.). There-
after the author will address the design flaws rendering the obligation to inform 
ineffective as a modality of providing transparency in relation to the data subject 
in genetic research (4.3.). Finally, the author shall avail a practical example 
from Estonia in order to critically examine existing practical modalities and their 
potential for effectively facilitating transparency in relation to data subjects in 
the context of research use of personal data (4.4.). 
 
  
4.1. The general obligation to inform under the GDPR 
Articles 13 and 14 GDPR oblige data controllers to provide information to data 
subjects regarding the processing of their data – with the former article regulating 
scenarios where data has been obtained from the data subject directly, and the 
latter regarding scenarios where data has been obtained from other sources (e.g. 
                                                                                                 
208  Arts. 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC, supra n 38. 
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another data subject or controller). Amongst the information to be provided to 
individuals regarding the use of their personal data are, most importantly, the 
identity and contact details of the controller, and the purposes of and legal basis 
for the processing. 
Both articles are essentially identical, albeit a few minor, and some major 
differences. As to minor differences, Article 13 GDPR obliges controllers to 
provide individuals the required information at the time of obtaining the data, 
whereas Article 14(3)(a) GDPR, as a general rule, mandates this to be done 
within a reasonable period, but the latest within one month after obtaining the 
data. Unlike Article 13, Article 14(1)(d) GDPR also requires the categories of 
personal data concerned to be communicated to the individual. Both described 
discrepancies are due to the scope of the respective articles – since Article 13 
GDPR concerns scenarios where data is obtained directly from individuals, 
there is no need to communicate the categories of personal data concerned, as 
the individual will be the one providing the data.209 The same rationale applies 
to the timing of the provision of the required information as in this scenario 
there is direct contact with individuals enabling immediate communication of 
the information. 
The major difference between Articles 13 and 14 GDPR is the fact that the 
latter establishes a list of exceptions to the obligation to provide information to 
data subjects. The only exception in Article 13 GDPR is established in paragraph 
4 according to which the obligation to inform does not apply “insofar as the 
data subject already has the information.”210 The same notion is also reflected in 
the list of exceptions under Article 14 GDPR. In terms of this approach to the 
exceptions to the obligation to inform, ironically, from the perspective of data 
subjects, it would be of equal (if not greater) importance to be informed of pro-
cessing activities precisely in cases in which the data has been obtained from 
sources other than the data subject. 
The list of exceptions in Article 14 GDPR includes a specific exception for the 
research context. Hence, where data has been obtained from sources other than 
the individual (e.g. health information databases), exceptions to the obligation 
to inform might apply, particularly if the data is to be used for research pur-
poses. As noted above, in scenarios falling under Article 13 GDPR there are no 
respective exceptions to the obligation to inform. M. Taylor (2012) has criticized 
this discrepancy in terms of Directive 95/46/EC and its Articles 10 and 11 – 
however, the underlying argument remains the same and as relevant under the 
GDPR. Taylor argues that the primary controller who obtained the data from 
                                                                                                 
209  Or, as put by the WP29, “This information is required in an Article 14 scenario because 
the personal data has not been obtained from the data subject, who therefore lacks an 
awareness of which categories of their personal data the data controller has obtained.” 
Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 
8, Annex, p 36. 
210  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, p 27, para 56. 
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the individual should as well be afforded some leniency in terms of the 
obligation to inform.211 Taylor goes on to explain that even where data has been 
obtained directly from the data subject, the data might still later find use in 
research, whilst (re)contacting the concerned individuals might be impossible or 
involve a disproportionate effort (just as it might for a processor who has not 
obtained the data directly from the data subject). 
In terms of Taylor’s criticism, one example could be health care providers. 
The latter obtain personal data from individuals for the purposes of clinical care 
from individuals directly (for purposes of simplification, the author excludes 
from this example prior medical records that might be accessed without direct 
involvement of the data subject). Article 13 GDPR applies in terms of the 
provision of information to the individual, which means that no exceptions 
apply and the patients should be re-contacted to provide information on further 
processing of their data for research purposes. However, there is a nuance to 
this, which arises under Article 13 GDPR. Although like Article 10 of Directive 
95/46/EC criticised by Taylor in regard to the lack of exceptions, Article 13 
GDPR does not specifically or explicitly provide an exception to the obligation 
to inform in this scenario, it does address secondary processing needs. Namely, 
Article 13(3) GDPR obliges the controller to inform individuals of intentions 
regarding further processing of the data for purposes other than for which the 
data was collected. The same rule is embedded into Article 14(4) GDPR. Thus, 
if a health care provider has intentions to further use patient data obtained for 
clinical care for research purposes, and if these intentions already exist at the 
time of obtaining the data from the patients, the health care provider could fulfil 
the obligation to inform in regard to such further research processing when 
obtaining the data from the patient (e.g. during the visit during which the 
medical data is obtained for purposes of clinical care). Hence, under Article 13 
GDPR, the primary controller’s secondary processing needs and the accom-
panying possible need for exceptions from the obligation to inform are not 
addressed via per se exceptions to the obligation to inform, but rather by the 
possibility provided under Article 13(3) GDPR to fulfil the obligation to inform 
in regard to secondary processing already during the provision of information 
regarding primary processing – thereby eliminating the need to re-contact indi-
viduals. Of course, this presumes that the controller already has known inten-
tions for possible secondary uses of the data (which may be the case in terms of 
health care providers later utilising the data for research purposes; particularly if 
the given health care provider is, e.g., a hospital associated with a university). 
However, the practical meaning of Article 13(3) GDPR will largely depend 
on how broadly secondary processing purposes need to be defined. If defined 
broadly, the provision of information regarding secondary processing purposes 
could be limited to a one-off communication. 
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Another nuance to the applicability of the obligation to inform in scenarios 
where data has been obtained from data subjects directly, are the impact of the 
principle of data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and the principle 
expressed in Article 11(1) GDPR. The former article sets out that no more 
personal data shall be processed than is necessary for the purposes for which the 
data is processed. Article 11(1) GDPR lays out that, 
“If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or 
do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, 
the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional 
information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of 
complying with this Regulation.” (emphasis added by the author) 
Applying the rationale of the above-referred principles to scenarios where a 
controller has no need or no longer needs to identify data subjects, identifying 
information (incl. contact information) should not be obtained and should be 
discarded if not needed for the particular processing purposes, and should not 
be processed for the sole purposes of complying with the GDPR (incl. the obli-
gation to inform). Not obtaining or discarding contact information would render 
the fulfilment of the obligation to provide information on secondary processing 
purposes impossible regardless of the lack of a respective exception under 
Article 13 GDPR. This would likely not be the case in the above-described 
example of a health care provider using patient data for research purposes, how-
ever, it could be the case were the data was initially obtained from data subjects 
for other purposes, which do not require obtaining or maintaining contact or 
other identifying information of data subjects. For example, if the data was 
obtained for research purposes as primary processing purposes with no need to 
further contact the data subjects, information enabling contact should not be 
obtained or maintained, and provision of information on secondary processing 
purposes would then be de facto impossible. 
To conclude, although in scenarios where data has been obtained from data 
subjects directly, Article 13 GDPR does not establish exceptions to the obligation 
to inform, this obligation might be nullified in regard to secondary processing 
by the principle of data minimisation and Article 11(1) GDPR where a given 
controller does not or no longer needs to identify data subjects and does not 
obtain or discards contact information (thus rendering it impossible to provide 
information on secondary processing). Furthermore, even where the obligation 
to inform regarding secondary processing purposes can be fulfilled in scenarios 
falling under Article 13 GDPR, the provision of information might be limited to 
a one-off communication depending on how broadly secondary processing 
purposes are communicated. 
The problem of the obligation to inform being limited to a one-off commu-
nication shall be elaborated upon further below. However, first, the research 
exceptions to the obligation to inform under Article 14 GDPR scenarios shall be 
addressed. 
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4.2. The research exceptions to the obligation to inform 
As noted, under Article 14 GDPR concerning scenarios where data has been 
obtained from sources other than the data subject (e.g. third party data controllers, 
public sources, data brokers, or other data subjects)212, a list of exceptions apply 
in regard to the controllers’ obligation to inform; one of which concerns inter 
alia expressly the research context. Namely, Article 14(5)(b) GDPR establishes 
that the obligation to inform does not apply if, 
“the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a 
disproportionate effort, in particular for processing for archiving purposes 
in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes, subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 
89(1) or in so far as the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article 
is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the 
objectives of that processing. In such cases the controller shall take 
appropriate measures to protect the data subject's rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests, including making the information publicly available”. 
The WP29 have interpreted Article 14(5)(b) GDPR as establishing essentially 
three different exceptions: (1) the provision of information proves impossible 
(particularly for processing for archiving, research or statistical purposes); 
(2) the provision of information would involve a disproportionate effort (particu-
larly for processing for archiving, research or statistical purposes); (3) the pro-
vision of information would make the achievement of the objectives of the pro-
cessing impossible or seriously impair them.213 Thus, two of the three scenarios 
addressed under Article 14(5)(b) give particular consideration for the research 
context. The author will address the two exceptions separately and argue that 
they are likely to apply in the context of genetic research. 
 
 
4.2.1. Impossibility of providing information in the research context 
In terms of the provision of information proving impossible, the WP29 have 
considered that, “In practice, there will be very few situations in which a data 
controller can demonstrate that it is actually impossible to provide the infor-
mation to data subjects.”214 The WP29 then go on to offer an example in which 
a data controller has no means to directly contact individuals due to a lack of 
valid contact information. 
                                                                                                 
212  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, p 15, para 26. 
213  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, p 28, para 58. 
214  Ibid., p 29, para 59. 
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The impossibility of providing information must be considered taking into 
account the GDPR as a whole, whilst simultaneously looking at it from the 
research perspective specifically. Two important factors come into play that 
were already commented upon earlier: the principle of data minimisation under 
Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and Article 11(1) GDPR. The principle of data minimisa-
tion would require that a party interested in using personal data in research 
would not request or obtain any more data than is necessary for fulfilling the 
particular research purpose. As noted earlier, Article 11(1) GDPR adds to this 
that personal data should not be acquired or maintained for the sole purposes of 
complying with the GDPR if a given controller does not or no longer need to 
identify data subjects. 
From this it follows that unless contact information is relevant to and neces-
sary for fulfilling certain research objectives, such data should not be obtained 
or maintained for the sole purpose of complying with the GDPR (incl. the 
obligation to inform). Without information enabling the controller to contact the 
individuals, the provision of information would be rendered impossible. 
Furthermore, in a research context, though re-identification of and re-con-
tacting specific individuals might be necessary in certain scenarios (e.g. rare 
disease research)215, in many cases pseudonymised data will suffice. If a given 
controller cannot re-identify a specific individual based on pseudonymised data 
that they use in their research (e.g. genetic data with no direct identifiers, and no 
access to the key code for de-pseudonymisation), Article 11(1) GDPR will relieve 
the researcher from having to obtain additional information (such as contact 
information) on the data subjects solely for complying with the GDPR.216 This 
argument stands even in the case of genetic data, which due to its inherently 
identifying nature could still potentially enable identification in a different or 
future context (though obtained for research purposes without direct identifiers). 
Although the WP29 have referred to Article 11(1) GDPR in their guidelines 
regarding transparency under the GDPR, they have done so whilst addressing 
the ‘disproportionate effort’ exception without further explanation and by simply 
hinting at its possible relevancy.217 They have also emphasized that “Article 11 
of the GDPR should be interpreted as a way of enforcing genuine data 
minimisation without hindering the exercise of data subject rights”.218 In the 
opinion of the author there is nothing disingenuous about researchers not 
obtaining or maintaining contact information of individuals where research 
purposes can be attained without such information. Hence, Article 11(1) GDPR 
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is likely to be of relevance whenever pseudonymised data is used in research 
(presuming that the key code is not accessible for purposes of re-identification). 
However, in regard to genetic research specifically, it is important to recognize 
that if the pseudonymised data to be used in research is or includes genetic data, 
identification of individuals might still be possible by, e.g., using comparative 
data in existing databases, accumulating additional data on the same individual 
(e.g. facilitated via the entity holding the key code), or using future (yet unknown) 
technological means. Whether a given controller can identify an individual based 
on their genetic data without direct identifiers, effectively depends on variables 
such as whether that particular controller has (or will have at any point in time) 
access to comparative data in existing databases, or acquires (at some point in 
the future) additional data that can be linked to the genetic data and potentially 
enable identification. As put by M. Taylor (2012) in regard to anonymity of 
data, “Data can be identifiable in one context, anonymous in another, and it may 
shift between these states depending upon the availability and accessibility of 
relevant interpretative frameworks.”219 The same logic applies to pseudonymised 
data that might at one point in time be anonymous from the perspective of a 
particular controller who cannot re-identify the individuals concerned. 
Thus, once a researcher has obtained data for research purposes without 
contact information – whether the data is pseudonymised or not – an argument 
for the impossibility of providing information to data subjects can be made and 
the relevant exception invoked. This means that the stream of informedness 
towards individuals is essentially cut off once the third party data controller 
obtains data for research purposes without valid contact information. 
 
 
 4.2.2. ‘Disproportionate effort’ in the context of genetic research 
In regard to the ‘disproportionate effort’ exception, first, it is unclear whether 
the disproportionality of the required effort is subject to an objective assessment, 
or a subjective one from the perspective of the data controller.220 According to 
the WP29, in order to rely on the ‘disproportionate effort’ exception, controllers 
have to “carry out a balancing exercise to assess the effort involved for the data 
controller to provide the information to the data subject against the impact and 
effects on the data subject if he or she was not provided with the information.”221 
Hence it seems to be more a matter of a subjective assessment from the per-
spective of the controller, rather than an objective one. 
Second, in determining when the provision of information could constitute a 
‘disproportionate effort’ for the controller specifically in regard to processing 
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for scientific research purposes, according to Recital 62 GDPR, “the number of 
data subjects, the age of the data and any appropriate safeguards adopted should 
be taken into consideration.” Putting this into the context of genetic research, as 
to the number of data subjects, in many cases, this criterion would speak in 
favour of invoking the disproportionate effort exception, as the data of large 
cohorts of participants may be needed in genetic research.222 Whereas the age of 
the data should rather be an argument against invoking this exception since the 
informative potential of genetic data will increase over time (instead of declining, 
as is the case with many other types of personal data).223 The third criterion laid 
out in Recital 62 GDPR – ‛any appropriate safeguards’ – is as ambiguous as a 
criterion can be.224 One ‘safeguard’ expressly named in Article 89(1) GDPR con-
cerning processing for research purposes is pseudonymisation. Hence, where 
pseudonymised data is used, this might tip the scale in favour of invoking the 
disproportionate effort exception. However, in the case of pseudonymised data, 
the impossibility exception discussed above is likely to be of primary relevance 
(depending on, inter alia, whether the data is pseudonymised by the primary 
controller before making the data available to the third party controller, or by 
the third party controller himself – if the data is already obtained in 
pseudonymised form by the third party controller, the lack of contact information 
would trigger the impossibility exception, as discussed above). 
Both in the case of the impossibility and the disproportionate effort excep-
tions, it will be a matter of a case-by-case assessment of whether these excep-
tions can be invoked or not. Although alternative measures, like making the 
information publicly available, apply, these are not likely to facilitate any 
transparency in relation to the individual for reasons discussed below. 
 
 
4.2.3. ‘Appropriate measures’ as an alternative to  
the obligation to inform 
In case one of the above-discussed exceptions to the obligation to inform is 
invoked, Article 14(5)(b) GDPR requires ‘appropriate measures’ to be adopted by 
the controller, including making the information publicly available. The position 
of the WP29 is that controllers always have to make the information publicly 
available whenever one of the exceptions under Article 14(5)(b) GDPR is 
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invoked.225 As to other appropriate measures, these will depend on specific 
circumstances, but according to the WP29 they may include inter alia “under-
taking a data protection impact assessment; applying pseudonymisation tech-
niques to the data; minimising the data collected and the storage period; and 
implementing technical and organisational measures to ensure a high level of 
security.”226 In this light, the ‘appropriate measures’ referred to in Article 14(5)(b) 
GDPR seem to coincide with the ‘safeguards’ under Article 89(1) GDPR (i.e. 
adopting technical and organizational measures, minimization, pseudonymisa-
tion). Since adopting safeguards within the meaning of Article 89(1) GDPR 
would be required in any case in which personal data is used in research,227 and 
Article 14(5)(b) GDPR furthermore specifically refers to Article 89(1) GDPR 
safeguards when invoking an exception to the obligation to inform, it seems that 
the further reference to ‘appropriate measures’ in the second sentence of Article 
14(5)(b) GDPR adds little substance in the research context – other than the 
expressly mentioned measure of “making the information publicly available”. 
However, making information publicly available does not equal due noti-
fication.228 Instead of direct communication to the individual, making infor-
mation publicly available is done by addressing the public in general via, e.g., 
the controller “putting the information on its website, or by proactively 
advertising the information in a newspaper or on posters on its premises.”229 
The obligation to make the information publicly available in the context of 
Article 14 GDPR contains a logical fallacy. First, there is the question of which 
controller needs to comply with the said obligation if one data controller has 
obtained the data from another. From the wording of Article 14(1) GDPR it 
seems this would be the third party controller – i.e. the controller that has 
obtained the data from another data controller – as it is the third party controller 
who can be in a situation where “data have not been obtained from the data 
subject”. However, in this case, it is questionable which, if any, connections are 
individuals presumed to have with the third party controller in order to happen 
to visit the third party controller’s website or premises for the publicly available 
information to have any practical meaning in regard to the individuals con-
cerned. Making information publicly available would have a potential impact in 
scenarios falling under Article 13 GDPR where data has been obtained from 
data subjects directly since there would be a connection between the data 
subject and the controller – this is not the case when data has been obtained 
from other sources. 
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To exemplify the above from the perspective of the GDPR as a whole in the 
research context the following example can be used. Researcher A has carried 
out a research project and collected genetic and health data from more than 
1,000 individuals based on informed consent. In the process of obtaining consent 
the individuals have been informed that their data will be used for scientific 
projects X and Y (with specific details regarding these projects) and additionally 
possibly for future purposes of oncological research. The information provided 
includes the fact that the data might be shared with other researchers in the field 
of oncology. Thus, as required by Article 9(2)(a) GDPR, and, arguably, allowed 
by Recital 33 GDPR, the individuals concerned have provided consent for the 
use of their data in certain specific projects and for future use in a certain 
scientific area. With the provision of this data, researcher A has simultaneously 
fulfilled his obligations under Article 13 GDPR. Researcher B, interested in 
using the genetic and health data collected by researcher A, requests said data 
from the latter. National law provides a legal basis for data to be processed 
without consent if it is done for research purposes. Researcher B has no need for 
direct identifiers, but simply pseudonymised data that enables linking the col-
lected health and genetic data. As established in Article 11(1) GDPR, researcher 
B should not ask for contact information purely for purposes of fulfilling obli-
gations under the GDPR. Since researcher B does not obtain direct identifiers or 
contact information of the individuals, provision of information to the data 
subjects is objectively not possible and the ‘impossibility exception’ under Article 
14(5)(b) GDPR can be applied. As required, researcher B makes the fact and 
purposes of obtaining the data publicly available on the website of his institution. 
However, the data subjects have no connection to researcher B or his institution. 
Since the purpose and storage limitations do not apply – and national law allows 
for processing without consent for research purposes – once having obtained the 
data, researcher B is able to use the data further for purposes not communicated 
to data subjects by researcher A (whilst researcher B cannot inform individuals 
due to the lack of contact information). 
Hence the connection between the individual and their personal data, and the 
data subject’s informedness in regard to the use of their data, is essentially cut 
off once the data is acquired by a third party controller for research purposes. 
 
 
4.2.4. Conclusive remarks on the exceptions to the obligation to inform 
The WP29 have made two important conclusions in regard to the exceptions 
established in Article 14(5)(b) GDPR. First, controllers who do not use personal 
data for research or statistical purposes cannot routinely rely upon the referred 
exceptions.230 From this it can be concluded that, vice versa, controllers who do 
use the data for research can routinely rely on this exception. Although the 
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WP29 have set out that measures regarding transparency (incl. providing infor-
mation to data subjects) are part of the requirement of “privacy by design and 
by default”,231 it seems that the possibility to routinely rely on the exceptions 
under Article 14(5)(b) GDPR effectively counteracts this position in the research 
context. 
Second, the WP29 note that the circumstances giving rise to invoking Article 
14(5)(b) GDPR have to be related to the fact that the data was obtained from 
sources other than the data subject (i.e. since the exception is specifically 
provided only under Art. 14, but not Art. 13 GDPR).232 However, given the 
above-discussed impact of the principle of data minimisation and Article 11(1) 
GDPR in research scenarios, the invocation of the exceptions under Article 
14(5)(b) in the research context will, in the majority of cases, be related to the 
fact the data was not obtained directly from data subjects. The latter fact will 
likely either bring about a disproportionate effort for the researcher as the third 
party data controller in contacting individuals where the researcher has acquired 
the data of a larger group of individuals, or – even more likely – it will render the 
provision of information impossible due to the lack of contact information (as 
acquiring this information is generally not necessary for attaining research 
purposes). As argued above, whenever data is obtained from another data 
controller for research purposes, the third party controller receiving the data 
should refrain from asking any data not necessary for fulfilling the intended 
research purposes – i.e. the third party controller should not request contact 
details of data subjects or any other personal data solely for the purposes of 
complying with the GDPR.  
To conclude, in a context in which a researcher obtains personal (incl. 
genetic and health) data of individuals from sources other than the data subjects 
themselves (e.g. from another researcher or a database), Article 14(5)(b) GDPR 
allows for a routine reliance on exceptions from the obligation to inform data 
subjects about the processing of their data. However, as argued below, even 
when the referred exceptions cannot or simply are not invoked, as far as the 
research context is concerned, the obligation to inform under the GDPR suffers 
design flaws that render it ineffective in facilitating transparency in relation to 
data subjects. 
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4.3. The design flaw of the obligation to inform 
4.3.1. The obligation to inform and the specificity of  
processing purposes  
In a research context – both in regard to the primary and secondary use of data, 
regardless of the source of the data – a significant point of contention is how 
broadly the purposes of processing may or have to be communicated to data 
subjects in order for (future) processing activities to be transparent to the 
individual. 
In terms of the provision of information during consent procedures addressed 
in the previous chapter, the question of the specificity of processing purposes to 
be communicated to data subjects was two-folded. First, whether the principles 
expressed in Recital 33 GDPR in regard to the breadth and specificity of 
consent in research are directly applicable. Second, if answered in the affirmative, 
the question became one of how broadly can ‘certain areas of scientific research’ 
be communicated to the individual within the meaning of the referred recital. 
Whether or not it establishes a directly applicable legal rule, Recital 33 GDPR 
serves at least as a sort of guideline in terms of the communication of pro-
cessing purposes in the research context when it comes to processing based on 
consent of the individual. Whereas the general obligation to inform under Articles 
13 and 14 GDPR lacks any such indicators as to how specific the processing 
purposes communicated to the individual need to be. 
One factor in regard to the specificity of processing purposes under the 
general obligation to inform is the requirement of ‘clear and plain language’. 
The latter is part of the general obligation of transparency233 and stipulated by 
Article 12(1) GDPR. As explained in Recital 39 GDPR in regard to this 
requirement, “In particular, the specific purposes for which personal data are 
processed should be explicit and legitimate and determined at the time of the 
collection of the personal data.” According to the WP29, this applies to both the 
grammatical approach of the language used (e.g. “avoiding complex sentence 
and language structures”) and the clarity of the information provided (i.e. 
concrete and definitive information with no ambivalent or abstract terms).234 
However, none of this addresses research purposes specifically or provides any 
indicators such as that provided by Recital 33 GDPR in terms of the specificity 
of consent in research – whether processing purposes must be communicated on 
the basis of, e.g., singular research projects, research areas, or in any other form. 
In regard to the research context, as noted earlier, the WP29 have emphasized 
as an example concerning the requirement of clear and plain language that what 
is not sufficient is a communication in the following manner: “We may use 
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your personal data for research purposes.”235 According to the WP29, “it is 
unclear what kind of research this refers to”.236 Regrettably, the WP29 have not 
offered insight as to how research purposes may be communicated in order to 
comply with the GDPR. One option would be to apply the same logic as with 
the breadth of consent in research under the guidance offered in Recital 33 
GDPR, i.e. by communicating the use of the data in “certain areas of research”. 
However, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, this would offer little 
help to outline any boundaries in practice. For example, if a hospital were to 
notify individuals that their data might be later used for research in the fields of 
oncology, epidemiology, genomics, epigenetics, hepatology, and haematology, 
would this fulfil the obligation to inform data subjects about the purposes of 
processing? 
This question remains pre-eminent in the discussion regarding transparency 
in relation to the individual independent of the exact scenario: i.e. whether data 
is obtained from data subjects or other sources, whether processing is based on 
informed consent or an alternative legal basis, whether the research use of the 
data is the primary or secondary purpose of processing. The specificity of the 
purposes to be communicated to data subjects will determine if and at what 
point the obligation to inform can be deemed as fulfilled. 
 
 
4.3.2. The obligation to inform as a one-off communication 
The above addressed question of specificity when it comes to the communication 
of processing purposes to individuals – particularly in the context of genetic 
research – leads to a fundamental problem concerning the obligation to inform 
as a modality of transparency in relation to the individual; namely, the nature of 
the obligation to inform as a ‘one-off deal’. As already pointed out by M. Taylor 
(2012) in regard to the predecessor of the GDPR, “the responsibility to provide 
information to a data subject on the purposes of processing, at least as required 
by the Directive, is not expressly an ongoing responsibility.”237 The same critique 
is still relevant in terms of the GDPR. 
In general, the WP29 indicate to the right to transparency as an ongoing 
right.238 The nature of the obligation to inform as an ongoing right is expressed 
in the fact that the controller would have to notify data subjects of changes in 
the aspects of processing already communicated to individuals, e.g., changes in 
processing purposes or changes regarding the identity of the controller.239 The 
controller would also have to inform data subjects about any changes regarding 
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the recipients of the data. This is particularly emphasized in Article 14(3)(c) 
GDPR regarding the timing of provision of information where disclosure to 
another recipient is planned. In terms of research, this would mean for example 
that data transfers between researchers would trigger the obligation to inform if 
the recipients were initially defined on an individual basis. However, both 
Articles 13(1)(e) and 14(1)(e) allow for the recipients of the data to be listed as 
categories. Hence, defining possible recipients as entities engaged in (certain) 
research activities may suffice, 240  and data exchange in the framework of 
research co-operation is thus not likely to re-trigger the obligation to inform. 
As to secondary processing purposes, these are not to be equated with a 
change in primary processing purposes. For example, the collection of health and 
genetic data in clinical facilities is primarily conducted for purposes of clinical 
care – the primary processing purpose of this data remains clinical care, whereas 
possible later utilization of the same data in research is a secondary purpose. 
The communication of secondary processing purposes, as analysed above, is 
addressed in Articles 13(3) and 14(4) GDPR, which oblige controllers to inform 
data subjects of their intentions for processing the data for a purpose other than 
for which the data was obtained (prior to commencing such processing).241 The 
latter could theoretically create an ongoing aspect to the obligation to inform. 
However, in the research context this is unlikely to happen for the following 
reasons. 
The required level of specificity of secondary processing purposes in the 
research context is just as unclear as in the case of primary purposes. As con-
cluded in the previous section, it is not clear how broadly or specifically pro-
cessing purposes can or have to be communicated in terms of the obligation to 
inform (other than excluding a general reference to ‘research purposes’, which 
has been expressly rejected by the WP29 as being not specific enough). This 
impacts the obligation to inform data subjects of secondary processing purposes 
in two ways. 
First, in scenarios in which the primary purpose for processing is research, 
whether the obligation to communicate secondary processing purposes is trig-
gered will depend on when secondary processing purposes can be deemed to be 
different from the primary purpose. Second, when secondary processing 
purposes have been communicated once, the specificity of the purposes will 
determine whether the obligation is re-triggered after the first communication. 
This is less relevant in terms of Article 14, as exceptions to the obligation to 
inform are likely to be applicable in the research context. Whereas in regard to 
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Article 13 it is of central importance as this article does not contain exceptions 
to the obligation to inform. The specificity of the processing purposes commu-
nicated to data subjects will determine in practice whether the obligation to 
inform is a one-time communication or whether it can be regarded as an ongoing 
obligation. 
As a general rule, Article 13(1) GDPR requires information to be provided to 
data subjects at the time the data is being obtained. In the case of secondary 
processing purposes, however, Article 13(3) GDPR requires these to be com-
municated to data subjects prior to such processing – which could effectively 
refer to the time at which data is being collected from the individual, or any 
later point in time (as long as it is done prior to commencing processing for 
secondary purposes).242 If secondary processing purposes are defined broadly, 
they can be communicated to data subjects at the time of the collection of the 
data with no need for further communication, thus rendering the obligation to 
inform a one-off communication. Referring back to the example used in the 
previous section on specificity of purposes, the question remains whether noti-
fying patients that their data might be later used for research in a number of 
possible medical fields (e.g. oncology, epidemiology, genomics, epigenetics, 
hepatology, and haematology) would be specific enough. If answered in the 
affirmative, the obligation to inform in the context of research could effectively 
be limited to a one-off communication by listing all possible areas of research 
that the data could potentially be used in. 
The problems regarding the specificity of the communication of processing 
purposes and the issue of the obligation to inform being a one-off communica-
tion are not novel problems in terms of genetic research, but ones that have not 
been effectively addressed during the data protection reform and within the 
framework of the GDPR (although the latter has established transparency in 
relation to data subjects as one of three core principles of personal data pro-
tection). Combined, the issue of the specificity of processing purposes and the 
obligation to inform as a one-off communication lead back to the general 
dilemma of prior informedness in genetic research.  
 
 
4.3.3. The dilemma of prior informedness in genetic research 
The above-addressed issues regarding the specificity of the processing purposes 
and the provision of the relevant information being limited to a one-time com-
munication lead to a fundamental problem in genetic research in regard to trans-
parency in relation to individuals: the general inefficacy of prior informedness 
and the need for ongoing informedness. Without ongoing provision of infor-
mation, transparency in relation to the data subject cannot be attained in genetic 
research.  
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As was concluded in the previous sections, whether it be consent procedures 
during which information is provided to individuals or the general obligation to 
provide information, the provision of information to data subjects in a research 
context can be limited to a one-off communication via broadly defined research 
purposes; and if data has been obtained from sources other than the data subject, 
exceptions to the general obligation to inform may routinely be relied upon. As 
far as the research use of personal data is concerned, the GDPR fails to establish 
an ongoing obligation to provide information that would effectively facilitate 
transparency in relation to data subjects. Hence what remains in terms of 
provision of information to individuals is prior informedness – as opposed to 
ongoing informedness. Prior informedness, however, cannot adequately facilitate 
transparency in relation to individuals in an environment in which genetic data 
can be stored indefinitely, shared with little limits (within the EU) and used for 
a myriad of research purposes. 
Scholars have long challenged the concept of prior informedness in genetic 
research. Though this has mainly been done in regard to prior informed consent, 
the same critiques can be applied to prior informedness in general (whether 
facilitated through consent procedures or the general obligation to inform). 
Thus the following arguments concerning prior informed consent shall mutatis 
mutandis be applied to prior informedness as such. 
As Laurie and Postan (2013) note in terms of consent, in contrast to the 
general aim of informed consent in disclosing information to facilitate certain 
autonomous decisions, “research itself is an inherently uncertain exercise.”243 In 
other words, as the (future) uses of genetic data in research cannot be foreseen, 
consent could not be truly informed unless it were (re)obtained for future uses 
that were unknown at the time that consent was obtained; otherwise consent 
would be rendered meaningless and “paying mere lip-service to the principle of 
respect for autonomy” as Laurie (2002) has put it.244 As Taylor (2012) argues, 
even the use of broad consent would not resolve this issue as “the chances of 
being able to communicate effectively all of the possibilities regarding future 
uses of data – and the associations that might provoke – are, in any case, 
extremely slight.”245 These arguments are not limited to the notion of informed 
consent as the core issue they address is not consent itself, but the limits of prior 
informedness in genetic research.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum regarding views on prior informedness, 
some scholars have presented arguments that essentially purport that informed-
ness is not important, as an autonomous decision can be made on the simple 
consideration of ‘to participate in research, or not’ – rather than deciding upon 
more or less specific research purposes. At the heart of this stance is the call for 
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a shift in the understanding of informed consent, with the underlying argument 
being that the notion of open consent would serve the principle of autonomy 
since there is no one clear answer as to how informed one should be prior to 
giving consent,246 including views that preclusion of deception and coercion 
would suffice for autonomy to be respected247. 
First, this approach is at odds with the simple fact of advancements in 
technology. Prior informedness is limited to the current state of art of techno-
logy and science – what constitutes ‘scientific research’ in a given area is inevit-
ably subject to change over time. Furthermore, unlike in the case of processing 
based on informed consent – which would at the very least entail a conscious 
‘opt in’ choice to have ones data used for research purposes – as demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, informed consent is not the only alternative as a legal 
basis for using personal (incl. genetic) data in research. In cases in which 
personal data use in research is based on legal grounds other than informed 
consent there is no ‘opt in’. An ‘opt out’, however, would presume at least 
informedness regarding the fact of processing. Of course, in cases in which 
none of the exceptions to the obligation to inform can be invoked, one could 
still argue that information regarding the basic fact of processing for ‘research 
purposes’ as such would suffice (i.e. a one-off communication providing the 
individual with the knowledge that their data will be used for ‘research pur-
poses’). However, this type of all or nothing choice would not serve the interests 
of any stakeholders, as individuals who might be interested in contributing to 
only certain research (or on certain conditions), might wish to opt out of 
participation entirely. Given the myriad of possibilities for using genetic data in 
research, this kind of singular option does not serve the interests of the scientific 
community since apprehension towards specific areas of research might keep 
individuals from wanting to contribute to research altogether.248 
Regarding the problems associated with prior informed consent, the notion 
of ‘dynamic consent’ has been advocated by, e.g., Kaye et al. (2015)249 who 
have proposed “an interactive personalised interface that allows participants to 
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engage as much or as little as they choose and to alter their consent choices in 
real time.” This interface would allow individuals to exercise their individual 
consent preference, e.g. whether they would prefer to give broad consent, or be 
approached on a case by case basis to give specific consent for certain projects, 
etc. Kaye et al. suggest that, “The options offered to participants can be set by 
the biobank or researcher according to their requirements.” However, Steins-
bekk et al. 250  argue that dynamic consent would essentially give primacy to 
private interests over public interests, rendering the approach “overly indi-
vidualistic and by implication un-solidaristic”251. Furthermore, in a context where 
each researcher gets to decide whether broad or specific consent is appropriate, 
transparency would still require ongoing informedness (both in terms of broad 
consent; and in regard to specific consent if secondary processing without 
consent would still be possible under national law).  
In regard to the peculiarities of genetic data specifically, a further challenge 
attached to prior informedness is the fact that genetic data is more frequently 
obtained for prenatal diagnostics, and routine prenatal whole genome sequencing 
might become a reality in the near future.252 Information provided to parents 
prior to giving consent could not provide for informedness on part of the 
individual whose genetic data is concerned (i.e. the individual to be born). As 
genetic data remains constant throughout an individual’s life and post mortem, 
there cannot be transparency without ongoing informedness. As Dondorp and 
de Wert (2013) point out, prenatal whole genome testing will reveal more 
information about a child “than is considered justifiable for neonatal screening”, 
meaning that already before birth knowledge about, e.g., the individual’s 
susceptibility for severe late on-set disease like hereditary breast cancer or 
Huntington’s disease, will be available.253 Dondorp and de Wert also point out 
that one of the underlying arguments for expanding prenatal whole genome 
testing is the need to obtain a research population as large as possible, thereby 
blurring the lines between care and research.254  In order to facilitate trans-
parency in relation to the individual whose data was included into research prior 
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to birth or during infancy or childhood, in terms of facilitating transparency 
there is no other alternative to ongoing informedness.255 
Essentially, any provision of information regarding intended (future) research 
uses of genetic data is limited not just by the foreseeable intentions of one given 
researcher or group of researchers, but also by the state of knowledge and 
technology at the time of the formulation of the state of informedness of the 
individual. This means that if the provision of information is designed to be a 
one-off communication, the state of informedness of the data subject is 
temporary. In turn, if the state of informedness of the data subject is rendered 
temporary, there can be no claim of transparency in relation to the data subject 
in terms of the (future) uses of their genetic data in research. 
 
 
4.4. Transparency in practice on the example of  
the Estonian Health Information System 
Much like privacy and data protection in general, transparency is a matter of 
infrastructural design as part of the ‘privacy by design’ and ‘data protection by 
default’ requirements under the GDPR.256 In this section, the Estonian Health 
Information System will be used as an example of the potential practical imple-
mentation for transparency in relation to the data subject. Currently, this system 
does not facilitate transparency in relation to the individual as far the secondary 
research use of data is concerned, however, it has untapped potential for 
doing so. 
 
 
4.4.1. The Estonian Health Information System 
In Estonia, health data of the entire population is stored in the Health Informa-
tion System (HIS), which is a digital database that is part of the state information 
system.257 In addition to keeping detailed medical records in institutional record 
systems, health care providers are obliged to submit information concerning 
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health services provided to patients to the HIS.258 The records stored in the HIS 
are often referred to as e-Health Records.259 
Patients have access to their own records via the Patient Portal, in which 
they can submit further health and lifestyle information that the health care 
provider might need for purposes of clinical care, referred to as the ‘declaration 
of health’.260 Submitting the health declaration is mandatory if the patient wants 
to receive a health certificate261 in order to, e.g., apply for a driver’s licence.262 
The declaration of health is valid for 30 days for purposes of applying for a 
health certificate, which means that all the submitted data needs to be updated at 
some point in the future (for, e.g., receiving a new health certificate in order to 
re-new the driver’s licence).263 
Since health care providers have a legal obligation to submit data on the 
patient’s care to the HIS, health care providers can refuse to enter into a contract 
with an individual (i.e. refuse to provide health care services, except for 
emergency situations) if the individual demands the health care provider not to 
submit data to the HIS.264 This means that storage of health data in the HIS is 
not a matter of choice for the patient. 
Part of the strategical vision of the e-Health system in Estonia for the next 
decade is to include genetic data into the HIS, and additionally to create a 
database to accumulate pseudonymised health and genetic data that could be 
used for both scientific research and also to further business developments.265 
Professionals in the health care system would submit the genetic data (and other 
                                                                                                 
258  § 592(1)(3) of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act. RT I 2001, 50, 284. 
Available in English at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/508012018001/consolide  
[Accessed 7 July 2019]. 
259  See, e.g., official website of the e-Estonia Briefing Centre at   
https://e-estonia.com/solutions/healthcare/e-health-record/ [Accessed 7 July 2019]. 
260  § 592(12) of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act, supra n 258. 
In the declaration of health, the patient submits data on their lifestyle, working conditions, 
allergies, mental health, nervous system, eyes and eyesight, ears, nose, throat, respiratory 
system, metabolic disorders, cardiovascular conditions, bones, joints and muscles, infectious 
diseases, other chronic diseases, conditions or symptoms, previous treatments, traumas, 
pregnancy, skin, digestive organs, urogenital system, blood problems, medical devices they 
use, and sleep. Appendix 34, Sotsiaalministri 18.09.2008 määrus nr 56 “Tervishoiuteenuse 
osutamise dokumenteerimise tingimused ja kord”, RT I, 03.05.2019, 3. 
261  § 10613 of Sotsiaalministri 18.09.2008 määrus nr 56 “Tervishoiuteenuse osutamise doku-
menteerimise tingimused ja kord”, ibid. 
262  § 101(1) of the Estonian Traffic Act, RT I 2010, 44, 261. Available in English at  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/525032019002/consolide [Accessed 7 July 2019]. 
263  Appendix 34 of Sotsiaalministri 18.09.2008 määrus nr 56 “Tervishoiuteenuse osutamise 
dokumenteerimise tingimused ja kord”, supra n 260. 
264  P. Varul et al. (2009), § 760. 
265  E-Health vision 2025. E-Health strategic development plan 2020. (E-tervise visioon 
2025. E-tervise strateegiline arengukava 2020). Estonian Health Strategy 2020. Government 
Office, supra n 73, pp 29–31.  
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health data) to the HIS. For example, if a patient has been referred to a clinical 
geneticist and the latter has prescribed a genetic test for diagnostic purposes 
(e.g. whole exome sequencing is a routine part of clinical genetics in Estonia),266 
the sequencing data would then be submitted to the HIS as well. This means 
that eventually the HIS would contain data on an individual’s medical con-
ditions and care, lifestyle information referred to above (incl., e.g., working and 
sleeping conditions etc.), and genetic data. This will provide a rich source of 
data for genetic research. 
 
 
4.4.2. Access to HIS data for research purposes 
Two of the primary purposes of the HIS are ensuring the quality of health 
services and protecting the rights of patients.267 As such, health care providers 
all across Estonia can access the HIS for purposes of clinical care of the patient 
(as opposed to being limited to institutional records or patients having to 
provide medical records themselves). At the same time, patients can keep track 
of their own medical data via accessing the HIS through the Patient Portal. 
Other than access for the clinical care of patients and access by patients them-
selves, access of other persons to the data in the HIS is subject to a respective 
right established by law.268 In addition, HIS data may be accessed based on 
consent of the patient, or without the patient’s consent for purposes of scientific 
or historical research and national statistics or for establishing the truth in 
offence or judicial proceedings.269  
As laid out in the previous chapter of this analytical compendium (Section 
3.4.3.), the Estonian Data Protection Act (DP Act) provides for a legal basis for 
personal data (incl. genetic and health data) to be used in research without the 
consent of an individual. As made clear in the explanatory note to the DP Act, if 
the legal requirements established in the DP Act are met, the researcher must be 
provided with the requested data.270 In case special categories of data are to be 
used in research, an ethics review is mandatory to determine compliance with 
the conditions set by the DP Act.271 
The ethics review requirement under the DP Act is duplicated by a respective 
clause in the Health Services Organisation Act (HSOA) according to which 
                                                                                                 
266  Whole exome sequencing and interpretation is listed for 1671,67 EUR in the list of 
health care services adopted annually by the government, based on which the national 
Health Insurance Fund covers medical costs of insured persons. Vabariigi Valitsuse 
20.06.2019 määrus nr 54 “Eesti Haigekassa tervishoiuteenuste loetelu”, RT I, 28.06.2019, 11. 
267  § 591(1) of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act, supra n 258. 
268  § 593 (6) of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act, ibid. 
269  § 593 (7) of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act, ibid. 
270  Seletuskiri isikuandmete kaitse seaduse eelnõu juurde (Explanatory note to the DP Act), 
supra n 203. 
271  § 6(4) of the Estonian Personal Data Protection Act, supra n 65. 
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access to the data in the HIS for research purposes is subject to an ethical review 
by a research ethics committee.272 In addition to reviewing compliance with the 
DP Act, the committee has to evaluate “the extent of ethical risks and the 
background of the person conducting the research, by finding a balance between 
the protection of fundamental rights and the purposefulness of the research.”273  
However, none of the conditions set by the DP Act (discussed in Section 
3.4.3.), or the ethics review required under the HSOA, facilitate transparency in 
relation to the data subject. Although the ethics review can be seen as a 
‘safeguard’ within the meaning of Article 89(1), in terms of transparency in 
relation to the data subject the question is not one of applicable safeguards, but 
one of whether and to what extent patients are informed of the fact of the 
processing of their data in the HIS for research purposes.  
 
 
4.4.3. Transparency in relation to patients within the HIS  
As noted, patients can access their health records stored in the HIS by logging 
into the Patient Portal.274 In addition to providing access for patients to their 
health records, the Patient Portal contains a Logbook, which is meant to provide 
an overview of inquiries made into patients’ data, access thereto and modifi-
cations thereof (i.e. submission, modification, and deletion of data). 
The Logbook contains the following information about actions taken in regard 
to HIS data: date (of submission of, access to, or changes made to data, or the 
adding or deleting of data); data (i.e. type of data concerned); person’s name 
(taking the action); organisation/registry code; justification (for the action taken). 
However, the Logbook contains only information regarding inquiries made via 
the X-tee system275. This means that the Logbook reflects actions taken in regard 
to HIS data via other information systems connected to the X-tee system (i.e. by 
health care providers, or other databases). As to access to and submission of 
HIS data for research purposes, this is of a different technical nature,276 as the 
submission of HIS data requires the permission of the Ministry of Social 
                                                                                                 
272  § 594 of the Estonian Health Services Organisation Act, supra n 258. 
273  Ibid. 
274  See the Patient Portal at https://www.digilugu.ee/login [Accessed 12 July 2019]. 
275  The Information System Authority has described the X-tee system in the following 
manner, “X-tee, the data exchange layer for information systems, is a technological and 
organizational environment enabling a secure Internet-based data exchange between infor-
mation systems.” See official website of the Information System Authority at  
https://www.ria.ee/en/state-information-system/x-tee.html [Accessed 18 July 2019]. 
276  Regrettably, there are no official publicly available sources that can be cited. This 
explanation was provided to the author by the Information System Authority on 18 July 
2019 via e-mail as a reply to the author’s inquiry, and confirmed by a representative of the 
Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre via e-mail on 29 August 2019. The relevant 
e-mail exchange is in Estonian and can be provided by the author. 
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Affairs,277 which is granted on a case-by-case basis. This means that the Patient 
Portal Logbook does not contain information on the research use of the HIS 
data – information on HIS data utilization in research is kept in internal logs, 
which are not public or accessible to patients. Patients can submit a request for 
information in order to receive confirmation whether or not their HIS data has 
been accessed for research purposes or not (i.e. patients can exercise their right 
of access under Art. 15 GDPR).278 
In the Patient Portal279, patients do have the option of controlling access to 
their health data. However, this does not concern the research use of the data. The 
means of control provided to patients are largely divided into three. First, under 
a rather misleading general label of “Managing accesses to health data”, patients 
have the specific option to disable access rights of the medical committees of 
the Estonian Ministry of Defence.280  Second, patients can disable access to 
single case summaries.281 However, disabling access to case summaries means 
that the patient’s own doctor will no longer have access to the data. Thus, dis-
abling access to case summaries can negatively affect the medical care of the 
patient as health care professionals will no longer have access to the patient’s 
medical history that might be relevant for the patient’s clinical care. In fact, 
when clicking on the option to disable access to a case summary, a warning 
appears, including the remark that, “By locking the data, you assume 
responsibility for the possible deterioration of the treatment quality.”
                                                                                                 
277  The Ministry of Social Affairs is the data controller in regard to HIS data within the 
meaning of the GDPR. § 5, Vabariigi Valitsuse 01.12.2016 määrus nr 138 “Tervise info-
süsteemi põhimäärus”, RT I, 12.03.2019, 35. 
278  These conclusions cannot be made based on legal acts or publicly available information. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs is the data controller in regard to the HIS, but the manage-
ment of the system is part of the tasks of the Health and Welfare Information Systems 
Centre as a data processor. The documentation concerning the internal logs regarding HIS 
data use is not public. The conclusions are based on relevant explanations and confirmation 
provided to the author by an official of the Ministry of Social Affairs via e-mail on 29 July 
2019. A representative of the Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre confirmed 
these conclusions via e-mail on 29 August 2019. The relevant e-mail exchange is in Estonian 
and can be provided by the author. 
279  The Patient Portal was accessed with the mobile-ID of the author on 13 July 2019 on the 
English version of the website. 
280  According to § 14 of the Militarty Service Act, healthcare providers on the medical com-
mittees of the Ministry of Defence can access HIS data subject to consent of the individual, 
however, in the Patient Portal their access rights are subject to an ‘opt-out’ approach with 
the individual having the possibility to disable such access.  
For more details on the access rights of the Ministry of Defence to HIS data, See § 14 of the 
Estonian Military Service Act, RT I, 10.07.2012, 1. Available in English at  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511042019005/consolide [Accessed 13 July 2019]. 
281  By clicking on “Case summaries” listed under the heading “Health data” in the Patient 
Portal. 
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Third, patients have the option to disable access to all of their health data in 
the HIS.282 This includes case summaries, examination results, dental care docu-
ments, immunizations, prescriptions, notifications, health certificates and declara-
tions, ambulance charts, referrals, time critical data and working ability assess-
ments. However, again, disabling access to the referred data will include access 
by health care professionals who might need the data for the clinical care of the 
patient. The same warning regarding the quality of future medical care appears 
as described above concerning disabling access to single case summaries. 
This approach of managing access rights to health data is questionable, as it 
remains dubious why patients’ options should be limited to an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach where disabling access to data is likely to negatively affect future 
medical care of the patient. An alternative would be to provide patients with the 
option to disable access of third parties not related to the patient’s care, i.e. to 
disable the use of personal data stored in the HIS for any purpose other than the 
clinical care of the patient. Considering that storage of health data in the HIS is 
not subject to a patient’s will as it is an obligatory system enforced by the state, 
access by third parties for purposes other than the individual’s medical care 
should be the primary concern in regard to transparency in relation to patients 
and the exercise of their rights. 
Although by exercising their right of access, patients can obtain information 
on the research use of their HIS data via submitting a request for information, 
within the current system it is not made transparent to patients that such use of 
their HIS data even exists. The Logbook contains no indication to the fact that 
HIS data might be accessed for purposes and made available to parties other 
than those visible in the Logbook. Furthermore, although patients have a basic 
option of disabling access to their HIS data (thereby risking the quality of future 
medical care), there is no reference to the fact that HIS data is still accessible 
for purposes other than clinical care (e.g. for research purposes by parties not 
involved in the patient’s clinical care).  
Regardless of its current shortcomings, the HIS system along with the Patient 
Portal contain the basic infrastructure to provide for ongoing informedness of 
individuals in regard to the secondary use of their health data in research. By 
accumulating data from different health care providers across the country the 
HIS system serves both patients’ interests, and at the same time serves research 
interests by providing a valuable source for research data. However, considering 
the principle of transparency under the GDPR, the secondary research use of HIS 
data should be made transparent to patients. The existing Logbook feature of 
the Patient Portal could serve as an effective means of facilitating transparency 
in relation to data subjects in the research context if it were to contain 
information regarding every single access to a patient’s data with a transparent 
description of information regarding the processing (i.e. the identity of the 
researcher or research entity, the type of data made available for research, and 
the research purposes).  
                                                                                                 
282  By clicking on the general heading “Health data” in the Patient Portal. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND NORMATIVE PROPOSITIONS 
In the transition from human subject research to human data research, the 
protection of the rights and interests of the individual is no longer primarily a 
matter of research or general human rights regulations, but instead depends 
largely on the personal data protection legal framework. In the EU, the latter is 
established under the GDPR. 
One of the main principles under the GDPR is transparency of data processing 
in relation to the data subject, i.e. on the most basic level the notion that it 
should be transparent to individuals if, by whom and for what purposes their 
data is processed. However, the GDPR is not specifically designed to govern 
research, although it both directly and indirectly does so in many regards. On 
the one hand, the GDPR leaves the research use of special categories of 
personal data (incl. genetic data) to be regulated by Member State or other EU 
law, whilst also setting certain limits, such as the breadth of consent in research, 
as referred to in Recital 33 GDPR. On the other hand, the GDPR creates a 
number of exceptions from general data protection rules when it comes to 
research, like setting the research use of personal data free from the purpose 
limitation. As shown on the Estonian example, if national law provides legal 
bases for data processing in research without consent, this might lead to an 
outcome where consent given for (more or less) specific research purposes does 
not actually limit the further use of the data to the previously determined pur-
poses. In this context, ironically, allowing for a broader determination of pro-
cessing purposes within consent procedures would be likely to create more 
transparency in relation to data subjects, as opposed to more narrowly defined 
processing purposes, which do not actually limit the further use of the data in 
research without renewed consent. Although in such scenarios the general obli-
gation to inform under the GDPR should still facilitate transparency in relation 
to data subjects, it was argued in this dissertation that the obligation to inform 
might not be efficient in this regard for two reasons. First, exceptions to the 
obligation to inform are likely to apply in the research context, particularly if 
data has been obtained from sources other than the data subject. Even where 
data has been obtained from data subjects directly, adhering to the principle of 
data minimisation and the principle expressed in Article 11(1) GDPR might 
result in the provision of information regarding secondary processing being 
rendered de facto impossible. Second, even if no exceptions apply and the 
provision of information to data subjects is possible, it is unclear how specific 
the processing purposes to be communicated need to be in a research context. 
Broadly defined purposes, however, render the obligation to inform a one-off 
communication, which will not suffice in making (future) research purposes for 
processing transparent to data subjects. As a result, the GDPR fails to deliver on 
the basic transparency promise when it comes to the research context. 
Due to a number of factors, the problem of transparency in relation to the 
data subject becomes amplified when it comes to research involving genetic 
(i.e. DNA sequencing) data. First, one important aspect setting genetic research 
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apart from other human data research is the nature of genetic data, which provides 
for essentially limitless potential in research. Second, although identification of 
individuals based on any data is relative to context, it is notably so in the case of 
genetic data, which is inherently identifying by its nature, regardless of additional 
information or identifiers present or available. Third, as the informative potential 
of genetic data is relative to technological advancements over time, it is not 
possible to determine its possible (future) uses at a certain point in time. Fourth, 
whilst the research value of genetic data will increase in time subject to techno-
logical advancements, privacy interests related to it will not simultaneously 
decrease as genetic data remains constant from prior to birth to beyond the 
lifetime of an individual – to the contrary, as the informative potential of 
genetic data increases, so do privacy interests and risks associated with it.  
Furthermore, as the GDPR does not limit the definition of scientific research 
on an institutional basis, the circle of possible data controllers processing personal 
data for research purposes within the meaning of the GDPR is essentially un-
limited (as long as their use of personal data can be regarded as scientific research 
as defined by the WP29). For example, private testing companies are increa-
singly accumulating genetic data, and using it and distributing it for research 
purposes.283 Thus, given that the potential uses and the potential users of genetic 
data for research purposes cannot be determined beforehand, in order to 
facilitate transparency in relation to data subjects in genetic research ongoing 
informedness is necessary. 
It is the opinion of the author that transparency in relation to data subjects 
regarding the use of their genetic data in research should be recognised as 
essential not just for the protection of individual rights and interests, or the sake 
of adhering to the principle of transparency as required by the GDPR, but 
because transparency enables self-correction within any ecosystem of data 
governance and is a cornerstone of public trust. Instead of providing exceptions 
from the obligation to inform where the performance of this obligation might be 
practically challenging or burdensome, the design of the obligation to inform in 
the context of genetic research should be reconceptualised and the development 
of necessary IT infrastructures should be required to enable the provision of 
information. The provision of information to data subjects should not be left to 
be a matter of possibility or effort – which is subjective depending on the given 
data controller engaged in research – instead, it should be an objective part of 
infrastructure design requirements whenever genetic data is accumulated. 
                                                                                                 
283  See, e.g., K.V. Brown. 23andMe Is Selling Your Data, But Not How You Think. 
Gizmondo 14.04.2017. Available at https://gizmodo.com/23andme-is-selling-your-data-but-
not-how-you-think-1794340474 [Accessed 22 March 2018]; A. Lardieri. 23andMe is Using 
Your DNA for Genetics Research: The personal genome company is using DNA collected 
from consumers for more than just ancestry information. U.S. News 13.09.2017. Available at 
https://www.usnews.com/news/health-care-news/articles/2017-09-13/23andme-is-using-
your-dna-for-genetics-research [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
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Because the contexts in which genetic data might be accumulated, and 
(further) used for research purposes, are not limited to specific fields like health-
care or clinical research – the data might be readily available in a myriad of 
entities, from, e.g., direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies to various 
research entities – the obligation to provide information should not be subject to 
specific regulations in specialised areas, but is to be best addressed within the 
data protection framework. As the only over-arching legal instrument in the 
European legal sphere concerning the processing of personal data, that is both 
directly applicable and a general instrument by nature, it is the GDPR that has 
the most potential to effectively address concerns regarding transparency in the 
context of genetic research. Though individual Member States might regulate 
and address issues specific to genetic research in more detail and perhaps more 
strictly in their national laws, this will not suffice in the light of the fact that the 
EU is increasingly becoming an interconnected research area. Considering that 
the matter of applicable law under the GDPR – specifically in the research 
context – remains an unsolved and ambiguous matter,284 a fragmented approach 
under national laws cannot effectively safeguard the interests of data subjects, 
or those of researchers and the public in general. Moreover, as the GDPR 
applies to processing in both the public and private sectors, is not limited to data 
processing in certain fields or areas, and encompasses a broad approach to the 
concept of ‘research’, it thereby has the potential to influence any and all 
scenarios of utilising genetic data in research (be it in the context of health-related 
research, clinical trials, or product development qualifying as research, etc.). 
In order to facilitate transparency in relation to data subjects in genetic 
research, the following normative changes within the GDPR are proposed: 
 
1. Redefining the concept of ‘genetic data’ and re-examining the approach 
to identifiability in regard to genetic data under the GDPR. The current 
definition under Article 4(13) GDPR qualifies DNA sequencing data as ‘genetic 
data’ if it is ‘personal’ data within the meaning of the GDPR, i.e. if it directly or 
indirectly enables identification of the individual. Based on current available 
technology, DNA sequencing data alone with no comparative or additional data 
would not enable identification of an individual. However, DNA is constant 
whereas technology and its availability are subject to change over time. As long 
as DNA sequencing data as such is not expressly recognized as ‘personal’ data, 
and thus ‘genetic data’ within the meaning of the GDPR, the latter will not 
apply to the processing of DNA sequencing data without additional information 
or identifiers. This, in turn, renders the existing safeguards and the following 
normative propositions ineffective, as although DNA sequencing data without 
further information or identifiers might be de jure anonymous within the 
meaning of the GDPR, it cannot be de facto de-identified, and the possibility to 
                                                                                                 
284  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and applicable law: the intra-EU conflict of laws as a 
regulatory challenge to cross-border genetic research. Supra n 115. 
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identify a data subject based on DNA sequencing data will always remain 
relative to context. 
Furthermore, recognizing DNA sequencing data as ‘personal data’ regard-
less of additional identifiers or information would bridge the gap between regu-
lations concerning data and those concerning biosamples from which the data is 
derived. Although biosamples as data carriers are not per se covered by data 
protection rules285, once a biosample is used to sequence DNA, this would fall 
under the concept of personal data processing if human DNA sequencing data 
as such would be recognized as personal and thus genetic data within the 
meaning of the GDPR.  
 
2. Establishing the breadth of consent and further rules regarding consent 
for the processing of genetic data for research purposes within the GDPR. 
The matter of the breadth of consent for the use of special categories of personal 
data (incl. genetic data) for research purposes is currently ambiguous. The 
author has argued that under the current framework, this matter is subject to 
national (or other EU) law. From the opinion of the WP29 it appears that 
Recital 33 GDPR is to be applied directly. In either case, there is no practical 
guidance for compliance on this matter (other than the WP29 excluding ‘research 
purposes’ as such as not clear enough). Adding to this the unresolved issue of 
intra-EU applicable law in the research context, 286  the author suggests 
addressing this matter within the GDPR (i.e. in the legally binding clauses, and 
not in the recitals). Although unsuccessful efforts in this regard were made 
during the drafting process of the GDPR, the outcome in the form of Recital 33 
GDPR is a compromise between the stricter proposals made during the drafting 
process and the possibility of not regulating the matter in the GDPR at all. 
However, the principle expressed in Recital 33 GDPR should be part of the 
legally binding clauses of the GDPR if the aim of the drafters was to create a 
directly applicable exception to general consent rules (as suggested by the 
WP29). Whether part of the recitals or legally binding clauses of the GDPR, 
practical guidance from the European Data Protection Board on the practical 
meaning of ‘certain areas of research’ in regard to genetic research is necessary. 
Broadly defined research areas (such as ‘genetic research’ as an area of research) 
or the listing of various research areas in the consent as processing purposes 
might nullify the aim of Recital 33 GDPR in setting boundaries to the breadth 
of consent in regard to personal data processing for research purposes. 
In addition to the breadth of consent, further conditions should be set in 
regard to the information to be provided to data subjects when obtaining consent 
for data processing. Most importantly, when giving consent, data subjects must 
                                                                                                 
285  Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data. Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, 01248/07/EN WP 136. Available at https://www.clinicalstudydatarequest.com/ 
Documents/Privacy-European-guidance.pdf [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
286  K. Pormeister. Genetic research and applicable law: the intra-EU conflict of laws as a 
regulatory challenge to cross-border genetic research. Supra n 115. 
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be notified of the fact that regardless of the processing purposes listed in the 
consent, the same data might later be used for (different) research purposes 
without renewed consent. Data subjects must be informed that by giving consent 
for their data to be processed for whatever purpose, the said data will potentially 
be indefinitely available for any kind of research. 
 
3. Redesigning the obligation to inform under the GDPR in regard to 
genetic research and creating a centralised approach to the research use of 
genetic data to effectively facilitate transparency in relation to data subjects. 
The matter of the specificity of the information to be communicated to data 
subjects in regard to the research use of their genetic data needs to be clear under 
the GDPR, as the determination of this question will decide whether the obl-
igation to inform is an ongoing one or not, and thus whether it can effectively 
facilitate transparency in relation to data subjects. Where genetic data has been 
obtained from sources other than the data subject, instead of establishing 
exceptions to the obligation to inform based on arguments of impossibility or 
disproportionate efforts, the GDPR should adopt a transparency by design and 
by default approach that would uphold the obligation to inform in the context of 
genetic research. In this light, concerning the use of genetic data in research, the 
following propositions are made in regard to the obligation to inform under the 
GDPR. 
1) Processing purposes to be communicated to data subjects should be defined 
per research project. In its current form under the GDPR, the obligation to 
inform has two major design flaws as far as transparency in relation to data 
subjects in the context of genetic research is concerned. First, the provision of 
information prior to processing encounters the same fundamental dilemma as 
the provision of information prior to obtaining consent. Namely, the question 
of how broadly research purposes may be communicated to data subjects. As 
noted above, it is clear that the WP29 have ruled out “for research purposes” 
as being sufficient,287 however the level of required precision remains unclear. 
Considering that genetic data is constant, but the possibilities for its utilisation 
in research are evolving over time, for the processing of genetic data to be 
transparent to data subjects the communication of processing purposes should 
be project-specific. For a project-specific ongoing provision of information 
to be practicable, an exclusively centralised system for genetic data use and 
sharing in research is suggested. 
2) An exclusively centralised approach to genetic data use and sharing in 
research should be adopted to effectively facilitate transparency in relation to 
data subjects via the ongoing provision of information. For a project-specific 
ongoing provision of information to data subjects to be practicable, the use 
and sharing of genetic data in research should be exclusively centralised. In 
this centralised system, the controller obtaining the genetic data from the 
                                                                                                 
287  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, p 9, para 12. 
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data subject (i.e. the primary controller) should be obliged to provide infor-
mation to the data subjects with no exceptions to this obligation – unlike the 
current approach, this provision of information should as well include infor-
mation on processing conducted by third party controllers with whom the 
primary controller has shared the data. 
Research exchange of genetic data should be limited so that third party 
controllers who obtain the genetic data from sources other than the data 
subject are not allowed to further share this data. All research purposes for 
which third party controllers process the genetic data must be communicated 
to the primary controller for the latter to communicate this information to 
data subjects. 
However, the above should not rule out approaches where the centralisa-
tion takes a different form, as is the case with, e.g., the Estonian HIS. As laid 
out in the analytical compendium, in this system providers of healthcare 
services are primary controllers as they obtain medical data from data sub-
jects. Healthcare providers are obligated by law to submit medical data of 
patients to the HIS. From the HIS, in turn, the data may be shared for 
research purposes. In this kind of context, in which healthcare providers as 
primary controllers are obligated by law to share personal data with a third 
party controller (i.e. the Ministry of Social Affairs as the data controller in 
regard to the HIS), it would not be reasonable for primary controllers to be 
put in a position to be responsible to provide information to data subjects on 
processing activities carried out by or going beyond the third party controller. 
3) No exceptions should apply to the obligation to inform regarding the research 
use of genetic data. Instead of providing for exceptions from the obligation 
to inform where data has been obtained from sources other than the data 
subject, in the above-proposed centralised system third party controllers 
should provide the necessary information regarding the use of genetic data in 
research to the controller who obtained the data from the data subjects, who 
then would communicate the information to the data subjects. Thus, as a 
general rule, the third party controller can still adhere to the principle of data 
minimisation and should not acquire any more data (e.g. contact infor-
mation) than is strictly necessary for the sought research purposes. However, 
in this centralised system the primary controller should not be able to refer to 
the principle of data minimisation and Article 11(1) GDPR in regard to 
secondary processing of genetic data, as the technical contact means and the 
necessary data to provide information to data subjects on an ongoing basis 
should be part of IT infrastructure designs (e.g. as is the case with the 
Estonian HIS and patient access thereto). The processing of genetic data (for 
research purposes) should be conditional upon the possibility of providing 
information to data subjects regarding the fact and purposes of processing, 
and the identity of the data controller. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Geeniuuringute läbipaistvus andmesubjekti suhtes –  
Eesti näitel põhinev analüüs 
25.05.2018 kohaldunud Euroopa Liidu isikuandmete kaitse üldmääruse 288 
(üldmäärus) eesmärk on isikuandmete kaitse taseme üleeuroopaline ühtlusta-
mine. Sellest hoolimata on üldmäärus jätnud mitmed olulised andmekaitse-
aspektid liikmesriikide reguleerida. Üheks valdkonnaks, mida üldmäärus ainult 
osaliselt reguleerib ning mis on ülejäänud osas jäetud liikmesriikide pädevusse, 
on isikuandmete töötlemine teadusuuringute eesmärgil. 289  Samas tulenevad 
üldmäärusest mitmed olulised põhimõtted, mis ka teadusvaldkonda mõjutavad. 
Üheks neist on andmetöötluse läbipaistvuse nõue. 
Isikuandmete töötlemise läbipaistvuse nõue on üldmääruse järgi üks kolmest 
andmetöötluse põhiprintsiibist. 290  Läbipaistvuse põhimõte on ka osa teadus-
eetikast, kuid teaduseetikas on läbipaistvusega seotud nõuded olemuselt üld-
määruses sätestatust erinevad. Teaduseetikas on läbipaistvus pigem suunatud 
kas sissepoole – väljendudes näiteks nõudes toimida teadustöö tulemuste 
avaldamisel ja tõlgendamisel läbipaistvalt või läbipaistvuse nõudes kolleegide 
teadustöö retsenseerimisel ja hindamisel – või üldsusele.291 Isikuandmete kaitse 
eesmärgil kehtestatud läbipaistvuse nõue isikuandmete töötlemisel on suunatud 
konkreetsele isikule, kelle andmeid töödeldakse, ehk andmesubjektile.292 Kui-
võrd üldmäärus ja sellest tulenevad isikuandmete kaitse reeglid kehtivad ka 
isikuandmete töötlemisel teadusuuringute eesmärgil,293 tuleb autori hinnangul 
läbipaistvuse printsiipi teaduskontekstis käsitleda kahetasandilisena. Esimese 
tasandina võib eristada läbipaistvuse printsiipi, mis väljendub teaduseetilistes 
normides ja mis on suunatud teadustöö läbipaistvusele teadusmaailma siseselt 
ning suhtlusele avalikkusega. Teise tasandina võib eristada läbipaistvuse print-
siipi, mis tuleneb isikuandmete kaitse üldmäärusest. Teise tasandi puhul on 
tegemist printsiibiga, mis on suunatud kindlale subjektile, kelle andmeid teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil kasutatakse. Andmekaitseõiguses eeldab läbipaistvuse nõue 
eelkõige seda, et andmesubjektile oleks teada, et tema andmeid töödeldakse, 
milline on isikuandmete töötlemise eesmärk ning vastutava töötleja isik.294 
                                                                                                 
288  Supra n 1. 
289  Vt üldmäärus, art. 9(2)(j) ja (4), supra n 1. 
290  Üldmäärus, Art. 5(1)(a), ibid. 
291  Vt nt The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (Revised edition). ALLEA – 
All European Academies 2017, supra n 90. 
292  Üldmääruse art. 5(1)(a) järgi peab isikuandmete töötlemine olema andmesubjektile läbi-
paistev, supra n 1.  
293  Üldmäärus, põhjenduspunkt 159, ibid. 
294  Üldmäärus, põhjenduspunktid 39 ja 60, ibid. 
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Inimuuringutes, kus toimub füüsiline või psühholoogiline sekkumine ini-
mesel, toimub uuringus osalejale teabe tagamine tavapäraselt informeeritud 
nõusoleku võtmise käigus, st nõusoleku küsimisele eelnevalt edastatava teabe 
näol. Inimuuringus osalemiseks võetava informeeritud nõusoleku fookuses on 
eelkõige uuringu raames toimuv füüsiline või psühholoogiline sekkumine ning 
sellega kaasnevad võimalikud riskid ja mõju uuritavale. 295  Geeniuuringute 
puhul võib selliseks sekkumiseks olla koeproovi (nt vere- või süljeproovi) 
võtmine. Nõusoleku võtmise eelselt tuleb planeeritava sekkumise osas isikut 
teavitada näiteks muu hulgas sellest, millal ja kuidas ning kes verd võtab, kui 
palju verd võetakse, millised on vere võtmisega seotud riskid. Viidatud nõus-
olekut inimuuringus osalemiseks tuleb eristada üldmäärusest tulenevast infor-
meeritud nõusolekust isikuandmete töötlemiseks. 296  Viimane puudutab isiku 
nõusolekut tema andmete kasutamiseks. Geeniuuringute puhul tähendaks see 
isiku nõustumist tema geeniandmete kasutamiseks (teatud) teaduslikel ees-
märkidel. Viidatud kahe nõusoleku võtmine toimub paralleelselt ning need 
võivad olla dokumenteeritud ühes nõusoleku vormis.297 Nõusolek, mis antakse 
isikuandmete töötlemiseks teadusuuringute eesmärgil, peaks tagama andmete 
töötlemise läbipaistvuse andmesubjekti suhtes, kuid nõusoleku võtmise eelse 
teavitamisega tekib geeniuuringutes läbipaistvuse printsiibi tagamisel eelkõige 
kaks probleemi. 
Esimene neist probleemidest puudutab küsimust sellest, kui kitsalt või laialt 
tuleb geeniuuringute puhul määratleda nõusolekus andmete kasutamise ees-
märgid. Geeniandmete võimalik teaduslik otstarve korrelatsioonide otsimisel 
geenide ja välismaailma vahel on praktiliselt piiritu,298 mistõttu tuleks teaduse 
edendamise kaalutlustel pooldada laiema eesmärgimääratluse lubamist nõus-
olekus, et kogutud andmeid saaks teaduses võimalikult laiaulatuslikult kasutada. 
Eesmärkide lai määratlus aga ei pruugi tagada andmetöötluse läbipaistvust 
andmesubjekti suhtes. Andmesubjekti perspektiivist on geeniandmete kui eri-
liselt tundliku andmekategooria299 puhul töötlemise läbipaistvus oluline, kui-
võrd geeniandmed on muuhulgas unikaalsed ehk olemuslikult isiku tuvastamist 
võimaldavad andmed. Lisaks on geeniandmed konstantsed ehk muutumatud, 
samas kui nende informatiivne potentsiaal on ajas kasvav, sõltudes tehnoloogia 
arengust ja kättesaadavusest, mistõttu on nende võimalik (teaduslik) otstarve 
                                                                                                 
295  Vt nt Oviedo konventsioon, artiklid 16(v) ja 5, supra n 9. 
296  Üldmäärus, art. 4(11), art. 7 ja art. 9(2)(a), supra n 1. 
297  Üldmääruse järgi peaks isikuandmete töötlemiseks antav nõusolek olema selgelt 
eristatav muudest samas dokumendis käsitletud küsimustest. Üldmäärus, art. 7(2), supra n 1. 
298  Vt nt E. Vayena and A. Blassime. Health Research with Big Data: Time for Systemic 
Oversight, lk 121, supra n 53. 
299  Geeniandmed kuuluvad üldmääruse järgi eriliiki andmekategooriate hulka (üldmäärus, 
art. 9(1)). Lisaks on üldmääruses tunnustatud tervise-, geeni- ja biomeetrilisi andmeid kui 
kõrgendatud kaitset vajavaid andmekategooriaid, kuivõrd art. 9(4) järgi on liikmesriikidele 
jäetud õigus viidatud andmekategooriate puhul säilitada või sätestada täiendavaid tingimusi, 
sh piiranguid viidatud andmete töötlemisel. Üldmäärus, supra n 1. 
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Enne üldmäärust kehtinud isikuandmete kaitse direktiiv 95/46/EÜ301 teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil andmete töötlemiseks võetava nõusoleku küsimust ei regu-
leerinud. Üldmäärus käsitleb nõusolekut andmetöötluseks teadusuuringute ees-
märgil põhjenduspunktis 33, milles tunnustatakse vajadust lubada teadusuurin-
gute eesmärgil andmetöötluseks antava nõusoleku puhul määratleda töötlemise 
eesmärke laiemalt ehk teadusuuringuvaldkondade põhiselt. Autor analüüsib 
teadusuuringu eesmärkidel toimuvaks andmetöötluseks antava nõusoleku küsi-
must üldmääruse raames ning andmekaitse direktiivi 95/46/EÜ artikli 29 alusel 
loodud andmekaitse töörühma (andmekaitse töörühm) arvamuste põhjal ning 
vastandub oma järeldustes töörühma seisukohtadele. Andmekaitse töörühma 
hinnangul tuleks teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse korral ees-
märkide määratlemise osas lähtuda üldmääruse põhjenduspunktis 33 väljen-
datud põhimõttest. Autori hinnangul on töörühma seisukohad vastuolus kohtu-
praktikaga ning sisuliselt vasturääkivad. Autor jõuab järeldusele, et kirjeldatud 
küsimus tuleb kehtiva õiguse kohaselt lahendada riigisiseses või EL õiguses, 
lähtudes põhjenduspunktis 33 väljendatust kui diskretsioonipiiridest. 
Teine probleem, mis tekib läbipaistvuse tagamisel geeniuuringutes nõusoleku 
võtmise eelse teavitamisega, on seotud asjaoluga, et geeniandmete kasutamine 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil on võimalik ka ilma isiku nõusolekuta. Kuivõrd 
geeniuuringud on muutunud tavapäraseks osaks kliinilisest meditsiinist,302 võivad 
isiku koeproov ja geeniandmed olla talletatud kliinilise ravi käigus. Samuti 
võivad koeproovid ja geeniandmed kättesaadavad olla ettevõtetele, kes osutavad 
tarbijatele geenitesti teenust. Eeltoodud näidete puhul, kus isiku geeniandmed 
on juba eelnevalt talletatud, puudub andmete kasutamiseks teadusuuringute 
eesmärgil vajadus isiku suhtes ühtegi sekkumist läbi viia (nt vere- või sülje-
proovi võtmise näol). Kui teadusuuringuks vajalikud andmed on juba talletatud, 
on nende kasutamine teadusuuringute eesmärgil võimalik ka ilma andme-
subjekti nõusolekuta.303 Seda sõltumata sellest, kas andmed koguti nõusoleku 
                                                                                                 
300  Inimgeeniuuringute seadus, § 12 lg 1, supra n 193. 
301  Supra n 38. 
302  Näiteks eksoomi sekveneerimine on osa Haigekassa poolt rahastatavatest tervishoiu-
teenustest. Vt Vabariigi Valitsuse 20.06.2019 määrus nr 54 “Eesti Haigekassa tervishoiu-
teenuste loetelu”, supra n 266. 
303  Koeproovide kasutamisel kehtib Oviedo konventsiooni artiklist 22 tulenev eelneva 
teavitamise nõue, kui riigisisene õigus ei näe ette rangemaid nõudeid. Oviedo konventsioon, 
supra n 9; Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Con-
ajas muutuv. Pidades silmas, kui laiahaardeline on geeniandmete võimalik (tule-
vane) otstarve teaduses ning kaaludes seejuures geeniandmetega seotud andme-
subjekti huve, tekibki teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva geeniandmete töötle-
mise puhul eesmärgimääratluse dilemma. Näiteks on küsitav see, kas geeni-
andmete töötlemise teadusliku eesmärgi määratlusena võib nõusolekus märkida 
“geeniuuringud” üldiselt, nagu seda on Eestis tehtud inimgeeniuuringute sea-
duses300 Geenivaramu puhul. 
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põhjal või muudel õiguslikel alustel. Näiteks juhul, kui isik on andnud nõus-
oleku oma andmete kasutamiseks teatud teadusuuringutes, on viidatud andmeid 
võimalik ilma nõusolekuta kasutada ka muudes teadusuuringutes, millest isikut 
nõusoleku võtmise eelselt ei teavitatud. Samuti on andmeid võimalik kasutada 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil ilma isiku nõusolekuta juhul, kui need on kogutud 
seaduse alusel näiteks isiku ravi eesmärkidel.304 Autor analüüsib üldmääruse ja 
Eesti isikuandmete kaitse seaduse305 pinnalt teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva 
isikuandmete töötlemise puhul seda, kuidas mõjutab ilma nõusolekuta töötlemise 
võimalus töötlemise läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes. Autor jõuab järeldusele, 
et ülalkäsitletud eesmärgimääratluse puhul nõusolekus võib tekkida olukord, 
kus täpsem ja konkreetsem (teadusliku) eesmärgi määratlus andmesubjekti 
poolt antavas nõusolekus võib tegelikult mõjuda töötlemise läbipaistvusele 
pärssivalt, kuivõrd andmesubjektil võib tekkida õigustatud ootus, et tema 
andmeid töödeldakse vaid neil eesmärkidel, millest teda nõusoleku võtmise 
eelselt teavitati. 
Sõltumata sellest, millisel õiguslikul alusel toimub isikuandmete töötlemine 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil, peaks reeglina kohalduma üldmäärusest tulenev 
üldine teavitamiskohustus. 306  Üldise teavitamiskohustuse järgi peab vastutav 
töötleja andmesubjekti tema andmete töötlemisest teavitama. Autor analüüsib 
üldise teavitamiskohustuse rakendumist teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva 
andmetöötluse puhul ning jõuab järeldusele, et geeniuuringute puhul ei pruugi 
üldine teavitamiskohustus tagada andmetöötluse läbipaistvust andmesubjekti 
suhtes eelkõige kahel põhjusel. Esiteks on tõenäoline, et olukorras, kus andmed 
on saadud mujalt kui andmesubjekti enda käest (nt andmebaasist), rakenduvad 
erandid teavitamiskohustusest. Ka olukorras, kus andmed on saadud andme-
subjekti käest, võivad üldmäärusest tulenev võimalikult väheste andmete töötle-
mise printsiip ja artiklist 11(1) tulenev põhimõte päädida sellega, vastutaval 
töötlejal ei ole võimalik andmesubjekte nende andmete teisesest töötlemisest 
teavitada, kuivõrd selleks vajalikke kontaktandmeid ei ole kogutud või need on 
hävitatud. Teiseks, juhul kui ükski erand ei rakendu ning teavitamiskohustuse 
täitmine on võimalik, tekib teavitamiskohustuse puhul sama dilemma nagu 
nõusoleku võtmise eelse teavitamise puhul. Nimelt on ebaselge, kui täpselt tuleb 
määratleda teadusuuringute eesmärke andmesubjekti teavitamisel. Lai ees-
märgimääratlus muudaks teavitamise ühekordseks üldiseks kommunikat-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, lk 21, para 137, supra n 11.  
Eesti õiguse järgi võib patsiendi ja veredoonori verd teadustöös kasutada patsiendi või 
doonori kirjaliku nõusoleku alusel, kuid see nõusolek ei pea vereseaduse § 10 järgi olema 
informeeritud. Supra n 196. 
304  Näiteks Eestis on üheks seaduses sätestatud õiguslikuks aluseks isikuandmete töötle-
miseks tervisehoiuteenuste korraldamise seaduse § 41 lg 1, mille alusel töötlevad tervishoiu-
teenuse osutajad tervishoiuteenuse osutamiseks vajalikke isikuandmeid ilma isiku nõus-
olekuta. Supra n 258. 
305  Supra n 65. 
306  Üldmäärus, art. 12–14, supra n 1. 
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siooniks, mis ei suudaks geeniandmete puhul tagada (tulevikus toimuva) 
andmetöötluse läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes. Kitsam eesmärgimääratlus 
(nt teadusprojektipõhine teavitamine) võib aga praktikas olla keeruline või 
võimatu, kui selleks puudub vajalik infotehnoloogiline infrastruktuur. 
Eelneva põhjal on doktoritöö eesmärk uurida, kas ja kuidas on tagatud geeni-
andmete töötlemise läbipaistvus andmesubjekti suhtes teadusuuringute ees-
märgil toimuva andmetöötluse korral. Selleks analüüsib autor üldmäärusest 
tulenevaid õiguslikke meetmeid läbipaistvuse tagamiseks ning nende tõhusust 
andmesubjekti suhtes läbipaistvuse tagamisel geeniuuringutes. Kuivõrd teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil toimuv geeniandmete töötlemine on ositi jäetud liikmes-
riikide reguleerida, kasutatakse riigisisese õiguse näitena Eesti õigust, et tagada 
analüüsi terviklikkus. 
Varasemalt avaldatud artiklites on autor uurinud teadusuuringute eesmärgil 
toimuva andmetöötluse reegleid üldmääruse raames, selgitamaks kohalduvaid 
nõusolekureegleid ning alternatiivseid õiguslikke aluseid andmetöötluseks 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil. Lisaks on varasemates artiklites uuritud erandeid 
üldisest teavitamiskohustusest, mis võivad rakenduda teadusuuringute ees-
märgil toimuva andmetöötluse ning eriti geeniuuringute puhul. Artiklites läbi-
viidud analüüsi tulemuste põhjal on kokkuvõtvas ülevaateartiklis konspektiiv-
selt käsitletud geeniandmete töötlemise läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse puhul. 
Doktoritöö põhineb autori poolt neljal varem avaldatud ja ühel avaldamisele 
kuuluval õigusteaduslikul artiklil: 
1. Pormeister, Kärt (2017). Informed consent to sensitive personal data pro-
cessing for the performance of digital consumer contracts on the example of 
“23andMe”. Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 6 (1), 17–23. 
Artikkel analüüsib geeniandmete töötlemist lepingulistes suhetes tarbijale 
suunatud geenitesti teenuse osutamise raames. Analüüsist tuleneb muu 
hulgas, et ärilistel eesmärkidel informeeritud nõusoleku põhjal teenuse 
osutamiseks kogutud geeniandmeid on kommertsteenuseid pakkuval ette-
võttel hiljem võimalik kasutada teadusuuringute eesmärgil ilma selleks eraldi 
nõusolekut küsimata.  
2. Pormeister, Kärt (2017). The GDPR and Big Data: Leading the Way for Big 
Genetic Data? In: Schweighofer, E. et al. (Eds.). Privacy Technologies and 
Policy (3–18). Springer. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Artiklis ana-
lüüsitakse, kuidas mõjutab üldmäärusest tulenevaid andmesubjektide õigusi 
ja vastutavate andmetöötlejate kohustusi asjaolu, et geeniuuringute raames 
on sageli tarvis töödelda suure arvu isikute geeni- ja muid isikuandmeid. 
Selgub, et puudutatud andmesubjektide suur arv võib vabastada andme-
töötleja mõningatest kohustustest nagu teavitamiskohustus. Artiklist koorub 
välja järeldus, et üldmääruse artiklite 14(5)(b) ja 11(1) koostoimel võib olla 
negatiivne mõju andmetöötluse läbipaistvusele andmesubjekti suhtes, kui-
võrd andmetöötleja võib vabaneda kohustusest teavitada andmesubjekte nende 
andmete töötlemisest. 
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3. Pormeister, Kärt (2017). Genetic data and the research exemption: is the 
GDPR going too far? International Data Privacy Law, 7 (2), 137–146, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx006. Artiklis analüüsitakse, kas ja kuidas on 
teadusuuringute eesmärkidel toimuv andmetöötlus üldmääruses reguleeritud. 
Üldmääruse teadustööd puudutavaid sätteid võrreldakse varasemalt kehtinud 
direktiiviga Eesti riigisisese õiguse näitel. Võrdluse tulemusel hinnatakse, 
milline on üldmääruse eeldatav mõju teaduseesmärkidel toimuvale isiku-
andmete töötlemisele ning mis ulatuses on vastav küsimus jäetud liikmes-
riikide reguleerida. 
4. Pormeister, Kärt (2018). Genetic research and consent: on the crossroads of 
human and data research. Bioethics, 33(3), 347–356,  
https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12475. Artiklis käsitletakse geeniuuringutes 
rakenduvaid nõusolekureegleid, pidades silmas, et geeniuuringute puhul 
võib, aga ei pruugi, toimuda koeproovide kogumine – st geeniuuringutega 
võib kaasneda füüsiline sekkumine inimesel, kuid uuringud võivad tugineda 
ka olemasolevate koeproovide või geeniandmete teisesele kasutusele. Ana-
lüüsi tulemusel selgub, et koeproovide kasutamisele teadusuuringute ees-
märgil kohalduvad erinevad nõusolekureeglid sõltuvalt sellest, millises 
kontekstis koeproovid on kogutud (st kas teadusuuringute või muudel, eel-
kõige raviga seotud eesmärkidel). Seejuures rakenduvad koeproovidele ja 
neist tuletatud geeniandmetele erinevad reeglid nende kasutamiseks teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil, kuigi koeproovide kasutamise eesmärk on neist 
andmete tuletamine. 
 
Doktoritöö eesmärkide täitmiseks on autor püstitanud viis uurimisküsimust. 
Järgnevalt esitatakse väitekirjas püstitatud uurimisküsimused koos analüüsi 
tulemusel selgunud vastustega. 
 
1. Millised on üldmääruses andmesubjekti suhtes läbipaistvuse tagamiseks 
kehtestatud õiguslikud meetmed, mis kohalduvad geeniuuringutes? 
Autor uurib üldmäärusest tuleneva läbipaistvuse printsiibi ja nõuete olemust 
ning üldmäärusest tulenevaid õiguslikke meetmeid läbipaistvuse tagamiseks. 
Kuivõrd andmetöötluse läbipaistvuse printsiip ei olnud varasemalt kehtinud 
5. Pormeister, Kärt. Regulatory environment for biobanking in Estonia. In: 
Slokenberga, S. et al. (Eds.). Individual rights, public interest and biobank 
research. Article 89 GDPR and European legal responses. Springer 2020 (to 
be published). Artiklis uuritakse biopankadele kohalduvat õiguslikku reeglis-
tikku Eestis. Seejuures analüüsitakse Eesti Geenivaramu suhtes kehtestatud 
erireegleid ning ka üldisi reegleid, mis tulenevad eelkõige andmekaitse-
õigusest. Muu hulgas kaardistatakse ja analüüsitakse kriitiliselt 2019.a jõus-
tunud Eesti isikuandmete kaitse seaduse reegleid andmekasutuseks teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil ilma isiku nõusolekuta. 
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andmekaitse direktiivi 95/46/EÜ307 järgi üks andmetöötluse põhiprintsiipidest 
ning tegemist on üldmääruse raames uue kohustusega,308 ei ole viidatud küsi-
must varasemalt käsitletud. 
Andmekaitse töörühma käsitluse järgi on läbipaistvuse printsiip üldmääruses 
üldine kohustus, mis hõlmab kolme põhilist valdkonda: andmesubjektile vajaliku 
teabe tagamine; vastutavate töötlejate poolt andmesubjektide individuaalsete 
õigustega seotud teabe edastamine; vastutavate töötlejate poolt andmesubjektide 
õiguste maksmapaneku võimaldamine.309 Üldmääruse põhjenduspunktide järgi 
eeldab läbipaistvuse põhimõte eelkõige andmesubjekti teavitamist vähemalt 
asjaolust, et tema andmeid töödeldakse, töötlemise eesmärgist ning vastutava 
töötleja isikust.310 
Autor eristab üldmäärusest tuleneva läbipaistvuse printsiibi puhul erinevaid 
tasandeid. Autori käsitluse järgi tuleb esmasel tasandil mõista läbipaistvust üld-
määruse raames kui andmesubjekti teavitamist vähemalt andmetöötluse faktist, 
eesmärgist ning vastutava töötleja isikust. See on eelduseks täiendavatele 
kohustustele seoses läbipaistvuse nõudega (nt art. 12 tulenevad nõuded seoses 
keelekasutusega teavitamisel või andmekaitse töörühma poolt viidatud indi-
viduaalsete õiguste maksmapaneku võimaldamine). Täiendavaid läbipaistvuse 
printsiibist tulenevaid kohustusi saab autori hinnangul pidada läbipaistvuse 
printsiibi täiendavateks tasanditeks. Seega on autori käsitluses andmesubjekti 
teavitamine läbipaistvuse printsiibi esmane ja peamine tasand, millele saavad 
lisanduda täiendavad tasandid vaid eeldusel, et andmesubjekt on üldse teadlik 
tema andmete töötlemise faktist ja eesmärgist ning vastutava töötleja isikust. 
Seetõttu käsitleb autor primaarse meetmena läbipaistvuse tagamisel üld-
määruse raames artiklites 13 ja 14 sätestatud üldist teavitamiskohustust. 311 
Üldise teavitamiskohustuse rakendumine ei sõltu sellest, millisel õiguslikul alusel 
andmeid töödeldakse. Kuivõrd teadusuuringute eesmärgil võib toimuda andmete 
töötlemine ka informeeritud nõusoleku alusel ning nõusoleku võtmine juba 
eeldab andmesubjekti teavitamist vähemalt vastutava töötleja isikust ja töötlemise 
eesmärkidest, 312  võib teavitamine toimuda nõusoleku võtmise käigus. Seega 
tuleb ka nõusoleku võtmise eelset teavitamist lugeda läbipaistvuse tagamise 
primaarseks meetmeks. 
Üldmääruses võib isikuandmete töötlemise läbipaistvuse tagamise meetmena 
käsitelda ka üldmääruse artiklis 5(1)(b) kehtestatud eesmärgi piirangut. Artiklis 
5(1)(b) kehtestatud eesmärgi piirangu kohaselt võib üldreeglina isikuandmeid 
                                                                                                 
307  Supra n 38. 
308  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, lk 4, para 1.  
309  Ibid. 
310  Üldmäärus, põhjenduspunktid 39 ja 60, supra n 1. 
311  Sekundaarseteks meetmeteks tuleb autori hinnangul pidada meetmeid, mis rakenduvad 
autori poolt eristatud läbipaistvuse täiendavate tasandite puhul (nt selge keelekasutusega 
seotud nõuded). 
312  Üldmäärus, art. 4(11) ja põhjenduspunkt 42, supra n 1. 
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töödelda vaid neil eesmärkidel, millisel neid koguti. Isikuandmete piiratud 
töötlemisõigus ehk õigus töödelda isikuandmeid vaid eesmärkidel, millisel neid 
koguti, tagab andmete töötlemise eesmärkide läbipaistvuse. Samas kehtestab 
viidatud säte erandi eesmärgi piirangust muu hulgas juhul, kui töötlemine 
toimub teadusuuringute eesmärgil. See tähendab, et eesmärgi piirang kui läbi-
paistvuse tagamise meede ei rakendu, kui isikuandmete töötlemine toimub 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil. 
Kokkuvõttes jõuab autor järeldusele, et geeniuuringutes andmesubjekti suhtes 
läbipaistvuse tagamise meetmetena üldmääruses saab käsitelda eelkõige andme-
subjekti teavitamist andmetöötluse faktist, eesmärkidest ja vastutava töötleja 
isikust. Andmesubjekti teavitamine võib toimuda osana informeeritud nõus-
oleku võtmise protsessist, kui andmetöötluse õiguslikuks aluseks on nõusolek, 
või üldise teavitamiskohustuse raames, sõltumata andmetöötluse õiguslikust 
alusest. 
 
2. Kas ja kuidas tagab informeeritud nõusolek läbipaistvuse põhimõtte 
järgimise andmesubjekti suhtes geeniuuringutes ning mis on informeeritud 
nõusoleku piirid läbipaistvuse tagamise meetmena? 
Autori analüüs geeniuuringutes rakenduvate nõusolekureeglite ja ilma nõus-
olekuta töötlemise võimalustest teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andme-
töötluse puhul kujutab endast esmakordset sellelaadset terviklikku käsitlust üld-
määruse raames ja ühe liikmesriigi riigisisese õiguse näitel, hõlmates seejuures 
ka koeproovidele kohalduvat õiguslikku režiimi ning ravimite kliiniliste uurin-
gute erijuhtumit.  
Doktoritöös defineeritakse geeniuuringud kui uuringud, mille raames töödel-
dakse geeniandmeid. Geeniandmete mõistet käsitletakse seejuures kitsamalt, 
kui üldmääruses. Kui üldmääruse järgi võib geeniandmeteks lugeda ka üksikuid 
fakte, mis avaldavad teavet isiku geneetiliste omaduste kohta,313 siis käesoleva 
väitekirja mõttes tähendavad geeniandmed inimese DNA sekveneerimise and-
meid. Seeläbi loetakse geeniuuringuteks uuringud, milles analüüsitakse muu 
hulgas inimese DNA sekveneerimise andmeid. Autor eristab doktoritöös eri-
tüüpi geeniuuringuid nõusoleku nõude perspektiivist: (1) uuringud, mille raames 
toimub füüsiline sekkumine isikult koeproovi saamiseks ja sellest geeniandmete 
tuletamiseks; (2) uuringud, mis põhinevad koeproovide ja/või geeniandmete 
teisesel kasutamisel. Omaette kategooriana eristatakse väitekirjas veel ravimi 
kliinilise uuringu raames toimuvaid geeniuuringuid, kuivõrd sellisel juhul 
kohaldub andmetöötluse reeglite osas lisaks üldmäärusele ka ravimi kliiniliste 
uuringute määrus314 (määrus 536/2014).315 
Uuringud, milles toimub füüsiline sekkumine koeproovi võtmiseks, on inim-
uuringud Oviedo konventsiooni mõttes ning eeldavad uuritava informeeritud 
                                                                                                 
313  Üldmäärus, art. 4(13), ibid. 
314  Supra n 56. 
315  Üldmäärus, põhjenduspunkt 161, supra n 1. 
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nõusolekut.316 Selle nõusoleku eesmärk on eelkõige teavitada uuritavat uurin-
guga kaasnevatest sekkumistest ning riskidest (nt geeniuuringute puhul vere- 
või süljeproovi võtmine). Kui koeproov võetakse muul kui teadusuuringute ees-
märgil (nt ravi käigus), kuid seda soovitakse hiljem teadusuuringute eesmärgil 
kasutada, ei ole enam tegemist inimuuringuga Oviedo konventsiooni mõttes 
ning viidatud konventsioonist tulenev nõusoleku nõue ei rakendu, 317  kuigi 
nõusolek võib siiski olla nõutav riigisisese õiguse kohaselt.318 
Nõusolekut inimuuringus osalemiseks tuleb eristada infomeeritud nõus-
olekust üldmääruse mõttes. Viimase informatiivne sisu puudutab isikuandmete 
töötlemisega seotud küsimusi (sh töötleja(te) isik(ud), töötlemise eesmärk, 
andmete säilitamise viis ja aeg jne). Inimuuringu puhul rakenduvad kaks 
viidatud nõusolekut paralleelselt.319 
Nõusoleku puhul geeniandmete töötlemiseks teadusuuringute eesmärgil on 
praktikas oluline küsimus sellest, kui laialt võib nõusolekus töötlemise ees-
märke määratleda. See, kuidas geeniandmete töötlemise eesmärgid nõusolekus 
määratletakse, määrab töötlemise läbipaistvuse andmesubjekti suhtes (st kas 
nõusoleku andmisel saadud informatsiooni põhjal on isikul võimalik ette näha 
ja olla teadlik sellest, mis eesmärkidel tema geeniandmeid võidakse (tulevikus) 
töödelda). Üldmääruse artiklist 9(2)(a) tulenevad üldreeglid eeldavad nõus-
olekus konkreetsete eesmärkide määratlemist, mis teadusuuringute eesmärgil 
toimuva töötlemise puhul tähendaks kindlate teadusprojektide nimetamist nõus-
olekus. Samas viidatakse üldmääruse põhjenduspunktis 33 vajadusele võimal-
dada teaduses laiemat nõusolekut, määratledes töötlemise eesmärgid uuringu-
valdkondade kaupa. Andmekaitse töörühm on erinevalt Euroopa Liidu Kohtu 
praktikast Euroopa Liidu õigusaktide põhjenduspunktide kohta 320  käsitlenud 
üldmääruse põhjenduspunktis 33 väljendatud põhimõtteid justkui otsekohal-
duvat erandit.321 Töörühma seisukohad põhjenduspunkti 33 praktilise tähenduse 
osas on mõneti vastuolulised, kuivõrd töörühma sõnul võib teadusuuringute ees-
märgil andmeid töödeldes töötlemise eesmärke nõusolekus väljendada üldsõna-
lisemalt kui tavapäraselt nõutud, kuid eriliiki andmete (sh geeniandmete) puhul 
                                                                                                 
316  Vt Oviedo konventsioon, artiklid 16(v) ja 5, supra n 9. 
317  See järeldub Oviedo konventsiooni artiklite 5 ja 16 kommentaaridest. Explanatory 
Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine. Supra n 11.  
318  Näiteks Eestis eeldab vereseaduse § 10 patsiendi ja veredoonori kirjalikku nõusolekut, et 
vastavalt ravi eesmärgil võetud või annetatud verd hiljem teaduslikel (patsiendi puhul ka 
kaubanduslikel) eesmärkidel kasutada. Supra n 196 ja 303. 
319  See ei tähenda ilmtingimata kahte eraldi nõusoleku vormi, vaid nõusoleku vastavust 
mõlemast õigusvaldkonnast tulenevatele nõuetele nii vormi kui sisu poolest. Vt supra n 149 
ja 297. 
320  Nilsson and Others, supra n 136. 
321  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, supra n 80, 
lk 27–29. 
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tuleks töörühma arvates viidatud erandit siiski rangemalt sisustada.322 Autor ei 
nõustu andmekaitse töörühma seisukohaga justkui kohalduksid üldmääruse 
põhjenduspunkti 33 printsiibid vahetult ilma, et need oleksid kehtestatud 
liikmesriigi riigisiseses või mujal EL õiguses. Autori hinnangul tuleb üld-
määruse põhjenduspunktis 33 väljendatut käsitelda kui piire, mis on seatud üld-
määruse artiklis 9(2)(j) liikmesriikidele ja EL seadusandjatele antud diskret-
sioonile eriliiki andmete teadusuuringute eesmärgil kasutamise reguleerimiseks. 
Andmekaitse töörühm on ainsa praktilise näitena välistanud töötlemise ees-
märgi määratlemise üldsõnaliselt kui töötlemise “teadusuuringute eesmärgil”, 
kuivõrd see ei väljenda töörühma hinnangul piisavalt täpselt töötlemise ees-
märke. 323  Vaieldavaks jääb, kas geeniuuringud liigituks iseenesest eraldi-
seisvaks uuringuvaldkonnaks (st kas üldmäärusega oleks kooskõlas sedastada 
andmesubjektile andmetöötluse eesmärgina “geeniuuringud” ilma täpsustuseta, 
nii nagu seda on tehtud Geenivaramu puhul inimgeeniuuringute seaduse324 § 12 
lg 1 alusel). 
Samas ei ole nõusolek ainus õiguslik alus geeniandmete töötlemiseks teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil. Sõltumata sellest, millisel alusel geeniandmeid koguti ja 
talletati, võib neid sõltuvalt liikmesriigi õigusest olla hiljem võimalik teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil kasutada ka ilma isiku nõusolekuta. Eestis loob selleks 
õigusliku aluse isikuandmete kaitse seaduse325 § 6. 
Autor jõuab järeldusele, et informeeritud nõusoleku tõhusus läbipaistvuse 
tagamisel andmesubjekti suhtes geeniuuringutes on piiratud eelkõige kahel 
põhjusel. Esiteks on ebaselge, kui täpselt peavad nõusolekus olema määratletud 
töötlemise eesmärgid, kui geeniandmete töötlemine toimub teadusuuringute 
eesmärgil. Teiseks, sõltumata nõusolekus määratletud töötlemiseesmärkide täp-
susest on andmeid võimalik kasutada ka (muude) teadusuuringute eesmärkidel. 
 
3. Kuidas mõjutab informeeritud nõusoleku ja geeniandmete teaduses 
kasutamiseks alternatiivsete õiguslike aluste suhe geeniuuringute läbi-
paistvust andmesubjekti suhtes? 
Autor analüüsib Eesti õiguse näitel informeeritud nõusoleku ja alternatiivsete 
õiguslike aluste vahelise suhte mõju isikuandmete töötlemise läbipaistvusele 
andmesubjekti suhtes. Eesti riigisisese õiguse näitel jõuab autor järeldusele, et 
Eesti kontekstis ei oma eesmärkide määratluse täpsus informeeritud nõusolekus 
praktilist tähendust. Sõltumata sellest, milline on informeeritud nõusolekus 
määratletud töötlemise eesmärk, on andmeid võimalik kasutada (muude) teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil. Reeglina kehtib üldmääruse järgi isikuandmete töötlemisel 
eesmärgi piirang, mille järgi võib andmeid töödelda vaid neil eesmärkidel, 
                                                                                                 
322  Ibid. 
323  Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, supra 
n 8, lk 9. 
324  Supra n 193. 
325  Supra n 65. 
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millistel need koguti. Samas teeb üldmäärus erandi eesmärgi piirangust muu 
hulgas olukorras, kus andmeid soovitakse kasutada teadusuuringute eesmärgil.326 
Edasine töötlemine eeldab siiski õiguslikku alust töötlemiseks. Eesti isiku-
andmete kaitse seadus loob aluse isikuandmete töötlemiseks teadusuuringute 
eesmärgil ilma isiku nõusolekuta. See tähendab, et näiteks kui andmed on 
kogutud nõusoleku alusel konkreetse teadusprojekti tarbeks, saab neid hiljem 
kasutada teistsuguste teadusuuringute eesmärgil ilma isiku nõusolekuta. 
Eeltoodu põhjal järeldab autor Eesti näitel, et kontekstis, milles on võimalik 
andmete hilisem kasutamine ilma isiku nõusolekuta muudel kui nõusolekus 
määratletud eesmärkidel, mõjub nõusoleku võtmise eelselt antud teave töötle-
mise eesmärkide kohta eksitavalt ja töötlemise läbipaistvust pärssivalt. See-
juures tagaks laiem eesmärkide määratlus nõusolekus läbipaistvust andme-
subjekti suhtes suuremal määral kui kitsas eesmärgimääratlus, kui viimane ei 
piira andmete töötlemist (muude) teadusuuringute eesmärkidel. 
 
4. Millisel määral kohaldub isikuandmete töötlemisel teadusuuringute ees-
märgil üldine teavitamiskohustus ning kuidas see mõjutab geeniuuringute 
läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes? 
Autor analüüsib üldmäärusest tulenevat üldist teavitamiskohustust eesmärgiga 
uurida selle rakendumist geeniandmete töötlemisel teadusuuringute eesmärgil 
ning selle mõju läbipaistvuse tagamisele andmesubjekti suhtes. Varasemalt pole 
viidatud kohustust üldmääruse raames ning teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva 
andmetöötluse osas süvitsi analüüsitud. 
Üldmäärus kehtestab artiklites 13 ja 14 vastutavale töötlejale üldise teavitamis-
kohustuse, mis ei sõltu sellest, millisel õiguslikul alusel andmeid töödeldakse. 
Artikkel 13 reguleerib olukordi, kus andmed saadakse otse andmesubjektilt, 
ning artikkel 14 stsenaariumeid, milles andmed saadakse mujalt allikast (nt teise 
vastutava töötleja või teise andmesubjekti käest). Viidatud sätted on valdavas 
osas analoogsed, kuid erinevalt artiklist 13 kehtestab artikkel 14 rea erandeid, 
mil teavitamiskohustus ei kohaldu. 
Olukorras, kus vastutav töötleja on saanud andmed otse andmesubjektilt, on 
ainus erand teavitamiskohustusele sätestatud artiklis 13(4), mille järgi ei kohaldu 
viidatud kohustus juhul ja sel määral, mil andmesubjektil on teave juba olemas. 
Sama põhimõtte kehtestab artikkel 14. Samas tuleb ka artikli 13 puhul silmas 
pidada üldmääruse artiklist 5(1)(c) tulenevalt võimalikult väheste andmete 
töötlemise printsiipi ja artiklis 11(1) kehtestatud põhimõtet, mille kohaselt ei ole 
vastutav töötleja kohustatud säilitama, koguma ega töötlema lisateavet üld-
määrusest tulenevate kohustuste täitmiseks olukorras, kus vastutaval töötlejal 
pole (enam) tarvis andmesubjekti tuvastada. Ehk kui vastutaval töölejal ei ole 
(enam) teadusuuringu eesmärkide täitmiseks vaja andmesubjekte tuvastada, ei 
ole vastutaval töötlejal kohustust koguda ega säilitada andmeid, mis võimal-
daksid andmesubjektidega kontakteeruda, kui selliste andmete kogumise või 
                                                                                                 
326  Üldmäärus, art. 5(1)(b), supra n 1. 
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säilitamise ainus eesmärk oleks üldmäärusest tuleneva teavitamiskohustuse 
täitmine. Sel juhul ei ole vastutaval töötlejal võimalik teavitamiskohustust täita, 
sõltumata vastava erandi puudumisest üldmääruse artiklis 13. Kuigi andmete 
saamisel andmesubjektilt on vastutaval töötlejal kohustus ja võimalus teavitada 
andmesubjekti töötlemise eesmärkidest, ei pruugi kontaktandmete puudumise 
tõttu olla võimalik hilisem teavitamine andmete teisesest töötlemisest ja selle 
eesmärkidest artikli 13(3) mõttes. 
Üldmääruse artiklis 14 kehtestatud nimekiri eranditest, mil teavitamis-
kohustus ei kohaldu, hõlmab kahte erandit, mis on mõeldud muu hulgas teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse jaoks. Nimelt ei kohaldu teavitamis-
kohustus, kui andmeid töödeldakse teadusuuringute eesmärgil ning teavitamine 
on võimatu või eeldaks ebaproportsionaalseid jõupingutusi. Arvestades, et 
andmekaitses kehtib võimalikult väheste andmete töötlemise põhimõte327 ning 
tuginedes üldmääruse artiklis 11(1) sedastatule, järeldab autor, et geeniuuringute 
puhul on tõenäoline, et üks kahest erandist teavitamiskohustusele rakendub. 
Olukorras, kus teadusuuringu läbiviimiseks ei ole vaja andmesubjektide kontakt-
andmeid,328 ei tohiks vastavalt võimalikult väheste andmete töötlemise põhi-
mõttele selliseid andmeid koguda ega säilitada. Nagu ülal selgitatud, tuleneb 
üldmääruse artiklist 11(1) lisaks, et kui vastutav töötleja ei saa andmesubjekti 
(enam) tuvastada (nt kodeeritud andmete kasutamisel, kui koodivõti pole 
nimetatud vastutava töötleja valduses), ei pea vastutav töötleja täiendavaid 
andmeid koguma või säilitama vaid selleks, et üldmäärusest tulenevaid kohustusi 
täita. See tähendab, et uuritavate kontaktandmeid ei tuleks koguda ega säilitada 
vaid selleks, et täita teavitamiskohustust. Ilma kontaktandmeteta pole teavitamis-
kohustuse täitmine võimalik. Eeltoodust järeldab autor, et juhul, kui teadus-
uuringute eesmärgi täitmiseks pole andmesubjekti kontaktandmeid (enam) vaja, 
ei tohiks selliseid andmeid koguda ega säilitada, mistõttu peaks kirjeldatud 
olukorras rakenduma artiklis 14(5)(b) kehtestatud erand teavitamiskohustele 
teavitamise võimatuse tõttu. 
Olukorras, kus uurijal on uuritavate kontaktandmed olemas, võib siiski 
rakenduda ebaproportsionaalse jõupingutuse erand. Viimase rakendamisel tuleb 
muu hulgas võtta arvesse andmesubjektide arvu, andmete vanust ja asjakohaseid 
kaitsemeetmeid. Andmesubjektide arv võib geeniuuringutes olla üsna suur,329 
kuna korraga võidakse analüüsida kümnete või isegi sadade tuhandete andme-
subjektide geeniandmeid, mistõttu võib individuaalne teavitamine eeldada jõu-
pingutusi, mida võib pidada ebaproportsionaalseks. Samas andmete vanus geeni-
andmete puhul erandi rakendamist põhjendada ei tohiks, kuivõrd geeniandmed 
                                                                                                 
327  Üldmäärus, art. 5(1)(c), supra n 1. 
328  See võib olla vajalik teatud olukordades, mille raames soovitakse uuritavatega ühenduses 
püsida või uuesti kontakti saada andmestiku täiendamiseks või uuendamiseks, näiteks 
haruldasi haigusi puudutavate uuringute puhul. Vt nt M.G. Hansson et al. The risk of re-
identification versus the need to identify individuals in rare disease research, supra n 215. 
329  Vt nt C. Wijmenga and A. Zhernakova. The importance of cohort studies in the post-
GWAS era, supra n 222. 
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on konstantsed ning nende informatiivne väärtus on sõltuv tehnoloogia arengust 
ning seega ajas kasvav. Kolmas kriteerium (asjakohased kaitsemeetmed) on 
umbmäärane ning selle põhjal pole võimalik anda hinnangut ilma konkreetseid 
asjaolusid kaalumata. 
Andmekaitse töörühm on selgitanud, et üldmääruse artiklis 14(5)(b) toodud 
eranditele ei saa rutiinselt tugineda vastutavad töötlejad, kes ei kasuta andmeid 
teaduslikel või statistilistel eesmärkidel.330  Sellest teeb autor ümberpööratult 
järelduse, et vastutavad töötlejad, kes kasutavad isikuandmeid teadusuuringute 
eesmärgil, saavad viidatud erandeid rutiinselt rakendada. 
Eeltoodu pinnalt hindab autor tõenäoliseks, et geeniuuringute puhul on 
võimalik teavitamiskohustusest vabaneda üldmääruse artiklis 14(5)(b) kehtes-
tatud erandite alusel. See tähendab, et kui andmed saadakse mujalt kui andme-
subjektilt endal (st eelkõige teise vastutava töötleja käest, nt andmebaasist), on 
andmed saanud kolmandast isikust vastutaval töötlejal võimalik rakendada 
erandit teavitamiskohustusest ning andmesubjekte ei pea teavitama nende 
andmete töötlemisest. Juhul, kui andmed on saadud andmesubjektilt, võivad 
võimalikult väheste andmete töötlemise põhimõte ja üldmääruse artikli 11(1) 
rakendumine päädida sellega, et vastutaval töötlejal ei ole võimalik andme-
subjekte teavitada teisesest töötlemisest, kuna ta pole teavitamiseks vajalikke 
kontaktandmeid kogunud või säilitanud.  
Isegi juhul, kui teavitamiskohustus rakendub, ei taga see geeniuuringute 
läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes. Autori hinnangul esinevad üldmäärusest 
tuleneva teavitamiskohustuse ülesehituses disainivead, mis piiravad selle tõhu-
sust läbipaistvuse tagamisel teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse 
puhul. Esimene probleem on analoogne informeeritud nõusoleku puhul käsit-
letuga. Töötlemise eesmärkidest teavitamisel on teadusuuringute eesmärgil toi-
muva andmetöötluse puhul määravaks küsimus, kui täpselt tuleb eesmärgid 
määratleda. Erinevalt nõusolekust ja üldmääruse põhjenduspunktis 33 sedas-
tatust ei ole üldise teavitamiskohustuse puhul üldmääruses selle küsimuse kohta 
ühtegi juhist ega indikaatorit (st puudub vastus küsimusele, kas teavitama peaks 
andmesubjektile tema andmete kasutamist näiteks teadusprojektipõhiselt või 
uuringuvaldkondade kaupa). Sellest, kui täpselt tuleb andmesubjektile sedas-
tatavaid töötlemise eesmärke määratleda, sõltub hinnang sellele, millal võib 
teavitamiskohustuse täidetuks lugeda. Iseenesest kohustavad nii üldmääruse 
artikkel 13(3) kui 14(4) vastutavat töötlejat teavitama andmesubjekti ka kavat-
setava teisese töötlemise eesmärkidest – st kui andmeid soovitakse kasutada 
muul eesmärgil kui neid koguti, tuleb andmesubjekti sellisest töötlemisest 
teavitada. Eesmärkide määratluse täpsus või konkreetsus on aga praktikas 
määravaks küsimuseks nii esmase kui teisese töötlemise puhul. Näiteks kui 
töötlemise eesmärke võib määratleda uuringuvaldkondade kaupa, siis võiks 
haigla, kes töötleb patsientide andmeid raviteenuse osutamise eesmärgil, täita 
teavitamiskohustuse raviandmete hilisemaks kasutamiseks teadusuuringute 
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eesmärgil seeläbi, et loetleb andmesubjektile teisese töötlemise kohta teavet 
andes kõikvõimalikud meditsiinieriala uuringuvaldkonnad. Geeniuuringute puhul 
tõusetub jällegi küsimus, kas üldmäärusega oleks kooskõlas määratleda töötle-
mise eesmärgiks üldsõnaliselt “geeniuuringud” (nii nagu seda on näiteks Eestis 
tehtud inimgeeniuuringute seaduse331 § 12 alusel Geenivaramu puhul).  
Eeltooduga vahetult seotud teine probleem teavitamiskohustuse puhul on 
teavitamise ühekordne olemus. Juhul, kui teavitamisel võib töötlemise eesmärke 
määratleda laialt nagu eeltoodud haigla näite puhul, siis piirdub teavitamine 
ühekordse suhtlusega vastutava töötleja ja andmesubjekti vahel. Ühekordse 
kommunikatsiooni vahendusel laialt määratletud töötlemiseesmärkide sedas-
tamine ei saa tagada töötlemise läbipaistvust andmesubjekti suhtes. Pidades 
silmas, et andmekaitse töörühm ei ole pidanud üldmäärusega kooskõlas olevaks 
töötlemise eesmärgi määratlemist kui andmete kasutamist “teadusuuringute 
eesmärgil”332 , kuna see ei väljenda piisavalt selgelt, millise teadustööga on 
tegemist, siis ei tohiks pädeda ka ülaltoodud haigla näites kirjeldatud toimimis-
viis. 
Kokkuvõtvalt järeldab autor, et geeniuuringute puhul on tõenäoline, et on 
võimalik rakendada erandit, mis vabastaks vastutava töötleja teavitamiskohus-
tusest juhul, kui geeniandmed on saadud mujalt allikast kui andmesubjektilt 
endalt. Olukorras, kus andmed on saadud andmesubjektilt, võivad võimalikult 
väheste andmete töötlemise põhimõtte ja artikli 11(1) rakendumine päädida 
sellega, et andmesubjekti pole hiljem võimalik teavitada teisesest töötlemisest ja 
selle eesmärkidest. Juhul, kui teavitamiskohustus rakendub ja seda on võimalik 
täita, on teavitamise puhul keskseks küsimuseks, kui laialt võib või kui kitsalt 
tuleb määratleda teadusuuringute eesmärke. Laiem eesmärgimääratlus muudab 
teavitamiskohustuse ühekordseks formaalsuseks, mis väljendub vaid eelnevas 
teavitamises (nagu nõusoleku võtmisele eelneva teavitamise puhul). Eelnev 
teavitamine seevastu ei saa tagada andmetöötluse läbipaistvust andmesubjekti 
suhtes geeniuuringutes, kuivõrd geeniandmete võimalikku (tulevast) otstarvet 
(teaduses) ei ole võimalik kindlal ajahetkel üheselt määratleda. Seetõttu on 
ainus viis andmetöötluse läbipaistvuse tagamiseks andmesubjekti suhtes geeni-
uuringutes andmesubjekti jooksev teavitamine. 
 
5. Kas ja milliseid normatiivseid muudatusi on vaja kehtestada, et tagada 
geeniuuringute läbipaistvus andmesubjekti suhtes? 
Doktoritöös analüüsitud ja tuvastatud probleemistiku lahendamiseks teeb 
autor kolm normatiivset ettepanekut. Autori hinnangul tuleks muudatusette-
panekud kehtestada üldmääruses. Üldmääruses ei ole isikuandmete kasutust 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil eraldi reguleeritud, kuigi seda püüti määruse loomi-
sel teha. Samas tulenevad üldmäärusest mitmed põhimõtted, mis isikuandmete 
töötlemist teadusuuringute eesmärgil oluliselt mõjutavad. Üldmääruses on 
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püütud piirata teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse puhul kasu-
tatava nõusoleku ulatust (st põhjenduspunktis 33 sedastatud piiride näol). Sama-
aegselt on kindlal eesmärgil antud nõusoleku alusel saadud andmeid hiljem 
võimalik (muude) teadusuuringute eesmärgil kasutada – eeldusel, et selleks 
esineb õiguslik alus nagu Eesti riigisisese õiguse puhul isikuandmete kaitse 
seaduse § 6. Asjaolud, et teadusuuringute eesmärgil andmete töötlemisel ei 
kehti eesmärgi piirang ning andmeid on võimalik töödelda ilma isiku nõus-
olekuta, muudab andmetöötluse andmesubjekti jaoks läbipaistmatuks. Seda 
enam, et teadusuuringute eesmärgil andmeid töödelda võivate isikute ring pole 
piiratud, vaid määravaks on, et tegemist oleks valdkonnale vastavale metoodi-
kale ja eetilistele standarditele vastava teadusprojektiga.333 
Kuigi üldmääruse raames peaks sõltumata andmetöötluse õiguslikust alusest 
kohalduma üldine teavitamiskohustus, selgus väitekirjas esitatud analüüsi tule-
musel, et teadusuuringute eesmärgil isikuandmete töötlemisel ei pruugi teavita-
miskohustus praktikas tagada andmetöötluse läbipaistvust kahel põhjusel. Esiteks 
on tõenäoline, et juhul, kui andmed on saadud mujalt allikast kui andme-
subjektilt, on võimalik rakendada erandeid teavitamiskohustusest. Ka olukorras, 
kus andmed on saadud andmesubjektilt, võib osutuda võimatuks andmesubjekti 
hilisem teavitamine teisesest töötlemisest. Teiseks, isegi juhul, kui erandeid 
pole võimalik rakendada ning teavitamiskohustust on võimalik täita, ei eelda 
teavitamiskohustuse täitmine praegusel kujul jooksvat teavitamist, vaid võib 
piirduda ühekordse üldise teavitusega. 
Tagamaks isikuandmete töötlemise läbipaistvuse andmesubjekti suhtes geeni-
uuringutes, tehakse doktoritöös kolm normatiivset ettepanekut: 
1) Geeniandmete mõiste ümber mõtestamine üldmääruses. Üldmääruse järgi 
käsitletakse DNA sekveneerimisandmeid ‘geeniandmetena’ eeldusel, et tege-
mist on isikuandmetega. See tähendab, et üldmäärus kohaldub DNA sekve-
neerimisandmetele vaid juhul, kui need võimaldavad otseselt või kaudselt 
isikut tuvastamist. Kuivõrd praeguse tehnoloogia taseme juures ei ole ainu-
üksi DNA sekveneerimisandmete põhjal isiku tuvastamine ilma täiendava 
informatsioonita (nt võrdlus- või lisaandmed) võimalik, ei pruugi üldmäärus 
viidatud andmetele kohalduda olukorras, kus neid töödeldakse ilma täien-
davate andmeteta. DNA sekvneerimisandmete potentsiaal isiku tuvasta-
miseks sõltub lisaks täiendavatele andmetele ka tehnoloogilistest võima-
lustest. Nii täiendavate andmete kui uute tehnoloogiliste võimaluste kätte-
saadavus sõltub kontekstist ja on ajas muutuv, samas kui inimese DNA on 
konstantne. Seetõttu ei ole võimalik tagada andmetöötluse läbipaistvust 
andmesubjekti suhtes geeniuuringutes ilma, et läbipaistvuse meetmed 
rakenduks ka olukorras, kus töödeldakse DNA sekveneerimisandmeid ilma 
täiendavate andmeteta või identifikaatoriteta.  
Lisaks aitab geeniandmete mõiste ülaltoodud viisil ümbermõtestamine 
ühtlustada geeniandmetele ja koeproovidele kohalduvat õiguslikku režiimi. 
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Kui DNA sekveneerimisandmed loetaks geeniandmeteks üldmääruse mõttes 
sõltumata täiendavatest andmetest, kohalduks andmekaitseõigus alates 
hetkest, mil koeproovidest DNA andmeid sekvneeritakse (st isegi kui tege-
mist on nö anonüümse koeprooviga). 
2) Teadusuuringute eesmärgil kasutatava andmetöötluse informeeritud nõus-
oleku ulatuse reguleerimine üldmääruses. Autor on väitekirjas jõudnud 
seisukohale, et kehtivas õiguses on informeeritud nõusoleku lubatud ulatus 
teaduses liikmesriikide (või muu EL) õiguse reguleerida. Andmekaitse töö-
rühma seisukohtade järgi kehtestaks üldmääruse põhjenduspunkt 33 justkui 
otsekohalduva erandi üldistest nõusoleku reeglitest. Sõltumata eeltoodud 
vaidlusküsimusest jääb selgutsetuks, kui täpselt peavad teadusuuringute ees-
märgil toimuva isikuandmete töötlemise puhul olema töötlemise eesmärgid 
nõusolekus määratletud. Andmekaitse töörühm on välistanud “teadusuurin-
gute eesmärgi” kui üldsõnalise määratluse, kuid pole seejuures selgitanud, 
kui lai määratlus oleks aktsepteeritav ja kooskõlas üldmäärusega.  
Pidades silmas teadusuuringute eesmärgil isikuandmete töötlemisel  
EL-sisest kohalduva õiguse dilemmat334 ning samas suunda ühtse teadus-
ruumi poole, on autor seisukohal, et informeeritud nõusoleku ulatuse küsimus 
teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse puhul tuleks lahendada 
üldmääruses. Kuigi üldmääruse vastuvõtmise käigus tehtud ettepanekud 
meditsiiniuuringute reguleerimiseks nurjusid, on põhjenduspunktis 33 esitatu 
kompromiss luhtunud ettepanekute ja küsimuse reguleerimata jätmise vahel. 
Küll peaks põhjenduspunkti 33 sisu olema osa üldmääruse õiguslikult sidu-
vatest sätetest mitte põhjenduspunktidest. Igal juhul on vaja Euroopa Andme-
kaitsenõukogu juhiseid selle kohta, kuidas praktikas sisustada põhjendus-
punktis 33 määratletud teaduses kasutatava nõusoleku ulatust ning seda eriti 
geeniuuringute puhul. 
Lisaks nõusoleku ulatuse reguleerimisele tuleks selge kohustusena sätes-
tada andmesubjekti teavitamine asjaolust, et nõusoleku andmine andmete 
töötlemiseks kindlal (teaduslikul) eesmärgil ei välista hiljem samade andmete 
kasutamist (muude) teadusuuringute eesmärgil. Andmesubjektile peab olema 
selge, et kui ta annab nõusoleku oma andmete töötlemiseks ükskõik millisel 
eesmärgil, võib neid andmeid olla võimalik määramata aja jooksul kasutada 
piiramata hulgal teaduslikel eesmärkidel. 
3) Üldmääruses teavitamiskohustuse ümberkujundamine geeniuuringute osas ja 
andmete jagamisel tsentraalse lähenemisega andmetöötluse läbipaistvuse 
tagamine andmesubjekti suhtes. Teavitamiskohustuse kui läbipaistvuse taga-
mise meetme tõhusus sõltub olulisel määral sellest, kui täpselt tuleb teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil toimuva isikuandmete töötlemise puhul määratleda 
töötlemiseesmärke. Mida laiemalt on eesmärgid määratletud, seda tõenäolise-
malt piirdub teavitamiskohustuse täitmine ühekordse kommunikatsiooniga. 
Küsimus töötlemiseesmärkide määratlemise ulatusest teavitamiskohustuse 
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täitmisel teadusuuringute eesmärgil toimuva andmetöötluse puhul tuleb üld-
määruses lahendada. Autori hinnangul tuleks geeniuuringute korral töötle-
miseesmärkidest teavitada projektipõhiselt, kuivõrd laiem määratlus muudab 
(tulevase) andmetöötluse andmesubjekti suhtes läbipaistmatuks. 
Selleks, et andmesubjektide projektipõhine teavitamine oleks praktikas 
võimalik, tuleb andmete jagamisel ja teavitamisel luua tsentraalne süsteem. 
See tähendab, et andmesubjektilt andmeid kogunud vastutav töötleja (st 
esmane vastutav töötleja) oleks kohustatud teavitama andmesubjekte nende 
andmete töötlemisest ka ulatuses, mis puudutab teadusuuringute eesmärgil 
töötlemist kolmandast isikust vastutava töötleja poolt, kes on andmed saanud 
esmaselt vastutavalt töötlejalt. Kolmandast isikust vastutava töötleja õigused 
geeniandmete edasiseks jagamiseks teaduskoostöö eesmärkidel peaksid 
olema piiratud. Kolmandast isikust vastutav töötleja peaks esmast töötlejat 
teavitama kõigist töötlemiseesmärkidest. 
Samas ei tohiks kirjeldatud ettepanek välistada alternatiivseid lähenemisi 
tsentraalsele andmejagamisele ja -teavitamisele. Näiteks Eesti Tervise 
Infosüsteemi (TIS) puhul on esmaseks töötlejaks tervishoiuteenuse osutajad, 
keda seadus kohustab patsientide andmeid TIS-i edastama. Samas väljastab 
TIS omakorda andmeid teadusuuringute eesmärgil kasutamiseks. Sellises 
stsenaariumis oleks ebamõistlik eeldada, et tervishoiuteenuse osutajad peaksid 
teavitama andmesubjekti andmetöötlusest, mis toimub pärast nende edastamist 
TIS-i (sh andmete edasine väljastamine TIS-st teadusuuringute eesmärgil). 
Sellistel juhtudel peaks teavitamiskohustus jagunema siiski selliselt, et TIS 
andmeväljastuste kohta teadusuuringute eesmärgil teavitab andmesubjekte 
TIS vastutav või volitatud töötleja. 
Kirjeldatud tsentraliseeritud lähenemise puhul poleks ka põhjendatud 
erandite kehtestamine teavitamiskohustusest olukorras, kus andmeid teadus-
uuringute eesmärgil töödelda sooviv vastutav töötleja on andmed saanud 
mujalt kui andmesubjektilt endalt. Kui andmesubjekte pole võimalik teavitada 
nende geeniandmete töötlemisest (teadusuuringute eesmärgil), peaks töötle-
mine olema välistatud. 
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